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Abstract 
Human beings live in a world full of social connections. Favoring by the evolution, humans could 
survive the challenges of nature by not only maximizing their own interests (i.e., selfish motives) 
but also by considering the well fare of others even at a cost to their own resources (i.e., altruistic 
motives). Beyond the kindness between relatives and direct reciprocity between friends, humans, 
as third-party bystanders, will sometimes engage in a costly situation where social norms are vio-
lated, to achieve justice via either punishing the unknown offender or compensating the anony-
mous victim, even when such a violation does not directly affect their own interests and the costs 
incurred by them will not be paid back. Why do unaffected third parties intervene at a personal 
cost and what might be the underlying neural as well as cognitive mechanism? What factors might 
influence their decisions in such situations? To address these questions, the present dissertation 
used four studies by adopting a modified third-party economic paradigm to capture the third-party 
altruistic behaviors (i.e., third-party help and punishment) in response to an unfair situation, with 
the help of the technique of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Studies 1-3) and eye-
tracking (Study 4). By mainly investigating neural correlates during altruistic decision-making of 
third parties, Study 1 showed that signals in the bilateral striatum (esp. the ventral part) were 
stronger when third-party deciders chose to either help the victim or punish the selfish offender. 
Further analyses revealed an association between either choice of altruistic behavior, or its neural 
activation, and the empathic concern level, a personality trait closely related with altruism (esp. 
helping behavior). Studies 2-4 further tested whether, and how, other factors modulate third-party 
decision-making and the underlying neural or cognitive processes. In particular, Studies 2A and 2B 
focused on oxytocin, a so-called ―pro-social‖ hormone, and tested whether its effect on other altru-
istic behaviors extended to the third-party context. As revealed by Study 2A, and replicated by 
Study 2B, we observed that intranasal oxytocin affects neither type of third-party altruistic deci-
sions; rather, it modulated neural processing, especially via enhancing activity in the temporo-
parietal junction (TPJ), a region shown to support mentalizing ability, during the perception of 
helping decision made by a computer (Study 2A). Study 3 manipulated the attention focus on 
different aspects of the norm violation (i.e., asking participants to consider either the unfairness of 
the offender or the feelings of the victim), and showed not only an effect on third-party altruistic 
choice behavior, but also confirmed the role of TPJ and control-related regions in such modula-
tion. Replicating the effects of empathic concern (Study 1) and attention focus on choice behavior 
(Study 3), Study 4 provided the first empirical evidence that eye-movement pattern during third-
party altruistic decision-making could also be biased by both factors and their interaction, shed-
ding light on the cognitive mechanism underlying attention and information searching. Limitations 
of the studies and future research directions were also discussed. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Menschen leben in einer Welt voller sozialer Beziehungen. Im Rahmen evolutionärer Anpassungen 
haben Menschen gelernt nicht nur ihre eigenen Interessen zu maximieren (d.h. selbstsüchtige 
Motive zu verfolgen), sondern auch das Wohl anderer, selbst auf Kosten ihrer eigenen Ressourcen, 
zu berücksichtigen. Über das kooperative Verhalten zwischen Verwandten und die direkte 
Reziprozität zwischen Freunden hinaus, involvieren sich unbeteiligte Beobachter manchmal auch 
in Situationen, in denen soziale Normen verletzt werden. Um Gerechtigkeit zu erreichen bzw. 
wiederherzustellen, bestrafen sie als unbeteiligte Dritte die Täter oder unterstützen die Opfer, auch 
wenn sich der Verstoß der sozialen Normen nicht unmittelbar auf ihre eigenen Interessen auswirkt 
und die Kosten, die dadurch entstehen, nicht zurückgezahlt werden. Warum greifen unbeteiligte 
Dritte unter Inkaufnahme persönlicher Kosten in solche Situationen ein und was sind die 
zugrundeliegenden neuronalen und kognitiven Mechanismen? Welche Faktoren könnten die 
Entscheidungen in solchen Situationen beeinflussen? Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, wurden im 
Rahmen der vorliegenden Dissertation vier Studien durchgeführt, die auf einem modifizierten 
ökonomischen „third-party― Paradigma basieren, um das „altruistische― Verhalten von Dritten (d.h. 
Hilfe und Bestrafung von Dritten) als Reaktion auf eine ungerechte Situation mittels der 
funktionellen Magnetresonanztomographie (fMRI; Studien 1-3) und Eye-Tracking (Studie 4) zu 
erfassen. Studie 1, in der hauptsächlich neuronale Korrelate während der 
„altruistischen― Entscheidungsfindung von unbeteiligten Beobachtern untersucht wurden, zeigte, 
dass Signale im bilateralen Striatum (insbesondere im ventralen Teil) stärker waren, wenn die 
unbeteiligten Beobachter sich entweder dazu entschieden dem Opfer zu helfen oder den 
egoistischen Täter zu bestrafen. Weitere Analysen zeigten eine Assoziation zwischen der Wahl des 
„altruistischen― Verhaltens oder ihrer neuronalen Aktivierung und dem Ausmaß empathischen 
Empfindens, einem Persönlichkeitsmerkmal, das eng mit Altruismus zusammenhängt (ins-
besondere helfendem Verhalten). In den Studien 2-4 wurde weiterhin geprüft, ob und wie andere 
Faktoren den Zusammenhang zwischen den Entscheidungen von unbeteiligten Dritten und den 
zugrundeliegenden neuronalen oder kognitiven Prozessen modulieren. Insbesondere 
konzentrierten sich die Studien 2A und 2B auf Oxytocin, ein so genanntes „prosoziales― Hormon, 
und prüften, ob die Wirkung, die es auf andere altruistische Verhaltensweisen hat, auch für den 
„third-party― Kontext gilt. In Studie 2A konnte gezeigt und in Studie 2B repliziert werden, dass 
intranasales Oxytocin keine Art der Entscheidungen von unbeteiligten Beobachtern beeinflusst; 
stattdessen modulierte es die neuronale Verarbeitung, insbesondere durch verstärkte Aktivität im 
tempoparietalen Übergang (TPJ), einer Region, die die Mentalisierungsfähigkeit unterstützt, 
während der Wahrnehmung der Entscheidungshilfe durch einen Computer (Studie 2A). In Studie 3 
wurde der Aufmerksamkeitsfokus auf verschiedene Aspekte der Normverletzung gelenkt (d.h. die 
Teilnehmer sollten entweder die Ungerechtigkeit des Täters oder die Gefühle des Opfers 
berücksichtigen). Dabei konnte nicht nur eine Wirkung auf das altruistische 
Entscheidungsverhalten von Dritten gezeigt, sondern auch die Rolle des TPJ und anderen 
Regionen, die mit Kontrollmechanismen in Verbindung gebracht werden, in einer solchen 
Modulation bestätigt werden. Studie 4 replizierte nicht nur den Effekt des Ausmaßes empathischen 
Befindens (Studie 1) und des Aufmerksamkeitsfokusses auf das Entscheidungsverhalten (Studie 
3), sondern lieferte auch erste empirische Evidenz dafür, dass das Augenbewegungsmuster bei der 
altruistischen Entscheidungsfindung unbeteiligter Dritter von beiden Faktoren sowie deren 
Interaktionen beeinflusst werden kann. Diese Erkenntnis gibt Aufschluss über den kognitiven 
Zusammenfassung 
xi 
Mechanismus, der Aufmerksamkeit und Informationssuche zugrunde liegt. Einschränkungen der 
vorliegenden Studien sowie zukünftige Forschungsrichtungen werden diskutiert.  
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“Justice will not be served until those who are unaffected are as outraged as those 
who are.” 
— Benjamin Franklin 
 
 
 
 
“Let no one ever come to you without leaving better and happier.” 
— Mother Teresa 
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1 Introduction 
Imagine a situation from everyday life: one day, you walked in a quiet forest and 
no others were around. Suddenly, you heard a sound nearby and then saw that a 
man robbing a girl’s wallet. The man pushed the girl down and was about to run 
away; neither of them was acquainted with you before. At this moment, what 
would you do? If you are selfish and cold-blooded, you could always witness such 
a situation and step away from it, since it had nothing to do with you. However, 
you could also engage in this situation, even though such an intervention might 
cost your energy, time, and money, and even run the risk of getting hurt. Given 
limitations on ability and resources, usually you could only choose from one of 
two altruistic actions, namely to stop and fight the robber, or to take care of the 
girl. To leave (observe) or to engage in such a situation leads a moral dilemma. 
More interestingly, to punish or to help, were you to choose to engage, represents 
another conundrum regarding which altruistic action to take. 
A couple of interesting research questions stem from the above example. For 
example, why do some bystanders choose to help, while others prefer to mete out 
punishment in response to the same situation? Under what conditions will third-
party deciders change their choice preference? Within the fields of social psychol-
ogy and behavioral economics, there are already numerous researches purposing 
to answer the above questions. However, at the moment, we still have limited 
knowledge about the neural and cognitive mechanisms that drive a third party to 
intervene norm violation at the cost to themselves and how such underlying pro-
cesses, together with corresponding behaviors, may be modulated by other fac-
tors. Answering these questions constitutes the main goal of the studies included 
in the present dissertation. 
Before taking a further look at novel studies and findings, it is always best to 
introduce the existing research (on third-party altruistic behaviors in the present 
context; i.e., help and punishment), simply because this helps us understand the 
research topic better. In the following section, I will start by talking about the key 
concepts closely related with third-party altruistic behaviors, to give the potential 
readers a clear, overall outline of the origin and development of the research topic. 
Then I will provide an overview that focuses on previous literature on this topic, 
so that the reader is cognizant of what has (not) already been done in this field. 
After that, I will introduce the motivations behind each study to conclude this sec-
tion. 
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1.1 Relevant Concepts 
 Pro-Social Behavior and Altruism 1.1.1
The concepts of pro-social behavior and altruism always appear together in text-
books and research literature on social psychology, evolutionary psychology, and 
behavioral economics. Although they are quite similar, there has been long-
standing debate, concerning the definition of these two concepts, between re-
searchers from different fields with disparate perspectives. Therefore, it is very 
important to list various definitions and try to clarify the similarities and differ-
ences between them.  
Generally speaking, prosocial behavior refers to a wide range of acts that are 
intended to benefit other people (one or more) besides oneself; usually, prosocial 
behavior includes the following: such as comforting, helping, and sharing, as well 
as more complex behaviors such as cooperating (Batson & Powell, 2003). Simi-
larly, Penner and colleagues (2005) added another point, which is that prosocial 
behaviors ―are defined by some significant segment of society and/or one’s social 
group‖ (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). More specifically, they 
decomposed prosocial behaviors into three levels, based on the scope of the re-
search: 1) the micro level, concerning the neural and evolutionary origins of pro-
social tendencies and the etiology of individual differences in these tendencies, 2) 
the meso level, concerning the context-specific behaviors of helper-recipient dy-
ads (esp. helping), and 3) the macro level, concerning the actions that occur within 
large groups or organizations (e.g., cooperation). 
Further controversy arises from the way in which people define the concept of 
altruism. From the perspective of behavior, altruism is usually defined as behav-
iors that are costly to the actor and beneficial (esp. bringing economic benefits) to 
the recipient (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Kurzban, Burton-Chellew, & West, 
2015). Both prosocial behavior and altruism mention benefiting others’ (the recip-
ient/s) welfare; however, altruism highlights the cost to the self (the actor), which 
leads to the view that altruism is a special type of prosocial behavior. However, 
there is a trend whereby recent literature mixes these two concepts together, for 
example, by also addressing the cost when defining prosocial behaviors (Gęsiarz 
& Crockett, 2015).  
Disagreeing with the behavior-based definition, Batson and colleagues argued 
that altruism should be viewed as a motivational concept, i.e., the motivation to 
increase others’ welfare instead of one’s own welfare, in contrast to egoism 
(Batson, 2014; Batson & Powell, 2003). From this perspective, the concepts of 
altruism and prosocial behavior have different dimensions and are thus independ-
ent of each other, so that altruism (altruistic motivation) does not necessarily pro-
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duce prosocial behavior, which is also not necessarily triggered by altruism (altru-
istic motivation). 
Given that the current dissertation does not aim to address the divergence 
among definitions, either of prosocial behavior or altruism, or within the concept 
of altruism, we instead rely on a more concise (and also more popular) concept of 
altruism defined from the behavioral perspective in all of studies included within 
this dissertation.    
 From Kin-Based Altruism to Direct Reciprocity 1.1.2
Why altruism exists in human society remains a big and enduring mystery to sci-
ence. In the past few decades, evolutionary biologists, anthropologists and psy-
chologists have tried their best to find a plausible evolutionary explanation for the 
psychological mechanism that is designed to benefit others. By and large, these 
evolutionary explanations cover the following two facets of altruism (Gintis, 
Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003; Kurzban, et al., 2015). The first focus is on explain-
ing why human beings, similar to many other species, desire to aid relatives (e.g., 
parenting behavior): namely, the role of kinship in human altruism. Based on the 
gene-centric view of evolution, Hamilton (1964) proposed the idea that kin-based 
altruism will be favored by selection if the product of the genetic relatedness be-
tween the actor and the recipient, and the fitness benefit to the recipient, is larger 
than the fitness cost to the actor. In other words, by delivering benefits to others 
who carry the same genes (i.e., relatives), genes can cause copies of themselves to 
increase in subsequent generations (Hamilton, 1964). However, given the fact that 
human parents take care of their children is so obvious and axiomatic (Cosmides 
& Tooby, 1994), psychologists and behavioral economists do not focus much on 
kin-based human altruism (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004; 
Kurzban, et al., 2015).   
A more intriguing and challenging question is why people would also desire to 
benefit non-genetically related others at cost to themselves, which is very rare in 
the animal kingdom (Hauser, Chen, Chen, & Chuang, 2003; Seyfarth & Cheney, 
2012). For example, it is quite common in modern human society for people to 
establish long-term non-kin-based friendships (Hruschka, 2010) and even two 
strangers prefer to cooperate with, instead of defect to, each other in a repeated 
social context (Andreoni & Miller, 1993). The most famous theory explaining the 
above phenomena is the Theory of Reciprocity (Trivers, 1971). In particular, peo-
ple help, or cooperate with, others at initial cost, but such altruistic behavior is 
still favored as the actor can benefit more through a mutual, sequential exchange 
of aid in the long term. The crucial point is that the exchange of altruistic acts oc-
curs repeatedly between the same two persons, which explains the meaning of 
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―direct‖. In term of this theory, the ultimate goal of reciprocal altruism can be re-
garded as an instrumental means of achieving self-benefit, namely egoism.  
 Third-Party Reciprocity: A Type of Indirect Reciprocity 1.1.3
Although the Theory of Reciprocity is very powerful, it cannot fully cover and 
explain the more complex forms of altruism that exist exclusively in human socie-
ty. For instance, a third-party observer will expend effort to reward the person 
(i.e., actor) who once kindly gave a seat to another person (i.e., recipient) or chase 
and fight with a thief (i.e., actor) who once stole money from the other person 
(i.e., recipient). In the above cases, neither the actor nor the recipient is known to 
the third party and the behavior of the actor does not directly affect the interests of 
the third party. Moreover, the three persons in this context are supposed to interact 
at most only once with each other. These critical features characterize indirect 
reciprocal altruism or indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). 
Formally, indirect reciprocity includes the following two types: 1) pay-it-
forward (or generalized) reciprocity (also called upstream reciprocity): here, the 
agent first receives a benefit from one anonymous person, and then continues to 
benefit the other stranger. Such reciprocity is based on a recent positive experi-
ence, but is hard to understand from an evolutionary perspective (Boyd & 
Richerson, 1989; Pfeiffer, Rutte, Killingback, Taborsky, & Bonhoeffer, 2005), 
although it is often observed in the experiments (Gray, Ward, & Norton, 2014; 
Strang, Grote, Kuss, Park, & Weber, 2016); and 2) third-party reciprocity (also 
called downstream reciprocity, and exemplified above): here, the agent (i.e., third-
party observer) first observes the actions of an actor towards a recipient, and then 
helps/rewards (if the actor performs a good action) or punishes1 (if the actor per-
forms a bad action) the actor. In other words, ―whereby my actions toward you 
also depend on your behavior toward others‖ (Rand & Nowak, 2013). Such reci-
procity is based on reputation and is more stable in evolutionarily terms (Nowak 
& Sigmund, 1998). 
                                                 
1 It is still debatable at whether to include third-party punishment in the concept of indirect (down-
stream) reciprocity. In terms of the underlying motive, third-party punishment is also usually re-
garded as an important form of strong (negative) reciprocity (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002; 
Gintis, 2000), which shares the key features of indirect (downstream) reciprocity (i.e., it is costly 
and brings no benefit, either immediately or in the future, for the actor ) but is not limited to a 
three-person context (e.g., a two-person sequential dilemma context).     
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
5 
 Third-Party Altruistic Decision-Making 1.1.4
1.1.4.1 Social Norm Violation and Third-Party Punishment 
The concept of norms is one of the most important terms in the field of sociology. 
Despite there being various definitions, norms are widely defined as statements 
loaded with enforcement mechanisms that are used to regulate behaviors (Horne, 
2001). More specifically, social norms refer to standards of behavior based on 
broadly accepted beliefs about how individuals within a group (i.e., from a family 
to society overall) should behave in a certain situation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004a). Social norms play a crucial role in constructing the basis of human society 
and facilitating the evolution of human altruism (e.g., enhancing interpersonal 
cooperation).  
As implied by their definition, social norms are protected and enforced by cer-
tain mechanisms, such that social norms persist rather than decay. One of the most 
important enforcement mechanisms is punishment (or sanctions) imposed on be-
haviors that violate the social norms 2  (Bendor & Mookherjee, 1990; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004a). The individual who punishes can be the ―second party‖, 
whose (economic) welfare is directly influenced by the norm violation. The most 
widely used example is the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 
1982). Two roles are involved in this game, namely those of a proposer and a re-
cipient. A proposer is endowed with a sum of money (i.e., 10 €) and proposes a 
distribution offer to an anonymous recipient (i.e., a selfish offer: 9/1; or a fair of-
fer: 5/5; the previous number refers to the payoff of the proposer and the latter 
refers to that of the recipient), who can either accept or reject the proposal. Im-
portantly, both the proposer and the recipient receive nothing once the recipient 
rejects the offer. Surprisingly at first glance, the recipient always rejects offers 
with a share percentage lower than 25%, whereas the proposer often proposes a 
quasi-equal split (e.g., with the share percentage on average around 30-40%) to 
make sure that the offer will be accepted (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). As fairness is one of the most important social norms, rejection 
by the recipient due to violation of the fairness norm can be regarded as an altruis-
tic punishment, which may then cause the proposer to be more likely to abide by 
the fairness norm in the future. 
However, a rather limited number of social norms can be enforced merely by 
the second-party punishment, given that the consequence of one’s own (second-
party) punishment of the norm violator is relatively weak in most cases. Let us 
reconsider the example of the thief we mentioned in the previous section. Assum-
ing this time that there is a group of thieves instead of only one, the female victim 
                                                 
2 For more details on theories and researches on social norm violation, or social injustice, please 
see the textbooks by (Hechter & Opp, 2001; Sabbagh & Schmitt, 2016). 
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who was robbed will spend a lot of energy in chasing and fighting with the 
thieves; however, she finally not only fails to get her belongings or property back, 
but is also assaulted by the assailants. As a consequence, the social norm is not 
enforced at all and faces potential breakdown in the future. Therefore, we need 
another type of enforcement mechanism, namely third-party punishment (or sanc-
tions). This refers to costly punishment of the social norm violator meted out by 
the unaffected third-party observer, which could be characterized as a specific 
case of third-party (indirect) reciprocity. Apparently, third-party punishment can 
greatly increase the scope of social norms, in fact representing the essence of the 
norm (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b). More importantly, third-party punishment also 
has the advantage over second-party punishment that it is a necessary condition to 
keep maintaining a cooperative state, from an evolutionary angle (Bendor & 
Swistak, 2001). Last but not least, third-party punishment is only widely observed 
in human society; it never happens in other species, even chimpanzees, one of the 
closest living relatives of humans (Riedl, Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2012).   
1.1.4.2 Beyond Punishment: Third-Party Helping (Compensation) 
In the context of social norm violation, the norm violator, despite being more sali-
ent, is never the only target person of the third-party observer. Rather, it is also 
important to lend a helping hand to the victim (e.g., spend time comforting them, 
or help them to call the police in the example mentioned above). This altruistic 
behavior not only occurs in our everyday life, but also is existent in the field of 
law. In particular, there usually are two ways to achieve justice against people’s 
wrong doing (Darley & Pittman, 2003). Besides retributive justice in which ad-
dresses the punishment of offenders (Tyler & Boeckmann, 1997), restorative jus-
tice focuses more on how to aid the victim while also taking the community and 
offender into consideration (Bazemore, 1998). 
To sum up, both punishing the perpetrator and helping (compensating) the vic-
tim, via the unaffected third-party observer, whose decisions will only bring a 
cost, and no benefit, to him- or herself, are regarded as altruistic responses to 
norm violation, which operationalizes the concept of third-party altruistic deci-
sion-making (see Figure 1 for summary and illustration). 
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Figure 1. Key concepts relevant to and the inter-disciplinary feature of third-party help and 
punishment behavior. 
1.2 Literature Review of Studies on Third-Party Altruistic 
Decision-making 
In general, third-party punishment has been more studied and some empirical evi-
dence has accumulated (esp. behavioral studies). In comparison, studies that take 
third-party help (or compensation) into consideration are rare. In my personal 
view, two factors might give rise to such an imbalance of research on these two 
types of altruistic decision: 1) As already mentioned, third-party punishment is 
common regarded as key to enforce and maintain a social norm (Bendor & 
Mookherjee, 1990). Due to its mysterious evolution and huge potential for ex-
plaining practical issues in the real life (e.g., protests, or military interventions to 
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keep the peace in another country), third-party punishment can always attract in-
vestigators from various fields, such as theoretical biology, psychology, and eco-
nomics; and 2) Researches on helping or compensating behavior might not need a 
clearly defined perpetrator. For instance, there are only two roles, proposer and 
recipient, involved in dictator game, perhaps the most famous economic paradigm 
investigating giving behavior (Camerer, 2003; Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, & 
Sefton, 1994; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). In social psychology studies, 
the situation is usually described in a way that focuses only on the emergent need 
of the hypothetical character (Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Toi & Batson, 
1982).  
In order to show a clear trajectory of previous research in third-party altruistic 
decision-making, the rest of this section is organized as follows: first, I will intro-
duce the behavioral studies on third-party punishment, and then those on third-
party help; then, I will introduce relevant studies that used human neuroscience 
techniques (esp. fMRI studies).  
 Behavioral Evidence3 1.2.1
1.2.1.1 Third-Party Punishment 
1.2.1.1.1 The original research 
Compared with a large amount of literature on direct reciprocity (esp. second-
party punishment), researches on third-party punishment did not attract sufficient 
attention of the academic field (Bendor & Mookherjee, 1990; Turillo, Folger, 
Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002) until a crucial paper (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004b) that systematically addressed third-party punishment, via experimental 
economic paradigms, was published at the beginning of this century.  
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) investigated third-party punishment in the con-
text of two forms of norm violation. In the first study, they created the fairness 
norm violation via the dictator game. Participants were invited to the study and 
part of them was randomly assigned to either the role of Player A or Player B, in 
order to play the dictator game in the context of a money splitting task. Specifical-
ly, Player A was endowed with 100 monetary units (MU; 1 MU ≈ CHF 0.3) and 
could decide to transfer one of the following amounts from their own endowment 
to the anonymous Player B: 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50 MU. Player B had no money 
at first, and could only accept an offer from the Player A that matched with 
him/her (i.e., Player B). The remaining part of participants was labeled as Player 
C, namely the third-party. Endowed with 50 MU, Player C was presented with the 
                                                 
3 Here I mainly focused on behavioral studies conducted in the lab. For applied studies under an 
organizational setting, please see (Skarlicki, O’Reilly, & Kulik, 2015)  for a comprehensive re-
view. 
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choice made by an anonymous Player A, and then freely decided how much they 
would like to deduct from Player A’s payoff with their own endowment (where the 
minimum amount equals 0 and the maximum amount equals 50, which leads to a 
possible loses of money for Player A). Importantly, the strategy method was im-
plemented so that Player C had to respond with the amount he/she would like to 
use according to each possible choice by Player A (i.e., investigators would elicit 
six responses from each Player C). Moreover, the cost ratio for third-party pun-
ishment in this case was set to 1:3; i.e., Player C could use 1 MU from his/her 
endowment to deduct 3 MU from Player A’s final payoff. To rule out the potential 
confounding effect of demand characteristics, Player C’s behavior was framed as 
a deduction instead of a sanction or punishment. Besides, both Player A and Play-
er B were informed of the third-party context and Player B was also asked to es-
timate how much Player C would punish Player A, given each possible choice 
made by Player A (although they cannot influence any other player’s payoff). 
Contrary to the selfish hypothesis, which assumes that third parties would not care 
about another’s payoff and instead always maximize their own payoff, approxi-
mately 60% of third parties deducted at least 1 MU from their own endowment to 
punish the selfish Player A, given their unfair choice. They also observed that the 
amount Player C transferred, to deduct from Player A’s payoff, increased linearly 
with the level of inequality between the payoff of Player A and that of Player B. 
Intriguingly, Player B not only expected Player C to costly punish the unfair Play-
er A, but even indicated a higher amount that they hoped Player C could use to 
punish Player A than the actual amount transferred by Player C, especially in ex-
tremely unfair cases (i.e., the payoff of Player A was at least twice as much as that 
of Player B).   
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) also tested third-party punishment in the context 
of violation of the cooperation norm, with the prison-dilemma paradigm. Similar-
ly, participants were randomly assigned to the role of either Player A or Player B. 
Both players were endowed with 10 MU and they had the chance to interact with 
each other which could affect both of their payoffs. In particular, if both players 
cooperated, namely transferring their money to the other, their payoff would be 
tripled by the experimenter (i.e., the final payoff for both would be 30 MU). How-
ever, if one of them cooperated and one defected (i.e., retaining his/her original 10 
MU), the cooperative player would have nothing left whereas the traitor could 
ultimately earn 40 MU (i.e., 30 MU tripled from the 10 MU transferred from the 
other, plus original 10 MU endowment). The last possible situation was that both 
sides chose to defect, which did not affect their payoff at all (i.e., remained on 10 
MU). Third parties, again labeled as Player C, observed the interaction above and 
were endowed with 40 MU. Player C could use up to 20 MU to subtract the pay-
off from Player A or B, which was known to all Player A and Player B before-
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hand. Consistent with the first study, nearly half of the Player C (45.8%) chose to 
punish the defector if his/her partner cooperated, which also led to the most severe 
punishment (≈ 3.4 MU). Last but not least, they also showed that the punishment 
behavior in both contexts could be predicted by negative emotions, which hinted 
at an underlying basis rooted in affect. Taken together, these findings supported 
the notion of indirect reciprocity, namely that people robustly engage in costly 
altruistic behavior, even if their payoffs are not directly affected by the norm vio-
lation. 
1.2.1.1.2 Follow-up studies: factors modulating third-party punishment 
1.2.1.1.2.1 Emotion 
Investigators further looked at the factors that can modulate third-party punish-
ment decisions. Enlightened by the findings on the relationship between emotion 
and third-party punishment reported by Fehr and colleagues (2004), Nelissen et al. 
(2009) extended the previous study and systematically evaluated how moral emo-
tions, especially anger and guilt, can influence third-party punishment toward un-
fairness (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). In a similar context of inequality to that 
induced by the dictator game, third parties participants, facing the only unfair sit-
uation (i.e., 80/20 split of money) in the game, were randomly assigned to one of 
the following conditions: an unfair decision made intentionally, or not, by the 
proposer (i.e., randomly determined by a computer or the proposer); or the third 
party’s decision being joint (i.e., two other participants were also assigned the role 
of the third party) or not (i.e., only the third-party participant decided to punish, or 
not). The first treatment manipulated the intention variable, with the aim of elicit-
ing the variance in anger; the second treatment manipulated the responsibility var-
iable, with the aim of eliciting the variance in guilt. Basically, the study showed 
that third parties punished significantly more when only one third party made the 
decision, and there was a trend toward more punishment when the unfair decision 
was made by the proposer. In the second study, a noise-manipulation was adopted 
(Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002) that independently inhibited anger and 
guilt, instead of eliciting each emotion (i.e., the noise here means the random 
choice by the computer). In detail, the manipulation of a positive noise changed 
the original highly unequal offer to a less unequal offer (i.e., from 80/20 to 80/52; 
in MU), with the aim of inhibiting only guilt; whereas a negative noise referred to 
increasing the unequal offer (i.e., from 50/50 to 50/18; in MU), with the aim of 
inhibiting only anger. Consistent with their prediction, the third party punished 
less in both conditions, compared with the control treatment, which supported the 
contribution of both anger and guilt in driving third-party punishment. By focus-
ing only on the emotion of anger, a recent study adopting a similar design to that 
of Fehr & Fischbacher (2004) showed that angry third parties (i.e., with anger 
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
11 
elicited via writing a past event that made them furious) punished more for the 
selfish dictator only when the emotion of anger was sustained (i.e., waiting for 3 
min) instead of being distracted (i.e., playing a computer game for 3 min) before 
the third-party punishment task (Gummerum, Van Dillen, Van Dijk, & López-
Pérez, 2016). 
Inconsistent with the above study, Pedersen et al (2013) argued that besides 
anger and guilt, there is another important moral emotion, envy, which also plays 
a key role in predicting third-party punishment decisions (Pedersen, Kurzban, & 
McCullough, 2013). Due to the methodological limitations of the standard para-
digm of third-party punishment, they modified the design in the following two 
ways: 1) no strategy method was implemented due to its impact on the affective 
system during decision-making, instead, third-party participants just needed to 
respond once to the terms of proposer’s actual choice; 2) participants could be 
either the second-party receiver or third-party witness (randomly determined), 
which unfixed the pre-determined role and reduced errors in the punishment 
measures. Surprisingly, the third-party witness did not show the expected punish-
ment, nor did they feel more anger (with the envy score controlled) towards the 
selfish (vs. fair) proposer. However, they were more envious (with the anger score 
controlled) of the selfish (vs. fair) proposer due to the disadvantageous payoff. 
Pedersen and colleagues (2013) argued that such an emotional difference was re-
sponsible for the fact that the third-party witness punished less severely and more 
rarely; i.e., they were more envious, but less angry, about the unfairness, which 
might cause them to be unwilling to punish the dictator with their own endow-
ment.  
However, the role of envy in driving third-party punishment was questioned in 
a recent paper (Jordan, McAuliffe, & Rand, 2014). In each of the two studies, par-
ticipants, as a third-party, were asked to report how angry and envious they felt, 
and also how angry and envious they expected the recipient to feel. By using line-
ar regression analyses on punishment behavior (i.e., the amount of MU third par-
ties transferred), the study only found a significant effect of the third-party’s an-
ger, and not envy (or any vicarious affective feeling), in positively predicting their 
punishment behavior. Given the above findings, it seems that the third-party’s 
own anger could consistently drive third-party punishment.  
1.2.1.1.2.2 Strategy method and endowment size  
Careful readers might note two features of the standard third-party punishment 
paradigm. The first feature is the use of strategy method (Mitzkewitz & Nagel, 
1993; Selten, 1965), whereby participants, prior to knowing the real choice, need 
to respond in terms of each possible choice of the proposer. Despite its popularity 
implemented in studies of third-party punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b) 
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and other behavioral economics studies (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005; 
Fischbacher, Gächter, & Quercia, 2012), a recent meta-analysis showed that strat-
egy method might somehow reduce the punishment behavior, especially direct 
punishment meted out by the second party (Brandts & Charness, 2011).  Another 
feature is that the initial endowment of the third party (i.e., 50 MU) is lower than 
that of the first party (i.e., 100 MU), thereby leading to the alternative explanation 
for the third-party punishment as being driven by the self-focused envy elicited by 
the disadvantageous inequality aversion, instead of other-regarding indirect reci-
procity. 
To further investigate the effect of the above two factors on third-party pun-
ishment, Jordan et al (2014) adopted a 2 × 2 design to systematically manipulate 
the decision-making type (i.e., the so-called ―cold‖ strategy method, or the so-
called ―hot‖ specific response method) and endowment size of the third party (i.e., 
equal to the proposer, namely 50 MU, or less than the proposer, namely 25 MU). 
Despite the endowment size affecting the envy felt by third parties, it did not alter 
their punishment behavior contingent either on the strategy method or the en-
dowment size. To further check the robustness of the non-significant effect of en-
dowment size, Jordan and colleagues (2014) ran a follow-up study that extended 
the endowment size condition (i.e., endowment of first/third party: 100/100, 
high/high; 50/50, low/low; 100/50, high/low) and varied the proposer’s behavior 
(i.e., from a binary fair/unfair response to a continuous spectrum, namely 100/0, 
90/10, 80/20, 70/30, 60/40, 50/50). In line with the first study, the results still 
showed that third-party punishment was independent of initial endowment. All in 
all, these findings provide strong support for the assumption that third-party pun-
ishment served as indirect reciprocity rather than being a byproduct of self-
focused envy in the face of inequality. 
1.2.1.1.2.3 Group 
In the real world, third parties are often not objective in their responses to norm 
violation. Rather, they may respond differently to norm violation committed by 
offenders from different social or racial groups. For instance, participants usually 
judge a crime scenario more harshly if it is violated by an outgroup versus in-
group perpetrator (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000). Is such group bias also existent 
in third-party punishment? If so, what mechanism drives such group bias? To ad-
dress the above questions, Schiller et al (2014) tested how third parties behaved in 
a social context where the cooperation norm was violated, when the perpetrator 
was either an in-group member, outgroup member, or unaffiliated person 
(Schiller, Baumgartner, & Knoch, 2014). To increase salience of the group factor, 
participants were asked to report their interest in soccer (Hein, Silani, Preuschoff, 
Batson, & Singer, 2010) or politics (Koopmans & Rebers, 2009) so that the sup-
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porter, as well as the corresponding rival, could be defined as in- or outgroup 
members with respect to the third party. They found that third parties punished 
most severely when the perpetrator was from a different group, whereas they were 
more lenient to in-group offenders (both compared with the unaffiliated violator) 
for trials in which the perpetrator defected while the victim cooperated. Further-
more, they also found that either outgroup discrimination (i.e., the difference in 
punishment severity meted out an outgroup perpetrator versus unaffiliated offend-
er) or the in-group favoritism (i.e., the difference in punishment severity meted 
out an unaffiliated offender versus ingroup perpetrator) was positively correlated 
with the corresponding difference in retribution motive. This result suggests that 
negative affect toward offenders could explain both outgroup discrimination and 
in-group favoritism, which could drive the group bias in third-party punishment. 
More recently, another study (Yudkin, Rothmund, Twardawski, Thalla, & Van 
Bavel, 2016) tested the cognitive mechanism underlying the in-group bias in 
third-party punishment (i.e., punish in-group offenders less severely than the out-
group offenders) from the aspect of dual-process theory (Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Yudkin and colleagues (2016) first showed that 
third parties responding more quickly showed more in-group bias than those re-
sponding more slowly. In follow-up studies, they directly manipulated the cogni-
tive load and found that the punishment meted out by third parties operating under 
higher cognitive load (i.e., remembering a letter string) was more biased by the 
group membership. These findings further demonstrate that in-group bias in third-
party punishment is reflexive rather than reflective. 
1.2.1.1.2.4 Beyond students samples: evidence from other strata of human socie-
ties and compassionate mediators 
As might be noticed, all evidence of third-party punishment has relied on student 
samples, which are not representative of all people. Is costly third-party punish-
ment also seen in other strata of human society? A striking anthropological study 
tried to address this by applying the third-party punishment paradigm to 1,762 
adult participants sampled from among 15 different populations located in five 
different continents (Henrich et al., 2006). These societies varied broadly in natu-
ral environment (e.g., from urban to tropical forest), economic base (e.g., from 
wage work to horticulture) and residence type (e.g., from sedentary to nomadic), 
providing a basis for a high degree of generalizability. It was found that third par-
ties in all societies punished less as the offers increased to 50%, despite with huge 
inter-group variance. Moreover, the mean maximum acceptable offer in the third-
party punishment game was positively correlated the mean offer provided in the 
dictator game across populations. These results suggest that such norm-enhancing 
unfair-sensitive costly behavior is widely existent in human society, which is con-
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sistent with the gene-cultural co-evolution of human altruism (Boyd, Gintis, 
Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 2002). 
McCall and colleagues (2014) applied the third-party paradigm, and other al-
truistic-relevant paradigms, to long-term mediation practitioners with several 
years’ worth of training in compassion or altruism (McCall, Steinbeis, Ricard, & 
Singer, 2014). Compared with the control group, long-term mediators, despite not 
reducing the degree of punishment on average, meted out less punishment with 
decreasing inequality between the payoff of the proposer and the recipient. Con-
sistently, they felt much less angry about unfair offers, especially with the increas-
ing level of inequality. These findings indicate that social preferences are not fixed 
and can be changed through experience (training) as well as learning.  
1.2.1.1.2.5 Age and species: a developmental and evolutionary perspective 
We know from the above evidence that third-party punishment is widely observed 
in human adults. A natural question then arises: how does third-party punishment 
develop within human beings? Moreover, does it originate from other species? 
Given the fact that children at age 5-6 years pay a cost to prevent themselves 
from being disadvantaged relative to their peers (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011), 
McAuliffe et al (2015) investigated at which age (i.e., 5 or 6 years) children 
would also punish the unfair proposer and prevent another peer from being unfair-
ly treated at the cost of their own resources. Due to their being in the primary 
stage of cognitive ability and to their having scant experience with money, the 
paradigm adopted to study children is different from the standard third-party pun-
ishment paradigm. Particularly, children as third parties were made to believe in a 
fake scenario whereby one peer divided six Skittles (candy) between him-/herself 
and another peer either in a fair (i.e., proposer/recipient: 3/3) or selfish (i.e., pro-
poser/recipient: 6/0) way on the previous day, as described on a card. Third parties 
were also informed that their decisions in the current game could affect the final 
payoffs (i.e., the number of Skittles) and were instructed on how to respond (i.e., 
by pulling the handle in either the green direction to accept, or the red direction to 
reject, the Skittle allocation). The key manipulation in this study was whether 
third parties costly reject (i.e., punish) or not. In particular, if they were assigned 
in the cost condition, they had to pay one Skittle from their own endowment (i.e., 
25 Skittles for the entire game), if and only if they chose to reject. In the free con-
dition, however, they did not have to pay for either decision. The results showed 
that, although children in both age groups were more likely to punish the proposer 
in the free condition, only children of 6 years old were also more likely to punish 
the unfair proposer in both the cost and free conditions. To rule out the possibility 
that children punished merely because of inequality aversion, they also invited the 
6-year old group to participate in a follow-up study that was exactly the same ex-
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cept that all of the selfish offers were replaced with the generous offer (i.e., pro-
poser/recipient: 0/6). Although third parties were still more likely to reject in the 
free condition and to reject the unequal (but generous) offers, the regression anal-
yses of the pooled dataset (i.e., with both experiments, including selfish and gen-
erous trials) showed a strong interaction between distribution (i.e., fair or unfair) 
and inequity (i.e., selfish or generous). Post-hoc analyses further revealed that 
third parties punished more for selfish (vs. generous) offers, compared with fair 
offers. The above evidence, in sum, showed that the costly third-party punishment 
in humans emerges as early as 6 years of age. 
Using a similar paradigm, Jordan and colleagues (2015) further investigated at 
which age (i.e., 6 or 8 years) children showed in-group bias in the context of cost-
ly third-party punishment (Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014), as seen in 
adult samples (Schiller, et al., 2014). Unlike the previous study, they adopted a 
minimal group paradigm, which is a weak-in-effect but cleaner method commonly 
used in the field of social psychology (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), to 
randomly categorize third parties into ―blue‖ or ―yellow‖ team. In the later deci-
sion task, third parties were presented the four combinations based on the group 
membership of the first peer (i.e., proposer: in-/out-group) and second peer (i.e., 
recipient: in-/out-group). Replicating the results whereby third parties punished 
the selfish proposer in both age groups at cost to themselves, they further showed 
that 6-year old third parties were not only more likely to punish the outgroup pro-
poser, but also more likely to punish when the in-group recipient was treated poor-
ly. The 8 year-old third parties only showed bias in punishing based on the group 
membership of the proposer, rather than that of the recipient. This interesting in-
teraction suggested that the group bias in third-party punishment, despite emerg-
ing at an early stage, might be reduced with development. 
By recruiting 8-, 12-, and 15-year-old group as well as an adult group (mean 
age = 22 yrs), a recent study (Gummerum & Chu, 2014) looked in more details at 
the following two questions: 1) whether the intention (and also outcome) can in-
fluence third-party punishment and if so 2) when this influence emerges. Similar 
to the standard economic paradigm, third parties always saw a pair of possible 
choices that could be made by the proposer: one was always 8/2, the alternative 
was either 5/5, 2/8, 8/2, or 10/0. A strategy method was adopted so that each third 
party needed to respond twice to each of the four possible pairs. Focusing on the 
default option (i.e., 8/2), the results showed that only adults punished less fre-
quently and with less points when they were presented with a worse alternative 
(i.e., 10/0) versus better alternative (e.g., 5/5, 2/8). Although adolescent groups 
(i.e., the 12- and 15-year-olds) showed a similar response in the second-party pun-
ishment game to that of the adult group, they failed to consider intention in the 
third-party punishment game. The 8-year-old group showed fairness-sensitive 
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punishment based only on outcome. These findings provide further insight into 
the origin of the cognitive mechanism underlying third-party punishment.  
Concerning the second question, a recent study investigated whether chimpan-
zees, one of humans’ closest relatives, could also show third-party punishment 
behavior (Riedl, et al., 2012). A norm violation case was created, whereby an of-
fender could steal the food of a victim via pulling the food tray away once the 
victim had caused the food to drop on a tray. Having witnessed such a scenario, 
the third-party chimpanzee could decide whether to ―punish‖ the offender by col-
lapsing the trapdoor (within two minutes) to prevent the thief from obtaining the 
food, which would nevertheless not benefit the third party. Although the chim-
panzee punished the thief (vs. other control conditions) more when it was the di-
rect victim, third-party chimpanzees did not punish often when another victim was 
stolen from, even when it was genetically related to the third party. In sum, these 
results indicate the unique feature of third-party punishment in human beings ver-
sus any other species in the animal kingdom. 
1.2.1.2 Third-Party Help (Compensation) 
As mentioned above, punishment is not the only altruistic behavior associated 
with norm violation by third parties. Rather, it is also possible for them to help 
(compensate) the victim. One of the early papers focusing on third-party help was 
that by Leliveld et al (2012), which also tested the role of empathic concern (see 
later section for an introduction to this concept) in third-party altruistic decisions 
(Leliveld, Dijk, & Beest, 2012). In the first study, third parties were presented 
with a series of (un)fair choices (i.e., payoff between the proposer and the recipi-
ent: 100/0, 90/10, 80/20, 70/30, 60/40, 50/50, in MU) made by an anonymous 
proposer in a hypothetical dictator game (i.e., deception is used in this study). 
With the strategy method, third parties were asked how many MU they would like 
to transfer from their initial endowment to compensate the victim (i.e., 50 MU; 
cost rate = 1:3). Instead of finding a main effect of the offer on transfer amount for 
compensation, they detected a significant interaction between offer and individual 
empathic concern level, measured by the empathic concern subscale of Ithe nter-
personal Reactivity Index (IRI; (Davis, 1983)). In particular, the more unequal the 
offer was, the stronger the positive relationship between empathic concern and 
compensation amount. To further investigate whether empathic concern can mod-
ulate a third-party’s choice preference, they ran a follow-up study (see Figure 2 
for the design illustration) in which all third parties were only presented with one 
unfair situation (i.e., 80/20). Importantly, they were provided the help and pun-
ishment (together with the keep) choice at the same time, so that they could vol-
untarily choose among of the options. If they chose either one of the two altruistic 
choices, they were then asked to indicate the exact amount. Intriguingly, it was 
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found that participants with different empathic concern level displayed different 
choice preference. Specifically, more empathic persons were more likely to com-
pensate the victim, whereas less empathic persons were more likely to punish the 
selfish proposer. Taken together, the above evidence suggests that help, as well as 
punishment, is also a common and reasonable choice for third parties when facing 
a norm violation and empathic concern can bias the choice preference. 
In a similar, but more complex, study (Chavez & Bicchieri, 2013), participants 
as third parties were randomly assigned to two conditions. In one condition, they 
could either add or deduct the payoff of the proposer or the recipient respectively 
(i.e., the all-adjustment condition); in the other condition, they were only allowed 
to deduct the payoff of the proposer or the recipient (i.e., the deduct-only condi-
tion). Although third parties punished the selfish proposer at cost to themselves 
only if they could punish, they preferred to spend their own money to compensate 
the unfairly treated recipient, consistent with a previous study that used a similar 
paradigm (Lotz, Okimoto, Schlösser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011). These findings again 
demonstrate that helping is always the most common, or even the favorite, choice 
for third parties dealing with a norm violation (see general discussion section for a 
possible explanation for this phenomenon).  
Similar to third-party punishment, emotion (esp. anger) is also a crucial factor 
that affects third-party helping behavior. A recent study tested the causal relation-
ship between anger and third-party compensation in either an attentive or distract-
ed condition: angry third parties (vs. those with neural emotion) gave much less to 
a victim treated unfairly when their anger was sustained rather than when they 
were distracted. Moreover, the study further distinguished other-focused anger 
(i.e., recall a past event where a victim was harmed so that they felt angry towards 
a norm transgressor) from the self-focused anger (i.e., recall a past event where 
they felt angry because they were badly treated) and showed that in the attentive 
condition, third parties with other-focused (vs. self-focused) anger compensated 
the victim to a large extent. These findings clarify the differential role of distinct 
forms of anger in third-party helping behavior (Gummerum, et al., 2016).      
In order to ascertain the developmental changes in third-party altruistic deci-
sions, a recent study (Will, Crone, van den Bos, & Güroğlu, 2013) used the modi-
fied third-party help/punishment paradigm in different groups of adolescents, in-
cluding 9- (i.e., pre-adolescence), 11-, 14-, 16-, as well as 22-year-olds (i.e., 
young adults). Instead of being presented with the fairness norm violation, third 
parties observed a situation of social exclusion, which was regarded as an exam-
ple of norm violation and peer victimization salient to adolescents (Blakemore & 
Mills, 2014). In detail, participants themselves played a ball-tossing game 
(Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000) with two other anonymous partner (i.e., in-
cluders) who passed the ball to each of the other two with equal frequency in the 
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first stage. Next, they observed another ball-tossing game in which three novel 
partners were involved. Critically, two of them (i.e., excluder) intentionally ex-
cluded the other partner (i.e., victim), who only received the ball once at the be-
ginning but never again until the end of the game. After that, participants had the 
chance to influence the payoff of each of the five partners they interacted with 
(i.e., recipients: two includers, two excluders, one victim). Each time participants 
and the target other were endowed with 10 MU. Participants could choose one 
from among seven options (i.e., payoff of the self/other: 7/19, 8/16, 9/13, 10/10, 
9/7, 8/4, 7/1, in MU) and the cost rate was set to 1:3. The results revealed a strong 
interaction between age group and recipient in terms of the MU that participants 
spent. Specifically, 9-year-old children showed a stronger preference for compen-
sating the victim compared with the other recipients, but they did not transfer dif-
ferent amounts to compensate between the includers and the excluders. Partici-
pants of 14-year-olds compensated the excluders less well versus either the 
includers or the victim. Only the elder groups of third parties showed different 
compensatory behavior to different recipients: i.e., giving the most to the victim, 
followed by the includers, with the least given to the excluders. Despite not 
providing less information on punishment (i.e., all participants seem to choose to 
compensate the recipient by increasing their payoff), this study provided the first 
evidence on how development affects both third-party helping and punishment 
behaviors.  
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Figure 2. Illustration of the third-party economic paradigm. In Stage 1, several pairs of the first 
(i.e., offender) and second party (i.e., victim) were invited (either online or to the behavioral 
lab) and played a dictator game, namely the first party could voluntarily split a certain amount 
of money (i.e., x MU) from his/her endowment (i.e., m MU) to the second party. Usually x took 
less than half of m, causing the inequality (unfair) situation. In Stage 2, participants, as the 
third party, were endowed with a certain amount of money (i.e., n MU) and presented with the 
unequal split. They could freely decide to either punish the first party (i.e., subtract money 
from him/her) or help/compensate the second party (i.e., add money to him/her) and then 
indicate the exact amount, with the cost of their own endowment. Besides they could also 
choose to keep the endowment (i.e., not costly intervene). For third-party punishment game, 
the only difference is that participants are not allowed to help/compensate the second party. 
Abbreviations: MU = monetary unit.  
 Human Neuroscience Evidence 1.2.2
For cognitive neuroscientists (esp. those who are interested in topics centering on 
economic and social decision-making), it is far from sufficient to only acquire 
behavioral evidence of third-party altruistic decision-making. Their ultimate re-
search goal is to uncover the neural mechanisms underlying such behaviors. With 
the increasing popularity of applying human neuroscience techniques to cognitive 
tasks, there are several such studies focusing on third-party altruism (esp. punish-
ment), which extend our understanding of its underlying neural basis. In order to 
increase the understanding of potential readers outside of the field of cognitive 
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neuroscience, I will give a brief overview of the methods commonly adopted by 
human neuroscience studies before I introduce the neural evidence on third-party 
altruistic decision-making. Given that the majority of such studies included in the 
current thesis are only specifically relevant to the technique of functional magnet-
ic resonance imaging (fMRI), I will focus on fMRI in the following overview.    
1.2.2.1 A Brief Overview of Techniques in Human Neuroscience Researches 
In general, human neuroscience techniques (see Figure 3A for comparisons 
among different techniques) can be categorized into two major types: measure-
ment and manipulation techniques (Ruff & Huettel, 2013). Measurement tech-
niques refer to those that measure direct or indirect information transmission by 
neurons. In particular, this includes neurophysiological techniques (i.e., invasive 
single-unit recording and electrocorticography (ECoG), usually applied to patients 
with neurological or psychiatric disorders; non-invasive electroencephalography 
(EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG), usually applied to healthy participants) 
and metabolic neuroimaging techniques (i.e., invasive positron emission tomogra-
phy (PET) and non-invasive functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)). By 
and large, neurophysiological techniques are much better at providing temporal 
resolution (i.e., capturing neural signal changes in the unit of milliseconds), and 
are therefore widely used in studies focusing on the time course of neural activity 
changes during perceptual or cognitive tasks. In contrast, neuroimaging methods 
are known for their high spatial resolution (i.e., the neural signal change can be 
differentiated in the order of millimeters), which can then help to demystify the 
link between brain regions and specific cognitive functions (Poldrack & Farah, 
2015).  
Undoubtedly, the fMRI technique (see Figure 3B), among all the aforemen-
tioned measurement methods, has been the most widely used in the field of cogni-
tive neuroscience (Bandettini, 2012; Poldrack & Farah, 2015) and especially in 
neuroeconomics (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2005; Fehr & Camerer, 2007; 
Glimcher & Fehr, 2013; Konovalov & Krajbich, 2016; Loewenstein, Rick, & 
Cohen, 2008) since it first appeared in researches on human brain function nearly 
25 years ago (Bandettini, Wong, Hinks, Tikofsky, & Hyde, 1992; Kwong et al., 
1992; Ogawa et al., 1992). The physics, as well as the biophysics principles, be-
hind MRI are quite complex (Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2004), and goes far 
beyond the scope of the dissertation. One point to highlight is that standard MRI 
cannot provide any information for understanding brain function, although it can 
markedly improve the visualization of anatomical structures in any part of our 
body (e.g., brain, heart, spine), which greatly benefits clinical diagnoses. Func-
tional MRI actually measures changes in microvasculature oxygenation, namely 
the Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) contrasts (Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & 
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Tank, 1990), which are devised according to the interrelationship between neu-
ronal activity, oxygen and glucose consumption, as well as the MR signal. BOLD-
fMRI thus laid a solid foundation for the majority of later fMRI cognitive neuro-
science studies.  
 
Figure 3. (A) Temporal and spatial features of different neuroscience techniques. The horizon-
tal axis represents the temporal resolution; the vertical axis represents the spatial resolution. 
Abbreviations: EEG = electroencephalography, ERP = event-related potential, fMRI = func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging, MEG = magnetoencephalography, PET = positron emis-
sion tomography, TMS = transcranial magnetic stimulation. This figure is obtained from Glim-
cher and Fehr (2014) with small adaptations. (B) Illustration of the Siemens Trio 3T scanner. 
Figure source: https://www.healthcare.siemens.ch/magnetic-resonance-imaging/for-installed-
base-business-only-do-not-publish/magnetom-trio-tim. 
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Compared with knowledge on the physics and biophysics principles of fMRI, 
it is more important for cognitive neuroscientists to know how to apply this tech-
nique to a cognitive task appropriately. I will briefly summarize the key proce-
dures (or points) in detail as follows:  
1. Conducting an fMRI experiment: To ensure the fMRI study runs smoothly, it 
is always necessary to perform several preparatory steps, listed as follows, be-
fore running the fMRI experiment. First and foremost, it is important to make 
sure that the fMRI research proposal has been approved by the local ethics 
committee. Second, it is crucial to confirm whether the participants you recruit 
are fit for the MRI environment. Unlike behavioral tests, participants in fMRI 
studies make their response to the task while lying in a scanner. Given the 
powerful magnetic field in the scanner (e.g., usually 3 Tesla; the earth’s mag-
netic field is around 5 × 10-5 Tesla), it produces a strong gravity which can 
cause harm to participants with metal implants and permanent pacemakers. 
Thus, participants will usually be asked to fill out a safety-check questionnaire 
to rule out any potential harm from participating in the fMRI study. Third, re-
searchers should take care regarding the signal synchrony between the task 
program and the MRI scanner; otherwise the measured BOLD signal may not 
reflect the neural activity changes during the cognitive stage of interest. 
Fourth, it is always recommended to control the length of the paradigm, for 
example by making it last less than 40 minutes, which can protect the partici-
pants from fatigue and distraction. Last but by no means the least, it is an issue 
of substantial importance to provide the warning button to participants, and to 
stop the scanning as soon as it is pressed, at any time during the experiment 
(e.g., due to claustrophobia, uncomfortable feelings and so on).  
2. fMRI data analyses (see Figure 4): Generally speaking, the fMRI data anal-
yses adopted in the studies included in the current dissertation consist of the 
following three major steps (Poldrack, Mumford, & Nichols, 2011). The first 
major step is preprocessing. In detail, the raw data (i.e., EPI images) usually 
need to be corrected in the time domain (i.e., slice timing) and the space do-
main (i.e., head motion correction). After that, the data should be normalized 
to the standard coordinate space (e.g., Montreal Neurological Institute space, 
MNI) and spatially, as well temporally (i.e., high-pass filter), smoothed.  The 
second major step is fixed-effect analysis at the individual level via the general 
linear model (GLM; (Karl Friston et al., 1994)). After this step, we can obtain 
the parameter estimates for each regressor (i.e., onset time of each condition of 
interest and other nuisance effects, such as head motion parameters) for each 
voxel (i.e., the minimum spatial unit in fMRI studies), which then allows us to 
build contrast images between different conditions. The third step is random-
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effect analysis at the group level. Several different statistical models can be 
adopted given a specific goal, ranging from t-tests to multi-factor ANOVA. 
After this step, we can obtain the neural correlates of a specific cognitive pro-
cess with other relevant processes being controlled for. With the rapid devel-
opment of statistical methods, recent fMRI studies do not limit analyses to the 
GLM, but rather extend to complex analyses including psycho-physiological 
interaction (PPI; (K Friston et al., 1997)), dynamic causal modeling (DCM; 
(Karl Friston, Harrison, & Penny, 2003)), representational similarity analysis 
(RSA; (Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini, 2008)), multi-voxel pattern analysis 
(MVPA; (Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006)) and so on.  
 
Figure 4. Pipeline for analyzing the fMRI data in a traditional way. Abbreviations: SPM = statis-
tical parametric mapping, ANOVA = analysis of variance. 
The main disadvantage for all measurement techniques is that they can only 
provide correlational results. Thus it is always necessary to be cautious when draw 
conclusions from these studies (esp. those with GLM analyses), otherwise it is 
very easy to fall into the reverse inference trap (Poldrack, 2006), namely to infer 
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the cognitive function based on the neural correlates (e.g., ―The participant feels 
fear because his/her amygdala is activated ‖). Despite the development of several 
new statistical methods (e.g., MVPA) to try to make inferences more causal, the 
direct causal evidence is still not produced, although this could be addressed by 
manipulation techniques, namely the transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS). TMS can influence the activity of 
neurons at a specific part of the brain via electromagnetic induction (Hallett, 
2000). tDCS affect neuronal firing via a weak but constant electrical current be-
tween two electrodes attached to the scalp (Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). For more 
details on these two techniques, please refer to the corresponding citations.   
1.2.2.2 Third-Party Punishment 
1.2.2.2.1 The original research 
This first fMRI study on third-party punishment did not surprisingly rely on the 
standard economic paradigm, and instead was conducted from the perspectives of 
law, justice and legal decision-making (Buckholtz et al., 2008).  While in the 
scanner, participants were presented with a series of scenarios involving the ac-
tions of a protagonist, and were then asked to indicate how much punishment (i.e., 
the penalty deserved) the protagonist should receive according to a 10-point Lik-
ert scale (i.e., 0 = ―no punishment‖, 9 = ―extreme punishment‖). To identify the 
neural processes relevant to responsibility and consequence, the investigators cat-
egorized the scenarios into three groups, namely those in which the protagonist 
committed a crime with full responsibility (i.e., Responsibility), those in which 
the protagonist committed a crime with less responsibility (i.e., Diminished-
Responsibility), and those in which the protagonist did not commit a crime (i.e., 
No Crime). The subjective rating showed a strong modulatory effect of the scenar-
io, with the highest degree of punishment being meted out in those in which the 
protagonist was completely responsible for the crime. At the neural level, the right 
dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), a region also crucial for modulating se-
cond-party punishment (Knoch, Pascual-Leone, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006; 
Ruff, Ugazio, & Fehr, 2013; Strang et al., 2014), showed higher activity in re-
sponse to the Responsibility (vs. Diminished-Responsibility) scenarios, whereas 
the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) displayed higher activity in response 
to the Diminished-Responsibility (vs. Responsibility) scenarios. Furthermore, the 
neural activity in the right amygdala was positively associated with punishment in 
the Responsibility condition, and the relationship remained after controlling for 
the influence of the Diminished-Responsibility condition. Overall, these findings 
provided the first neural evidence on third-party punishment and suggested a 
common neural basis underlying both second- and third-party punishment. 
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1.2.2.2.2 Follow-up studies: factors modulating third-party punishment 
1.2.2.2.2.1 Evidence from fMRI studies 
With the standard paradigm in which the fairness norm is violated, Strobel et al 
(2011) conducted a more complicated study in order to further investigate 1) the 
difference between second- and third-party punishment at the neural level and 2) 
whether the cost rate (i.e., cost 2 MU to reduce 1 MU, weak punishment; cost 
1MU to reduce 4 MU, strong punishment) and 3) relevant genes (i.e., COMT gen-
otype, Met/Met, Val/Met, Val/Val) can influence punishment behavior and its neu-
ral correlates (Strobel et al., 2011). They showed that third-party punishment was 
even stronger in an unfair case than second-party punishment, despite there being 
no difference in other cases. With the region of interest (ROI) approach, they 
found that the anterior and posterior part of cingulate cortex together with the nu-
cleus accumbens (NAcc), displayed lower activities in third-party (vs. second-
party) context. More interestingly, the left DLPFC showed higher activity only 
during punishment (vs. no punishment) for third parties. Last but not least, they 
showed that genotype also modulated the third-party punishment-relevant activity 
in affective regions, including the cingulate cortex, insula and NAcc. 
Baumgartner and colleagues (2012) investigated the impact of group member-
ship on neural correlates of third-party punishment (Baumgartner, Götte, Gügler, 
& Fehr, 2012). To induce in-group bias, participants were randomly assigned to 
real social groups in the Swiss Army and trained exclusively with their group 
members for four weeks. On the scanning day, participants, as third parties, were 
presented with the results of a sequential prison dilemma game (see previous sec-
tion for details) between two anonymous players (i.e., first and second parties) 
with only the group membership shown. Then, they indicated the amount by 
which the first party should be punished. Behaviorally, third parties punished the 
outgroup perpetrator, who defected especially when the partner cooperated (DC), 
more harshly than the in-group one. At a neural level, the right orbital frontal cor-
tex (OFC), lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and caudate displayed higher activi-
ties for the out-group (vs. in-group) perpetrator during the case of DC. Interesting-
ly, the functional connectivity between the right OFC and LPFC positively 
correlated with the amount of punishment meted out to the outgroup perpetrator in 
the case of DC. However, the theory-of-mind network (Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, 
& Adolphs, 2014; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014), including 
the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and bilateral TPJ, showed higher 
activation for the in-group (vs. out-group) perpetrator. The functional connectivity 
between the DMPFC and left TPJ was negatively correlated with the amount of 
punishment meted out to the in-group perpetrator in the case of DC. These find-
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ings suggest differential neural mechanisms interact in the parochial third-party 
punishment decisions. 
Belief in free will (BFW) is also thought to affect judgments in the criminal 
law. A recent study investigated how BFW influences third-party punishment of 
the offender in a hypothetical criminal context (Krueger, Hoffman, Walter, & 
Grafman, 2014). Participants were divided into two groups based on the score of a 
validated psychological test that measures BFW and scientific determinism 
(Paulhus & Carey, 2011), namely ―Libertarians‖, who have higher BFW and be-
lieve people are morally responsible for their wrongdoings, and ―Determinists‖, 
who have lower BFW and believe that the material antecedents, instead of the 
self, should be responsible for an action. Participants were asked to read about the 
criminal scenarios that, consisted of either high- or low-affective offenses, and to 
rate how much punishment the protagonist deserved (on a scale ranging from 0 to 
100) while in a scanner. Libertarians only punished more than determinists in sce-
narios with low-affective contents. Consistently, the right TPJ also showed higher 
activity only for low-affective criminals, in libertarians vs. determinists, during 
punishment decisions. These findings indicate that the modulatory effect of BFW 
on third-party punishment was highly context-sensitive. 
Another factor that might influence third-party punishment is diffusion of re-
sponsibility, which is a hot topic among social psychologists (Latané & Nida, 
1981). A recent study addressed this question, in which third parties were either 
told to decide alone (i.e., Alone condition) or decide simultaneously with four 
other putative partners (i.e., Group condition), in an unfair situation (Feng et al., 
2016). As predicted, third parties felt less responsibility for reducing the selfish 
proposer’s payoff and punished less in the Group condition. Neuroimaging results 
showed that signals in the bilateral anterior insula (AI) were higher during decid-
ing alone (vs. Group condition) only for the unfair case, which also positively 
correlated with the difference in punishment amount between the two conditions 
(i.e., Alone vs. Group condition). However, the medial parts, including dorsal and 
ventral medial prefrontal cortex (i.e., DLPFC and VMPFC respectively) as well as 
the precuneus, showed the opposite activation and correlation pattern. Moreover, 
effective connectivity analyses via Granger causality mapping (Deshpande, 
LaConte, James, Peltier, & Hu, 2009) showed that the left AI and DMPFC acted 
as a driver for the other regions mentioned above in the Alone and Group condi-
tions respectively. 
To further dissociate the effects of intention and harm (consequence) on third-
party punishment at both the behavioral and neural level, a recent fMRI study 
adopted the criminal-justice judgement paradigm used in Buckholtz et al (2008) 
but with a refined design (Ginther et al., 2016). In particular, the whole decision-
making procedure was divided into four cognitive stages (i.e., reading about the 
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violation event, judging the harm and intention separately with the order counter 
balanced, and deciding on the punishment), separated by another irrelevant task 
(i.e., simple mathematical calculation) to intercept the mutual influences between 
the stages. Behavioral analyses showed that the interaction between intention and 
harm significantly modulated the punishment intensity. At the neural level, they 
successfully matched different brain to the corresponding cognitive stages; i.e., 
the mentalizing network (e.g., TPJ, DMPFC) encoded the judgement of intention, 
the affective regions (e.g., insula) encoded the judgment of harm, and the infor-
mation was integrated in the medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices, 
together with amygdala, which finally informed the right DLPFC to initiate pun-
ishment. By adopting advanced connectivity analysis from the perspective of a 
brain network (e.g., multivariate Granger causality analysis), another recent study, 
which used a similar paradigm,  showed that the DMPFC worked as a hub not 
only by sending information to the TPJ and VMPFC, but also by connecting with 
the DLPFC in correlation with the punishment degree (Bellucci et al., 2016). The-
se findings support the previous studies and characterize the possible neural net-
work underlying third-party punishment (Krueger & Hoffman, 2016). 
1.2.2.2.2.2 Evidence from TMS studies 
To our knowledge, two studies have used TMS technique to provide causal evi-
dence for third-party punishment. By adopting the standard paradigm, Brüne et al 
(2012) found that only third parties with repetitive TMS inhibition in the right 
DLPFC, rather than the left DLPFC or a sham condition, significantly increased 
the punishment amount toward the unfair proposer (esp. the 8:2 case, with the first 
and second number being the payoffs for the proposer and recipient) (Brüne et al., 
2012).  
In a more recent study, Buckholtz and colleagues (2015) also applied repeti-
tive TMS to inhibit the bilateral DLPFC (i.e., active condition, together with a 
sham condition as the control) and then presented participants with vignettes 
about criminal scenarios that varied according to harm (e.g., from property theft to 
murder) and culpability (i.e., responsibility or diminished responsibility of the 
protagonist). Participants were asked to indicate either how much punishment the 
offender deserved (i.e., punishment) or how morally responsible the offender was 
for his actions (i.e., blameworthy) on 10-point Likert scales. Although participants 
did not show differences in blameworthiness judgments between the active and 
sham conditions, they differed in terms of punishment: the punishment degree was 
significantly reduced after the DLPFC was inhibited. The mediation analyses fur-
ther revealed that inhibition of DLPFC via repetitive TMS influenced the integra-
tion of harm and culpability judgments, which then led to altered punishment be-
havior. An additional fMRI task also showed higher activation in the right DLPFC 
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during punishment (vs. blameworthiness) assessments, which again corroborated 
the key role of the DLPFC in driving third-party punishment during judicial deci-
sion-making. 
1.2.2.2.2.3 Evidence from patient studies 
Studies based on patients with brain lesions or neurological disorders can always 
inform and supplement studies of healthy population (i.e., provide stronger evi-
dence for the necessary condition at the neural level initiating a certain behavior); 
the field of third-party (punishment) decision-making is no exception. In the hy-
pothetical legal justice judgment paradigm (Buckholtz, et al., 2008), a recent 
study revealed that patients with penetrating traumatic brain injury (pTBI), with 
specific lesions in regions including the MPFC and DLPFC, punished less than 
the normal controls (Glass, Moody, Grafman, & Krueger, 2015). Another study 
first investigated third-party punishment, as well as moral judgment towards norm 
violations, in a sample of patients with multiple sclerosis (MS) (Patil, Young, 
Sinay, & Gleichgerrcht, 2016), a demyelinating disease involving deformation of 
anatomical structures (i.e., inflammation or degeneration in brain or spinal cord) 
which is associated with several neuropsychological impairments in both non-
social (Feinstein, Magalhaes, Richard, Audet, & Moore, 2014; Rocca et al., 2015) 
and social domains (Charvet, Cleary, Vazquez, Belman, & Krupp, 2014). The re-
sults showed that MS patients made harsher punishment as well as judgment than 
normal controls across different types of violations. Taken together, these findings 
additionally extend our knowledge of third-party punishment to different clinical 
populations and contribute to our understanding of the underlying neural mecha-
nism.  
1.3 Current Studies 
Based on the above literature review, we know that third-party altruistic behavior 
(esp. punishment) has been one of the central topics in behavioral economics, so-
cial psychology and decision neuroscience for more than a decade. However, as 
far as we know, no study has simultaneously considered the neural correlates of 
both third-party punishment and helping behavior within the same paradigm. This 
knowledge gap provides the basic motivation for the studies included in the cur-
rent dissertation. In the rest of this section, I will clarify the motivation behind, 
and goals of each of the studies in more detail.  
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 Motivations and Goals 1.3.1
1.3.1.1 Study 1 
The first and foremost goal of Study 1 is quite straightforward; namely, to investi-
gate the common and differential processing during third-party help and punish-
ment at the neural level. Since no previous human neuroscience studies investi-
gated the helping behavior with a third-party paradigm, we need to find clues 
from studies using paradigms involving direct helping behavior, which has been 
found to be closely associated with positive emotional experiences (Aknin et al., 
2013; Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008, 2014). For example, Dunn and colleagues 
(2008) found that people’s happiness can only be predicted by the money they 
spend on others (e.g., buying gifts for others or donating to a charity) rather than 
themselves, after controlling for income. To further test the causal relationship 
between prosocial spending and happiness, they designed an experiment in which 
participants were asked to either spending their endowment (i.e., $5 or $10) on 
themselves or on someone else (or charity). Again, participants felt happier after 
spending money on others. Consistent with behavioral findings, neuroimaging 
studies also show that helping others is associated with reward-relevant brain are-
as, especially the ventral striatum (Haber & Knutson, 2009). In particular, the 
more participants helped other out-group members (i.e., those in support of the 
opposing soccer team as the participants) by taking half of the other’s pain on 
oneself, the higher neural activity in the striatum displayed during observation of 
other out-group members in high pain (Hein, et al., 2010). Striatal activation was 
also observed in another study, in which participants invested their own endow-
ment in a charity improving the everyday quality of life of African orphans 
(Genevsky, Västfjäll, Slovic, & Knutson, 2013). Interestingly, the same region is 
also involved in altruistic punishment (De Quervain et al., 2004; Strobel, et al., 
2011). In an earlier PET study, increased activity in the striatum was observed 
when participants costly punished an anonymous partner who defected in the trust 
game (De Quervain, et al., 2004). Moreover, Strobel and colleagues (2011) direct-
ly compare the neural correlates of second- and third-party punishment in an un-
fair situation, finding that participants displayed an enhanced response in the stria-
tum during punishment (vs. non-punishment) in both tasks, despite the striatal-
relevant reward effect being stronger for the second-party punishment. Based on 
these findings, it seems that both helping behavior and punishment in the third-
party context might elicit positive emotions, which connects with activation in the 
striatum. 
Moreover, we also would like to know why different third parties sometimes 
show different altruistic choices in the same context. According to a behavioral 
study by Leliveld et al (2012), third-party deciders diverged in their choice prefer-
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ences according to empathic concern; i.e., more empathic people preferred to 
compensate the victim, whereas those with lower empathic concern were in favor 
of punishing the offender. To be specific, empathic concern is a personality trait, 
which is defined as other-oriented concern for those who suffer or are in need 
(Coke, et al., 1978; Toi & Batson, 1982), considered as a reliable precursor for 
altruistic behavior, especially helping behavior (Batson & Powell, 2003; De Waal, 
2008; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Usually, empathic concern is measured by the 
empathic concern subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; (Davis, 
1983)), as a stable trait. Thus, in Study 1, we will focus on the potential moderat-
ing effect of empathic concern on the third party’s choice, as well as its neural 
correlates, in a context whereby helping behavior and punishment are both altruis-
tic options.   
1.3.1.2 Studies 2A and 2B 
In Studies 2A and 2B, we would like to answer an important and interesting ques-
tion, whether third-party altruistic decision-making can be influenced by a spray 
of oxytocin (OXT), a hormone famous for its prosocial effect (Striepens, 
Kendrick, Maier, & Hurlemann, 2011). Generated in the hypothalamus, the pep-
tide OXT has long been known for its effect in lactation and production in females 
(Carter, 2014; Gimpl & Fahrenholz, 2001). However, OXT has becomes a central 
topic in social and affective neuroscience due to a study that revealed its role in 
enhancing human altruism in a social context (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, 
Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005). In that study, male participants were asked to play a 
trust game, in the role of ―investor‖, with an anonymous partner as a ―trustee‖. 
The task for the ―investor‖ was to decide how much he would like to bequeath 
from his own endowment to the ―trustee‖ (i.e., this amount were tripled by the 
experimenter), who could transfer the money back to benefit both of them. Sur-
prisingly, participants that received an intranasal spray of OXT significantly in-
creased their investment to the unknown ―trustee‖ compared with the placebo 
(PLC) condition (but see (Nave, Camerer, & McCullough, 2015) for a different 
finding). To rule out the alternative explanation that OXT just influences the risk 
aversion in general, they also ran a control experiment in which participants made 
similar decisions except that the final payback was randomly determined by the 
computer, which failed to show the same results. Inspired by this study, a series of 
researches investigated whether intranasal OXT could influence other aspects of 
human altruism, including empathy (Hurlemann et al., 2010), generosity (Zak, 
Stanton, & Ahmadi, 2007) and cooperation (De Dreu et al., 2010; Rilling et al., 
2012) in different paradigms. However, no study, to our knowledge, has examined 
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whether and how OXT affects third-party altruistic decisions in healthy males, 
which serves as the motivation for Studies 2A and 2B4.   
Moreover, Study 2A had another crucial goal of investigating how OXT exerts 
an impact on neural processing during altruistic decision-making in the third-party 
context. Previous neuroimaging studies have already shown that reward-relevant 
brain regions, mainly the ventral striatum and nucleus accumbens (NAcc), might 
be involved during costly help (Genevsky, et al., 2013) and punishment decisions 
(De Quervain, et al., 2004) made in social contexts. Apart from that, another cru-
cial cognitive prerequisite for making third-party decisions is theory-of-mind 
(ToM) or mentalizing, defined as the ability to understand others’ specific (affec-
tive) states, beliefs, and intentions (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; De Waal, 
2008), which is strongly connected with regions including the temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) in terms of multiple fMRI 
evidences (Frith & Frith, 2006; Schaafsma, et al., 2014; Schurz, et al., 2014). Im-
portantly, either the reward neural circuitry or mentalizing ability could be modu-
lated by OXT. For instance, a recent fMRI study detected stronger neural respons-
es in regions like the striatum and NAcc when healthy males viewed their female 
partners’ faces with OXT treatment compared with a PLC condition (Scheele et 
al., 2013). Concerning mentalizing ability, one behavioral study documented that 
male participants’ performance in a ToM task was enhanced by intranasal OXT 
(Domes, Heinrichs, Michel, Berger, & Herpertz, 2007), which also extends to oth-
er associated domains such as empathy (Hurlemann, et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, a recent study found that OXT selectively enhanced perception 
of harm to the victim, but not the perceived deservedness of the offender punish-
ment, in a hypothetical criminal judgment task (Krueger et al., 2013). This indi-
cated that OXT might not only affect the decision-making process per se, but also 
the perceptions accompanying the process. This finding inspired our additional 
research question, namely regarding how OXT affects perceptions during third-
party decisions at the neural level. To disentangle perceptions from the decision-
making process, Study 2A included another condition, in which participants were 
asked to only observe either the offender being punished or the victim being 
helped by the computer (this condition was the control condition in Study 1; see 
Study 1 for details). To be consistent, we will focus on the same regions of interest 
(e.g., NAcc and TPJ) for both research questions. 
                                                 
4 Study 2A serves as a discovery study; Study 2B can be regarded as a behavioral replication study 
with a similar, but slightly different, paradigm and design (see corresponding empirical chapter for 
details).  
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1.3.1.3 Study 3 
As mentioned above, unselfish third parties can intervene in norm violations via 
either punishing the offender or compensating the victim. Those different altruis-
tic behaviors correspond with two basic types of justice goal, namely retributive 
and restorative justice (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Gromet & Darley, 2009). In brief, 
the former goal highlights only punishment, whereas the latter one takes the vic-
tim into account. One previous study found that participants, as third-party judges 
in a simulated context, were less likely to select the way merely addressing pun-
ishing the offender but instead preferred the sanction also considering the restora-
tive justice (e.g., helping the victim) after they were asked to think about how the 
victim was affected by the offender in a given criminal situation (Gromet & 
Darley, 2009).  This suggests a potential cognitive basis underlying the altruistic 
decision-making process in the third-party context. In particular, two types of oth-
er-regarding attention focus (i.e., one concerning the offender’s behavior and the 
other concerning the victim’s feelings) highlighting different types of justice goal 
(i.e., retributive and restorative justice) compete with each other, with the prevail-
ing goal driving the subsequent altruistic decision (i.e., punishment or help). If 
there is an external cue that highlights one of the foci, to makes it more salient, 
this will help that specific concern to outweigh the other one and thereby shift the 
decision in a direction consistent with that concern.  
Several recent findings strengthen the validity of the proposed coupling be-
tween external attention focus and choice behavior across different tasks. For in-
stance,  participants improved their dietary choices (i.e., choosing more healthy 
food items) when they focused on the healthiness rather than tastiness of the food 
items (Hare, Malmaud, & Rangel, 2011). Similarly in a social decision task, par-
ticipants, in the role of recipients, were more likely to reject (accept) an unfair 
offer from an anonymous proposer while considering the fairness (their own inter-
ests) in the ultimatum game (Makwana, Polania, & Hare, 2014). In another study, 
which used the paradigm of the dictator game, participants, in the role of propos-
ers, were more generous to unknown recipients when considering what was the 
right thing to do, or their partner’s feelings compared with the baseline condition 
(Hutcherson & Rangel, 2014). 
Hence we designed Study 3 to further test the hypothesis of there being a 
causal relationship between exogenous attention focus and changes in altruistic 
behaviors in the third-party context. Two key characteristics distinguish this study 
from a previous study by Gromet & Darley (2009). First and foremost, it adopts 
an incentivized context with a modified behavioral economic paradigm. Similar to 
Study 1, participants as third-party deciders are presented with the offer made by 
the anonymous proposer to the recipient, and they need to decide whether to en-
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gage (i.e., punish the offender or help the victim) at self-cost and, if so, how much 
they will pay. In addition, we experimentally manipulate the other-regarding focus 
by instructing participants to either consider the offender’s behavior, the victim’s 
feelings, or to decide naturally when making their decisions. All decisions made 
by participants are costly for themselves, and they are also told to believe the con-
sequences of their decisions for the other people involved (i.e., the offender and 
the victim). Unlike the non-costly choice and hypothetical context used in Gromet 
& Darley (2009), decisions in the current study have higher ecological validity 
and can thus reflect real life situations pertaining to morality (FeldmanHall et al., 
2012). Moreover, we also employ fMRI to record neural signals during the deci-
sion period in the different focus conditions, which could provide insights for un-
derstanding the neural mechanisms underlying the attention-induced decision 
changes of third parties.  
Given that the decision-making process (esp. during other-regarding focus 
conditions) is highly likely to recruit mentalization, we again focus on the TPJ 
(Schaafsma, et al., 2014; Schurz, et al., 2014). In addition, participants might feel 
more cognitive conflict when making specific altruistic choice (e.g., help) under 
certain focus conditions (e.g., focusing on the unfairness of the offender) versus 
the baseline condition, since the justice goal hinted at by the choice (e.g., help 
choice hints at restorative justice goal that takes the victim into account more) 
goes against the goal indicated by the focus (e.g., focusing on unfairness high-
lights the retributive justice goal that takes the offender into account more). Thus 
regions related with cognitive control (e.g., the anterior cingulate and inferior 
frontal cortex) are also assumed to play a role.  
1.3.1.4 Study 4 
As we mentioned earlier (see literature overview and motivation for Study 1), the 
altruistic choice preference of third-party deciders could be influenced by individ-
ual difference in empathic concern level. Based on this finding, it is natural to ask 
a follow-up question: what is the underlying cognitive basis driving such an ef-
fect?  
Traditional behavioral studies cannot answer this question, since they do not 
capture subtle changes during cognitive or decision-making processes in the tem-
poral domain. However, the eye-tracking technique can offset such a methodolog-
ical disadvantage and provide a refined measure of eye-movement to describe the 
general information-searching depth or distribution of attention towards a specif-
ic-piece of information (Orquin & Loose, 2013). For example, fixation number is 
usually adopted to measure the general depth of information searching during de-
cision-making, and is regarded as a better index of decision time (Fiedler & 
Glöckner, 2012; Fiedler, Glöckner, Nicklisch, & Dickert, 2013; Glöckner & 
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Herbold, 2011), Another important and widely used index of gaze behaviors is the 
fixation proportion, which is a reliable measure of how attention is distributed 
over different pieces of information during cognitive processing (Fiedler & 
Glöckner, 2015; Orquin & Loose, 2013). For instance, a meta-analysis on the 
comprehension of visualization showed that compared with novices, experts had 
higher proportion of fixations on task-relevant areas (Gegenfurtner, Lehtinen, & 
Säljö, 2011). A recent study showed that participants with higher other-regarding 
concern, indexed by the ring measure of social value orientation as a personality 
trait (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988), paid more attention to the other’s payoffs 
when deciding on between different monetary distributions between themselves 
and another person (Fiedler, et al., 2013). This finding provides an important link 
between social preference and attention-based information searching. Other gaze 
measures, such as the distribution of the first- and last-fixation towards the specif-
ic information, might also help to reveal changes of attention during the decision-
making process (Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Krajbich & Rangel, 2011). 
Enlightened by the study by Fiedler et al (2013), we argued that the empathy-
dependent shift of altruistic choice preference might be induced by the attention 
distribution towards different aspects of the norm violation situation, which might 
serve as the potential underlying cognitive mechanism. Given the nature of em-
pathic concern, participants as third-party deciders with higher levels of empathic 
concern usually pay more attention to the victim (i.e., consider and understand 
his/her feelings, especially if the victim has been mistreated by others), which is 
in turn more likely to activate the goal of restorative justice (see Study 3) and fi-
nally drives helping rather than punishment behavior. Accordingly, bystanders 
with lower levels of empathic concern punish more often, as they pay less atten-
tion to the victim but more to the offender, which might highlight the goal of re-
tributive justice (see Study 3).  
Additionally, it is also possible, with the above proposal, to directly manipu-
late the attention focus of third-party deciders towards different aspects of the 
unfair situation, namely either to consider the unfairness of the offender (i.e., of-
fender-focus block, OB) or to think about the feelings of the victim (i.e., victim-
focus block, VB), similar to Study 3. The proposal will be further confirmed if we 
find either a main effect of attention focus and/or the an interaction with the em-
pathic concern level, in terms of both choice behavior and measures of eye-
movement during the altruistic decision-making process; such findings could pro-
vide a direct link between the external attentional modulator (i.e., attention focus), 
behavior, and the underlying attention-based decision process.   
In summary, Study 4 aims to answer the following three specific research 
questions, with the help of the eye-tracking technique: first, whether and how em-
pathic concern level (measured by the empathic concern subscale of the IRI; see 
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also Studies 1-3) influences the eye-movements (in addition to altruistic choice), 
as a measure of attention, during the decision-making process in a third-party con-
text in which participants decide naturally (i.e., baseline block, BB); second, 
whether and how external attention focus (i.e., OB or VB) influences both altruis-
tic choice and gaze measures; third, whether and how their interaction (i.e., atten-
tion focus × empathic concern) influences these measures. To address these ques-
tions, we used a similar design to that of Study 3, except that participants always 
completed the decision task in BB first and then were informed about the other 
two conditions to rule out a potential confounding influence of the different focus 
conditions (see corresponding empirical section for details). 
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2 Study 1: Neural Correlates of Third-Party Altruistic 
Decision-Making and Its Link with Empathic 
Concern5 
2.1 Hypotheses 
Based on previous findings and our research questions, we have the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): We expect that participants as third-party deciders will show 
stronger activation in regions involved in reward process, especially in (both 
dorsal and ventral) striatum, either when they choose to help the victim or 
punish the offender, compared with to control trials. 
H2a: We expect that empathic concern will influence the participant’s choice pref-
erence. In particular, participants with higher empathic concern will prefer to 
help the victim, whereas lower empathic participants will punish the offender 
more frequently. 
H2b: We expect that empathic concern will also affect the neural correlates during 
the help versus punishment choice.  However, we do not have a clear predic-
tion on which region will be affected, as there is no previous study which 
provides sufficient hints for this hypothesis. 
2.2 Methods 
 Participants 2.2.1
Thirty-six healthy participants (mean age = 22.72 ± 2.85; 24 females) were re-
cruited from the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE) 
for the present fMRI study. All of them reported no history of neurological or psy-
chiatric disorders. To collect the real decisions used for the fMRI study, we re-
cruited another 84 participants (mean age = 23.58 ± 6.13; 54 females) from the 
same subject pool for an independent behavioral experiment. The study was ap-
proved by the ethics committee of the University of Bonn. All participants signed 
                                                 
5 The study based on this chapter has been published during the PhD study period of the author 
with permission. The full citation is here: Hu, Y., Strang, S., & Weber, B. (2015). Helping or pun-
ishing strangers: Neural correlates of altruistic decisions as third-party and of its relation to em-
pathic concern. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9, 24. 
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the written consent form based on the Declaration of Helsinki (BMJ 1991; 302: 
1194). 
 Decision Collection and Behavioral Task 2.2.2
Following the ―no deception‖ rule of experimental economics (Glimcher & Fehr, 
2013), we first collected real decisions from another group of participants (i.e., 
behavioral participants) before we ran the fMRI study. In particular, the recruited 
behavioral participants were invited to the Bonn EconLab and asked to play a 
Dictator Game, which has two roles, namely an offender (labeled as ―proposer‖) 
and a victim (labeled as ―recipient‖). Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of the two roles and kept that role for 10 rounds of the game. In each round, one 
offender was paired with an anonymous victim and was endowed with 100 mone-
tary units (MUs; 1 MU = 20 Cents). His or her task was to determine how to split 
this amount with the victim, by choosing from one of the five options listed as 
follows: 100/0, 90/10, 80/20, 70/30, 60/40, 50/50 (i.e., payoff for the offend-
er/victim). The presentation of the stimuli and response collection was conducted 
via Z-tree, the most popular software for behavioural economic experiments 
(Fischbacher, 2007) . 
It is necessary to note the following aspects of the behavioral task. First, par-
ticipants in the role of the offender were informed before the behavioral task that a 
certain proportion of their choices, together with the name initials, would be pre-
sented to third parties (e.g., fMRI participants) who would complete another part 
of the study later. They could further affect the final payoff for both offenders and 
victims denoted in those decisions. Hence, behavioral participants only received a 
€ 4 show-up fee at the end and would receive the choice-dependent payoff (M = € 
10.1, SD = € 7.3) a month later (i.e., at the time when the fMRI study was com-
pleted). Second, in each round the victim matched with a certain offender who 
was never the same person, as confirmed by the perfect stranger matching strate-
gy.  
From the total of 420 choices made by all offenders (i.e., 142, 82, 57, 33, 43, 
63 choices for the split 100/0, 90/10, 80/20, 70/30, 60/40, 50/50 respectively), we 
finally selected 160 choices in response to the unfair split (i.e., 100/0, 90/10, 
80/20, 70/30, 60/40) as stimuli used in the later fMRI study. These choices (i.e., 
stimuli) were evenly distributed over each of the unfair split in either the decision 
condition (i.e., 24 choices for each split) or the control condition (i.e., 4 for choic-
es each split). 
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 fMRI Paradigm 2.2.3
Two functional scanning runs were divided by a self-paced break. Each run con-
sisted of 80 incentivized trials. In 75% of these trials (i.e., the choice trials), par-
ticipants were presented with the choice made by the specific offender together 
with the name initials of both parties (i.e., the offender and the victim) and were 
asked whether they would like to help the victim by increasing his/her payoff or 
punish the offender by reducing his/her payoff, each time with their own endow-
ment (i.e., 50 MU per trial; 1 MU = 20 Cents). A bar in magenta was shown below 
the option once participants made the decision by pressing one of the two buttons 
with the left or the right finger, which was recorded via response grips (Nordic 
NeuroLab, Bergen, Norway). Independent of the decision time, the decision phase 
lasted 4s followed by an inter-stimulus fixation point (1-3s). For trials in which 
participants failed to respond in 4s, the endowment was deprived for that trial. 
Then came the next screen in which participants were asked to further indicate the 
exact amount they would like to transfer by moving a cursor in a scale ranges 
from 0 to 50 (with the step of 5) in 4 seconds (i.e., the transfer phase). The trial 
ended with a jittered fixation cross (3-7s). For the remaining 25% trials (i.e., the 
control trials), which were indicated by a white frame, the procedure was the 
same, except that participants only needed to observe the decisions and transfers 
already made by the computer (see Figure 5). To balance the decision, half of the-
se trials were set to the help choice, while others were set to the punishment 
choice, which was consistent across all five monetary splits. All trials were pre-
sented in a pseudo-random order, fixed across participants. Participants saw the 
stimuli via video goggles (Nordic NeuroLab, Bergen, Norway). The stimuli 
presentation during the experiment was performed with Presentation 14.9 (Neuro-
behavioral System, Albana, Canada). 
Apart from that, we considered the following details to make the paradigm 
stand against the potential confounds. First, the cost ratio was set to 1:3, meaning 
that 1 MU transferred from participants could either reduce 3 MU from the of-
fender or add 3 MU to the victim. This was in line with previous literature (Fehr 
& Fischbacher, 2004; Leliveld et al., 2012). Second, to avoid demand characteris-
tics, the key words such as ―help‖ and ―punish‖ were never used in either the in-
structions or the fMRI screen; instead, words with neutral emotion (e.g., ―in-
crease‖ and ―subtract‖) were adopted respectively. Third, to avoid the association 
between position and specific option, we counterbalanced the position of the two 
options (i.e., ―increase‖ and ―subtract‖) in the decision phase across trials. Fourth, 
to ensure that all costly altruistic choices were made voluntarily, participants were 
explicitly told that in the transfer phase they could transfer 0 MU. Fifth, the start-
ing position of the cursor was randomly determined to be located between 0 and 
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50 in the transfer phase of each trial. Finally, the offender could not lose money 
(i.e., the minimum payoff was 0). 
 
Figure 5. Example of the procedure for the choice trials as well as the control trials. In the 
example of the choice trial, the participant subtracted 15 MUs from the offender (i.e., L.E.); in 
the example of the control trial, the participant observed the computer to add 30 MUs to the 
victim (i.e., N.C.). Abbreviations: MU = monetary unit; ISI = inter-stimulus interval; ITI = inter-
trial interval. 
 Procedure 2.2.4
Upon arrival, participants were informed about the behavioral experiment and 
about the upcoming task in the scanner. They confirmed to have understood the 
task by passing a short comprehension test directly after the instructions. Before 
they were sent to the scanner, they were also familiarized with the task using prac-
tice trials. A structural scanning was performed following the functional scanning. 
After coming out of the scanner, participants filled out a series of online ques-
tions including in the empathic concern subscale of Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI) which measures empathic concern as a stable personality trait (see Table 1 
for items of empathic concern subscale; see Appendix Table 1 for all items of IRI 
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scale). They also rated the perceived fairness of the five unfair monetary splits 
used in the study, together with the 50/50 fair split as control, on a 8-point Likert 
scale (i.e., 1 = very fair, 8 = very unfair). At the end of the study, participants were 
paid 10 € for their attendance. Additionally, one out of the 160 trials were random-
ly selected to pay the fMRI participants as well (M = € 7.0, SD = € 2.5). This pay-
off further determined the choice-dependent extra payoff for corresponding of-
fenders and victims. 
Table 1. Items of the empathic concern subscale of IRI 
Note: 0 refers to ―does not describe me well‖, 4 refers to ―describes me very well‖. * refers to 
reverse-scored items. IRI refers to interpersonal reactivity index. 
 Data Collection 2.2.5
All imaging data was collected via the 3-Tesla Siemens Trio platform at the Life 
& Brain Imaging Center, located at the University Hospital Bonn. For images of 
the fMRI task, 37 slices of the axial plane (in-plane resolution = 2 2 mm2, matrix 
= 9696, slice thickness = 3 mm, FOV = 192192 mm2) covering the whole brain 
were acquired via a T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequences with 
blood-oxygenation-level dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 2500 ms, TE = 30 ms, 
flip angle = 90°). We also obtained a high-resolution anatomical scanning with 3D 
MPRage sequences for anatomical co-registration and normalization (TR = 1660 
ms, TE = 2.75 ms, flip angle = 9°, matrix = 320  320, slice thickness = 0.8 mm, 
FOV = 256  256 mm2). 
Content Answer Scale 
I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 0---1---2---3---4 
Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having 
problems.* 
0---1---2---3---4 
When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective 
towards them. 
0---1---2---3---4 
Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.* 0---1---2---3---4 
When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very 
much pity for them.* 
0---1---2---3---4 
I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 0---1---2---3---4 
I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 0---1---2---3---4 
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 Data Quality Check and Analyses 2.2.6
Given the goal of the current study, we excluded 10 participants as they failed to 
show enough decisions (i.e., with a lenient criterion: at least 5 decisions per run) 
to help (n = 1), punish (n = 7), or both altruistic choices (n = 2) in both of the two 
functional runs, since few trials might lead to unstable estimation for the target 
effect according to the low signal-to-ratio feature for fMRI data analyses. Besides, 
we also excluded one participant due to the incomplete data. Henceforth, data 
from the remaining 25 participants was adopted for further analyses.  
2.2.6.1 Behavioral Data 
For the behavioral data, the mean proportion of choice, the mean decision time as 
well as the mean transfer amount were calculated for help and punishment choice 
respectively for each participant. Statistical analyses were performed via SPSS 22 
(SPSS Inc.). Paired t-test, repeated-measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) as 
well as Pearson correlation were used to test hypotheses and to perform explorato-
ry analyses. All reported p values were two-tailed and p < 0.05 was considered 
significant. 
2.2.6.2 fMRI Data 
2.2.6.2.1 Preprocessing 
For fMRI data, SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Department of Cognitive Neurology, Lon-
don, UK) was used for analysis. For raw EPI images within each run of each par-
ticipant, we started with the preprocessing, including the following steps. To begin 
with, we discarded the first three volumes to make sure of a stable BOLD signal 
in the remaining images. Next, EPI images were realigned to the first volume in 
order to correct for head motions (< 2.5 mm). After the head motion correction, 
the images were corrected at the temporal domain via slice timing, which aimed to 
ensure all slices within one volume were adjusted to the same time point. Then, 
the mean EPI image within this run was computed and co-registered to the ana-
tomical image, which was followed by the segmentation. With the parameters of 
the normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space generated 
after the segmentation, all EPI images were projected onto MNI space with a 2  
2  2 mm3 resolution. In the next step we applied the spatial smoothing on all im-
ages with an 8-mm FWHM (full width half maximum) isotropic Gaussian kernel. 
To further remove low-frequency drifts, we also performed a high-pass temporal 
filtering with a cut-off of 128 s. 
2.2.6.2.2 General linear model (GLM) analyses 
The GLM mass-univariate regression approach was adopted for the individual-
level fixed-effect analyses. This GLM focused on the decision-phase and included 
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four regressors of interest within in each run, given the decisions participants or 
the computer made, namely onsets of stimuli presentation during help choice, 
punish choice, as well as the corresponding control trials (i.e., help_control, and 
punish_control). All onsets of other events were pooled to one regressor (i.e., oth-
er), including onsets of stimuli presentation during keep choice (i.e., participants 
in these trials kept all the endowment) or no response, and onset of all transfer 
phase. For the choice less than 5 trials in some runs, onsets of stimuli presentation 
during that choice were also treated as other regressor and not modeled as an in-
dependent event. To control for motion, we additionally included the six estimated 
head movement parameters in the GLM design matrix. Individual contrasts be-
tween regressors of interested pooling the effect across two runs were built, name-
ly the contrast help vs. help_control, punish vs. punish_control, as well as help vs. 
punish.  
For the group-level random-effect analyses, we first performed a one-sample 
t-test on the contrast help vs. help_control as well as punish vs. punish_control 
respectively to check for decision-relevant activity. In order to know the common 
activation pattern in association with the help and punishment choices, we ran a 
conjunction analysis between the two contrasts mentioned above within the flexi-
ble factorial model. Apart from that, we also applied a regression analysis to test 
whether empathic concern could modulate the altruistic-relevant neural activation. 
To this end, the contrast help vs. punish was used as the dependent variable with 
the scores measured by empathic concern subscale of IRI as the predictor in the 
regression.  
2.2.6.2.3 Explorative functional connectivity analysis 
To explore the neural network involved in help and punishment decisions, we per-
formed a standard psycho-physiological interaction (PPI) analysis (K Friston, et 
al., 1997; Gitelman, Penny, Ashburner, & Friston, 2003). In principle, this analysis 
aims to address the question of how a given target region changes its functional 
connectivity with other part of the brain, measured by the correlation between the 
time series of BOLD signals in both regions, dependent on different experimental 
conditions. It has become one of the most popular approaches within the field of 
cognitive neuroscience to test the context-dependent functional network in fMRI 
studies (O’Reilly, Woolrich, Behrens, Smith, & Johansen-Berg, 2012). 
To do this, we first defined the source regions, namely the striatum, in terms of 
the conjunction activation of the contrast help vs. help_control and punish vs. 
punish_control at the group level. To refine and make sure that the joint activation 
was located in the anatomical region of striatum, we defined two spheres (i.e., the 
left and the right side) centered at the peak voxel of the joint activation, using the 
radium of 8 mm and then intersecting these spheres with the bilateral striatum 
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mask of the AAL template. Taking the individual difference of neural activity into 
account, we drew the volume of interest (VOI; a 6mm sphere) from the individual 
contrast help vs. help_control and punish vs. punish_control, respectively for each 
participant, within the two group-level source masks. To build the interaction 
term, we then extracted the time series of each VOI (i.e., the physiological term), 
deconvolved and mulplied them with the psychological term, namely the onsets 
vectors of either help vs. help_control (i.e., weight: 1, -1) or punish vs. pun-
ish_control (i.e., weight: 1, -1), according to the recommended procedure by 
Gitelman et al. (2003). Then we ran four GLM regression analyses separate for 
help and punishment choice with either the left or the right striatum as the seed 
VOI at the individual level, each including three regressors of interest (i.e., the 
PPI term, the physiological term, the psychological term) within each run control-
ling for head motion. Next, the individual contrast image pooling the effect across 
two runs was built while focusing on the PPI term vs. the implicit baseline. These 
images were then forwarded to the group-level random-effect analyses one-
sample t-tests, which identified the other regions displaying increased functional 
connectivity with seed VOI (i.e., either the left or the right striatum) during either 
help or punishment choices.  
For whole-brain analyses mentioned above, we adopted the uncorrected voxel-
level p < 0.001 with the extent threshold at k = 50. For display reason, we also 
extracted and plotted the parameter estimates (i.e., contrast values) together with 
time course of percent signal change of the peak voxel in above analyses by 
MarsBar (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net).  
2.3 Results 
 Behavioral Results  2.3.1
We first investigated whether empathic concern (mean ± S.D. = 17.24 ± 3.70; 
Range: from 7 to 23) is correlated to the proportion of help or punishment choice 
via the Pearson correlation analysis. Consistent with our initial hypothesis (see 
H2a), we found that participants with higher empathic concern helped the victim 
more often (r = 0.441, p = 0.027), whereas those less empathic third parties more 
preferred to punish the offender (r = -0.461, p = 0.02, Figure 6A). A similar ex-
ploratory analyses further showed that empathic concern could also modulated the 
decision process (i.e., the mean difference of decision time between help and pun-
ishment choice), showing that participants helped faster but prolonged punishment 
choice with increasing empathic concern level (r = -0.406, p = 0.044, Figure 6B).  
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Moreover, we also examined whether participants differed in the following 
behavior measures between help and punishment choice, namely choice propor-
tion (%), decision time (ms) and transfer amount (MU), by using paired-samples 
T-test (see Table 2 for summary of descriptive statistics). Although we detected 
the significant difference in neither proportion (t(24) = 0.632, p = 0.533) nor deci-
sion time (t(24) = -0.326, p = 0.747) between trials with help and punishment 
choices, we observed that participants invested more MUs to punish the offender 
than to compensate the victim (t(24) = 3.266, p = 0.003).  
In addition we checked whether objective inequality affected participants’ sub-
jective rating on unfairness. A one-way repeated measure ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of inequity on unfairness rating (F(5, 120) = 225.967, p < 0.001, par-
tial η2 = 0.904), which was further confirmed by the post-hoc analyses that partic-
ipants perceived stronger unfairness with increasing inequality of the monetary 
split (ps < 0.05, Bonferroni corrected; see Table 3 for summary of descriptive sta-
tistics). 
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Figure 6. (A) Correlation between empathic concern level and proportion of either help or pun-
ishment choice; (B) Correlation between empathic concern level and the difference in decision 
time between help and punishment choice. Significance level: *p < 0.05. 
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Table 2. Descriptive summary of behavioral measures during the fMRI task 
 help punishment 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
Choice Proportion (%) 49.30 42.40 
 (27.28) (27.90) 
Decision Time (ms) 1583.15 1611.45 
 (431.63) (402.22) 
Transfer Amount (MU) 11.07 16.15 
 (5.07) (6.86) 
Note: S.D. refers to standard deviation; MU refers to monetary unit. 
Table 3. Descriptive summary of post-scanning rating 
 50/50 60/40 70/30 80/20 90/10 100/0 
Unfairness Rating 1.48 3.52 5.24 6.24 7.32 8.00 
 (1.12) (1.30) (0.93) (0.93) (0.48) (0.00) 
Note: Values refer to the mean; standard deviations are provided in parentheses; unfairness ratings 
range from 0 (not at all) to 8 (very much). 
 Imaging Findings  2.3.2
2.3.2.1 Neural correlates of third-party help and punishment 
To test H1, we compared the neural correlates during decisions to help (vs. 
help_control) and to punish (vs. punish_control) respectively. Consistent with our 
initial prediction, we found an increased response in bilateral striatum in associa-
tion with either help or punishment choices. Additionally, both contrasts revealed 
activation in other regions including inferior/superior parietal lobule (BA 39/40) 
and mid-cingulate cortex extending to supplementary motor area (BA 4/6). To 
further confirm the common neural substrates underlying both altruistic choices in 
such context, we ran a conjunction analysis for the contrast of help vs. 
help_control and punish vs. punish_control, which showed again the involvement 
of the bilateral striatum (see Table 4 and Figure 7)6. We consequently asked our-
                                                 
6 To rule out the effect of button press differed between the choice and the control trials, we ran 
another GLM with the same regressors as the main GLM except that we modeled the onset of the 
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selves, whether there was difference in neural correlates between two altruistic 
choices. We henceforth compared the contrast of help vs. punish via a one-sample 
t-test, finding no significance under the pre-defined threshold.   
  
Figure 7. (A) Conjunction activations of both contrasts of help (vs. help_control) and punish-
ment (vs. punish_control); (B) Timecourse of percent (%) signal change in the local peak voxel 
of left striatum in all conditions. Display threshold: p < 0.001 at voxel-level, uncorrected; Error 
bars: SEM. Abbreviations: L = left, R = right. 
                                                                                                                                     
button press separately. The main findings in striatum during altruistic decisions remained signifi-
cant (see Table 5).  
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Table 4. Neural activations in response to third-party altruistic decisions (vs. control conditions) 
Brain Region Hemi-
sphere 
Cluster 
Size 
MNI Coordinates 
  
BA T-
value 
      x y z     
help > help_control             
MFG L 93 -46 36 22 46 4.16 
MFG R 147 40 48 8 46 5.20 
ACC/SMA B 937 -4 12 42 6/24/32 6.92* 
Insula/STG R 254 46 -18 10 13/22 6.90* 
PCG/PoCG/IPL/SPL L 2877 -46 -2 58 1/2/3/6/ 
7/39/40 
8.93* 
PCG/PoCG/IPL/SPL R 2301 26 -64 58 1/2/3/4/ 
7/39/40 
7.31* 
IOG/MOG L 1438 -38 -78 0 17/18/19 7.56* 
IOG/MOG R 1760 34 -84 2 17/18/19 8.85* 
Caudate/Putamen L 574 -14 14 4   8.35* 
Caudate/Putamen R 264 16 14 -2   7.71* 
                
punish > punish_control             
SMA/MCC/ACC B 1167 10 -8 50 6/24/31/3
2 
6.71* 
PCG/PoCG/IPL/SPL L 1870 -40 -38 44 2/3/4/ 
7/39/40 
7.22* 
PCG/PoCG R 1047 48 -18 50 2/3/4 6.74* 
STG/ Insula L 206 -50 -34 8 13/41 4.68* 
IOG/MOG/MTG L 573 -44 -72 6 17/18/ 
19/37 
5.55* 
IOG/MOG/MTG R 629 46 -66 2 17/18/ 
19/37 
7.08* 
Caudate/Putamen L 599 -16 10 -2   7.48* 
Caudate/Putamen R 255 24 -12 2   7.26* 
                
Conjunction             
Caudate/Putamen L 382 -16 12 0   6.26* 
Caudate/Putamen R 250 16 -20 6   6.08* 
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PCG/PoCG/IPL/SPL L 1493 -38 -38 38 2/3/4/ 
6/40 
5.13* 
PCG/PoCG R 922 40 -12 58 2/3/4/6 5.69* 
MTG/MOG L 125 -44 -70 6 19/37 5.05 
ITG/ MTG R 236 46 -66 4 19/37 5.57* 
SMA/MCC/ACC M 583 -4 14 46 6/9/24/32 4.97* 
STG/Insula/PoCG L 324 -38 -34 16 13/41/42 4.16* 
STG/Insula R 232 50 -14 10 13/22/41 4.56* 
IOG/MOG L 96 -26 -92 -4 18 4.10 
IOG/MOG R 130 30 -86 -2 18/19 4.28 
Note: Threshold is set to p < 0.001, k = 50, uncorrected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise error 
(FWE) corrected at the cluster level.  
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling toolbox for 
SPM8): L = left, R = right, B = bilateral; ACC = Anterior Cingulate Gyrus, IFG = Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus, IOG = Inferior Occipital Gyrus, IPL=Inferior Parietal Lobule, ITG = Inferior Temporal 
Gyrus, MCC = Mid-cingulate Cortex, MFG=Middle Frontal Gyrus, MOG = Middle Occipital 
Gyrus, MTG=Middle Temporal Gyrus, PCG=Precentral Gyrus, PoCG=Postcentral Gyrus, 
SMA=Supplementary Motor Area, SMG=Supramarginal Gyrus, SPL = Superior Parietal Lobule, 
STG = Superior Temporal Gyrus. 
Table 5. Neural activations in response to third-party altruistic decisions (vs. control conditions) 
controlling for button pressing 
Brain Region Hemi-
sphere 
Cluster 
Size 
MNI Coordinates BA T-
value 
   x y z   
help > help_control        
PoCG/PCG L 355 -46 -28 64 1/3/4/6 6.03* 
IPL/PoCG/PCG R 602 58 -30 54 1/2/3/4/ 
6/40 
5.56* 
Caudate/Putamen/Pallidum L 274 -12 14 2  5.87* 
Caudate/Putamen/Pallidum R 225 16 12 0  6.98* 
Thalumus L 158 16 -16 4  5.15 
Thalumus R 162 -18 -12 6  4.73 
punish > punish_control        
SMA R 90 16 -8 52 24 5.17 
PoCG/PCG L 240 -36 -22 48 3/4 4.79* 
PoCG/PCG R 353 38 -12 54 3/4/6 5.83* 
Cau- B 1766 6 -28 -10  7.37* 
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date/Putamen/Pallidum/ 
Thalamus/Brainstem 
Conjunction        
Caudate/Putamen/Pallidum L 205 -14 10 0  4.81 
Caudate 
/Pallidum/Putamen 
R 126 18 6 0  4.42 
PoCG/PCG L 195 -50 -20 54 3/4 3.99 
PoCG/PCG R 196 38 -14 60 3/4/6 4.50 
Thalamus/Brainstem B 657 -2 -24 -12  5.27* 
Button Press        
SFG/MFG R 185 32 -4 66 6 5.14 
PCG R 72 36 -10 42 6 4.25 
IOG/MOG/SOG/ 
FG/Precuneus/Cuneus/ 
PoCG/PCG/ 
IPL/SPL/ITG/STG/ 
SMA/ACC/PCC/ 
MFG/Insula/PHG/ 
Caudate/Putamen/ 
Cerebellum 
B 66552 22 -78 -14 3/4/5/6/ 
7/8/9/10/ 
13/18/19/ 
20/22/23/ 
24/30/32/ 
37/38/39/ 
40/42/43/ 
44/45/ 
46/47 
15.64* 
Note: In this GLM, we added the onset of button presses to control for motor related activity, with 
the other regressors being the same as the main GLM. Threshold is set to p < 0.001, k = 50, uncor-
rected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise error (FWE) corrected at the cluster level. 
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling toolbox for 
SPM8): L = left, R = right, B = bilateral; ACC = Anterior Cingulate Gyrus, FG = Fusiform Gyrus, 
IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus, IOG = Inferior Occipital Gyrus, IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobule, ITG 
= Inferior Temporal Gyrus, MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus, MOG = Middle Occipital Gyrus, MTG 
= Middle Temporal Gyrus, PCC = Posterior Cingulate Cortex, PCG=Precentral Gyrus, 
PoCG=Postcentral Gyrus, PHG = Parahippocampal Gyrus, SFG = Superior Frontal Gyrus, SMA = 
Supplementary Motor Area, SOG = Superior Occipital Gyrus, SPL = Superior Parietal Lobule, 
STG = Superior Temporal Gyrus. 
2.3.2.2 Empathic Concern Modulates Neural Correlates During Third-
Party Altruistic Choices 
The regression analyses on the contrast help vs. punish with the empathic concern 
scores as the predictor showed that the activity in a frontal-parietal network, main-
ly including the left part of the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC, BA 9) as well as 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL, BA 7/40; see Table 6 and Figure 8). These findings 
supported H2b and also explained to some degrees the lack of the main effect 
mentioned above. 
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Figure 8. Regions reflecting the correlation between the contrast of help vs. punishment and 
empathic concern level. Scatter plots showed the relationship between contrast values of peak 
voxel and empathic concern, only with the goal of illustration. Display threshold: p < 0.001 at 
voxel-level, uncorrected. Abbreviations: L = left, R = right, LPFC = lateral prefrontal cortex; IPL 
= inferior parietal lobule. 
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Table 6. Correlation between brain activation of the contrast help vs. punishment and empath-
ic concern scores 
Brain Region Hemisphere Cluster Size MNI Coordinates 
  
  
BA T-value 
      x y z     
IFG/MFG L 84 -34 24 22 45/46 4.62 
MFG L 150 -46 20 40 8/9 4.79 
MFG/FP L 79 -38 54 6 10 4.34 
SFG/MFG L 312 -24 26 60 6/8/9 5.43* 
SFG R 112 20 66 10 10 5.60 
IPL/SPL/AG/SMG L 620 -32 -74 50 7/39/40 5.47* 
MTG R 73 66 -2 -24 21 5.54 
ITG R 58 60 -20 -18 20/21 4.36 
Note: Threshold is set to p < 0.001, k = 50, uncorrected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise error 
(FWE) corrected at the cluster level. 
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling toolbox for 
SPM8): L = left, R = right, B = bilateral; AG = Angular Gyrus, FP = Frontal Pole, IFG = Inferior 
Frontal Gyrus, IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobule, ITG = Inferior Temporal Gyrus, MFG=Middle 
Frontal Gyrus, MTG=Middle Temporal Gyrus, SFG = Superior Frontal Gyrus, 
SMG=Supramarginal Gyrus, SPL = Superior Parietal Lobule. 
 
2.3.2.3 PPI Results 
The explorative functional connectivity analyses via PPI showed that the bilateral 
striatum, as our seed regions, increased the connection with the right LPFC (BA 
45/46) during help decision (vs. help_control) (see Figure 9), whereas they en-
hanced the connectivity with left LPFC (BA 44/45) during punishment choices 
(vs. punish_control) (see Figure 10; see Table 7 for other PPI results). 
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Figure 9. Regions reflecting enhanced functional connectivity with bilateral striatum during 
help (vs. help_control). Bar plots showed the contrast value of PPI in the peak voxel of LPFC 
with bilateral striatum in all conditions (vs. implicit baseline respectively), only with the goal of 
illustration. Display threshold: p < 0.001 at voxel-level, uncorrected; Error bars: SEM. Abbrevi-
ations: PPI = psycho-physiological interaction, L = left, R = right, LPFC = lateral prefrontal 
cortex. 
Chapter 2.  Study 1: Neural Correlates of Third-Party Altruistic Decision-Making and Its Link with Empathic Concern 
54 
 
Figure 10. Regions reflecting enhanced functional connectivity with bilateral striatum during 
punishment (vs. punish_control). Bar plots showed the contrast value of PPI in the peak voxel 
of LPFC with bilateral striatum in all conditions (vs. implicit baseline respectively), only with the 
goal of illustration. Display threshold: p < 0.001 at voxel-level, uncorrected; Error bars: SEM. 
Abbreviations: PPI = psycho-physiological interaction, L = left, R = right, LPFC = lateral pre-
frontal cortex. 
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Table 7. Regions reflecting enhanced functional connectivity with striatum during third-party 
altruistic decisions (vs. control conditions) 
Seed 
Region 
Brain Region Hemisphere Cluster 
Size 
MNI Coordi-
nates 
BA T-value 
       x y z   
Left 
Striatum 
help > help_control       
  MFG/IFG R 50 60 26 20 45/46 4.47 
  SMA B 78 -8 4 64 6 4.71 
  MCC/PCC B 319 -8 -26 46 24/31 4.73* 
  STG/TP L 104 -36 12 -22 38 4.92 
  Precuneus/Cuneus R 110 24 -82 26 7/18/31 4.06 
  LG/FG/Cuneus B 3300 18 -72 -4 17/18/ 
19/37 
6.79* 
  Thalamus B 81 -4 -4 10   5.27 
  punish > punish_control           
  IFG L 169 -48 14 22 44/45 5.50* 
  SFG L 76 -22 -4 52 6 4.45 
  PCG L 528 -44 -4 44 6 6.44* 
  PCG R 270 40 -4 40 6 5.80* 
  STG/MTG L 323 -58 -34 2 21/22 5.33* 
  MTG/TP R 105 58 10 -18 21/38 6.63 
  LG/FG/Cuneus/ 
Precuneus/PHG 
B 12443 20 -68 -2 7/17/18
/19/31 
10.10* 
  Putamen/Amygdala L 101 -18 8 -6   4.54 
  Putamen R 58 22 10 -4   4.33 
Right 
Striatum 
help > help_control            
  MFG/IFG R 172 56 28 18 45/46 5.88 
  SFG/MFG R 71 28 40 42 8/9 4.77 
  SMA L 60 -12 4 62 6 4.00 
  PCG R 196 54 -2 52 6 4.73* 
  STG/MTG L 234 -58 -32 0 22 4.76* 
  MTG/TP R 76 48 4 -18 21/38 4.94 
  ITG/FG L 277 -36 -36 -20 20/36 5.18* 
  PHG/FG R 55 32 -28 -24 36 4.07 
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  Cuneus R 50 18 -80 30 7/31 4.13 
  LG/FG B 5026 -6 -74 2 17/18/ 
19/37 
6.80* 
  Puta-
men/Insula/PHG 
L 352 -28 -20 0   6.23* 
  Caudate/Putamen R 57 22 14 8   4.70 
  punish > punish_control            
  MeOFG/ACC B 315 0 42 -6 10/11/ 
32 
6.37* 
  PCG L 278 -40 -6 38 6 4.73* 
  PCG R 135 34 -2 34 6 6.07 
  MTG R 55 40 -78 18 19 4.54 
  TP L 55 -44 24 -32 38 5.67 
  TP R 86 58 10 -16 38 5.65 
  SPL L 163 -20 -72 56 7 4.58 
  Cuneus R 124 16 -88 22 18 4.35 
  LG/ FG/Precuneus/ 
Cuneus/PHG 
B 4781 -18 -84 10 17/18/ 
19/23/ 
30/31 
6.69* 
  Putamen R 59 26 10 -4   4.64 
Note: Threshold is set to p < 0.001, k=50, uncorrected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise error 
(FWE) corrected at the cluster level. 
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling toolbox for 
SPM8): L = left, R = right, B = bilateral; ACC = Anterior Cingulate Gyrus, AG = Angular Gyrus, 
FG = Fusiform Gyrus, IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus, IOG = Inferior Occipital Gyrus, IPL=Inferior 
Parietal Lobule, ITG = Inferior Temporal Gyrus, LG = Lingual Gyrus, MCC = Mid-cingulate 
Cortex, MFG=Middle Frontal Gyrus, MeOFG = Medial Orbital Frontal Gyrus, MTG=Middle 
Temporal Gyrus, PCC = Posterior Cingulate Cortex, PCG=Precentral Gyrus, PoCG=Postcentral 
Gyrus, PHG = Parahippocampal Gyrus, SFG = Superior Frontal Gyrus, SMA=Supplementary 
Motor Area, SPL = Superior Parietal Lobule, STG = Superior Temporal Gyrus, TP = Temporal 
Pole. 
2.4 Discussion 
 Shared Representation for Third-Party Help and Punishment 2.4.1
Decision in Striatum 
In line with H1 and previous fMRI studies focusing on help (Genevsky, et al., 
2013) as well as altruistic punishment choice (de Quervain et al., 2004), we ob-
served for the first time that striatum (esp. the ventral part) was activated during 
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both help and punishment choice in a third-party context where the third-party 
decider had both altruistic options to restore the justice.  
The striatum is well known for processing the reward for more than half a cen-
tury. The first direct evidence linking striatum and reward were from a neurophys-
iological study on rats (Olds & Milner, 1954). With electrodes permanently im-
planted in the brain, rats could get the electrical stimulation towards several 
specific regions while pressing a lever. It was important to note that rats received 
no other reward (e.g., water, food) during the experiment. Results showed that rats 
frequently pressed the lever which led the electrical stimulation on the striatal 
area, suggesting the strong relationship between striatum and reward. In non-
primate electrophysiological studies, striatal neurons (e.g., in putamen, caudate 
and nucleus accumbens) were found to fire when animals were presented with 
reward itself or reward-predicting stimuli (Apicella, Scarnati, Ljungberg, & 
Schultz, 1992; Schultz, 2015). With the proliferation of the fMRI studies, multiple 
evidence that human reward processing and the relevant decision-making relied 
on the function of striatum was accumulated (K. S. Wang, Smith, & Delgado, 
2016). The most common paradigm for human reward processing research is a 
simple guessing paradigm and relevant modified tasks. In such paradigms, people 
are always asked to make a simple guess and to win the money if their response is 
correct, such as guessing whether the next number is larger than the current one or 
which out of one to four boxes (from 1 to 4) contains a randomly hidden ball. Re-
sults have consistently showed the engagement of striatum at the moment of win-
ning money (Fliessbach et al., 2010).  Moreover, several studies further extend the 
effect of the social reward on the striatum (Bhanji & Delgado, 2014). An earlier 
study showed that the striatum was strongly activated when participants viewed 
attractive (vs. unattractive) faces (Aharon et al., 2001). The similar phenomenon 
was also observed when people gained the attention and the potential approval 
from others, in comparison to making decisions alone, while deciding whether to 
donate to the charity (Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2010). Furthermore, a study direct-
ly compared the neural correlates of receiving either monetary or social reward 
(i.e., obtaining the positive evaluation on their personality from other strangers), 
finding that both types of reward robustly activated striatum (Izuma, Saito, & 
Sadato, 2008). Given the above evidence, our results suggest that people might 
gain reward experience via either compensating the victim or punishing the of-
fender, even with the cost of their own money. 
A supplementary evidence which partially supports the shared neural represen-
tation between the two altruistic choices is that the LPFC, despite being in differ-
ent hemispheres, increased the functional connectivity with the bilateral striatum 
during help or punishment decisions. This result partly consisted with the previous 
finding that third-party punishment elicited stronger activity in left LPFC in com-
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parison with direct punishment (Strobel, et al., 2011). From the anatomical per-
spective, the connection between the LPFC and the striatum (Haber & Knutson, 
2009) provide the basis for the task-dependent functional connectivity. From the 
functional perspective, the LPFC has long been regarded as a key area activated 
during goal-directed decision-making as well as cognitive control (Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Tanji & Hoshi, 2008). Several studies adopting the brain stimulation 
technique revealed the causal relationship between the LPFC (esp. the right side) 
and decisions in either the social or non-social domain. For instance, participants 
in the recipient role during the Ultimatum Game were more likely to accept an 
unfair offer after the right LPFC was inhibited by low-frequency repetitive TMS 
compared with the sham control group. Recent evidence with tDCS further con-
firmed the crucial function of right LPFC in norm compliance. In particular, en-
hancing the excitability of the right LPFC via anodal tDCS reduced the voluntary 
sharing percentage of a proposer in a standard Dictator Game, but enhanced the 
sanction-induced sharing percentage in a context where the recipient can costly 
punish the unfair proposer. Interestingly, the opposite effect was observed if the 
right LPFC was inhibited by the cathodal tDCS (Ruff, et al., 2013).  The similar 
effect was replicated in a later TMS study (Strang, et al., 2014). Besides, with an 
inter-temporal choice task, participants chose the option with immediate monetary 
reward more often after the inhibitory TMS on the left, but not the right, LPFC, 
indicating that left LPFC also engages in cognitive control (Figner et al., 2010). 
Given the above-mentioned evidence from previous literature, our PPI results in-
dicate that third-party deciders, despite experiencing positive emotion and reward-
ing, still need more cognitive control to inhibit selfish impulses during the altruis-
tic but costly decisions. 
Given the common underlying neural substrates, our PPI results also hinted 
that there might still be some difference in neural processing during these two 
altruistic choices from a functional network perspective. Particularly, we found 
that the vmPFC was more closely associated with striatum during punishment 
choices. Based on previous literature, we know that the vmPFC is crucial for val-
ue computation during decision-making (Clithero & Rangel, 2013; Ruff & Fehr, 
2014), engaged in integrating affective information (Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 
2006) and is also sensitive to reward processing together with the striatum (Bartra, 
McGuire, & Kable, 2013). Given the multiple functions that the vmPFC might be 
involved in, it becomes difficult to find a reasonable explanation to this 
explorative finding. 
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 The Role of Empathic Concern in Affecting Choice 2.4.2
Preference and Its Neural Correlates  
As predicted in H2a, we found that empathic concern correlated positively with 
the proportion of help choices and negatively correlated the punishment propor-
tion of third-party deciders. Our behavioral results replicate previous finding with 
the one-shot third-party paradigm (Leliveld et al., 2012) and extend the similar 
effect into a multi-shot game. Surprisingly, we also showed the modulatory effect 
of empathic concern on the decision process, namely that people with higher em-
pathic concern were faster in making help choice but slower to punish on average. 
In the theoretical framework of dual system, reduced decision time is usually re-
garded as a sign for the automatic process. For instance, Rand and colleagues 
showed in a series of behavioral studies that participants are more cooperative if 
they made the decision faster than if they made the decision under time constraint, 
thus suggesting the heuristic and spontaneous nature of human altruism (Rand, 
Greene, & Nowak, 2012). Based on these findings it seems that help choice is the 
automatic option for higher empathic participants but with more controlled pro-
cesses for lower empathic participants. If this explanation is true, we would pre-
dict that regions relevant to cognitive control, such as LPFC, were less activated 
during help vs. punishment choice in higher (vs. lower) empathic participants. 
However, our imaging findings conflicted with this prediction. Instead, partici-
pants with higher empathic concern displayed higher activity in fronto-polar re-
gions (i.e., left part of LPFC and IPL) during help (vs. punishment) choice. Given 
the role of frontopolar region in attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Dosenbach, 
Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008), we proposed an alternative possibility 
that high empathic third-party deciders prefer to help the victim as they have allo-
cated more attention to the victim, which is in turn driven by the personality trait. 
However, this unsolved conflict in the explanation motivates future studies to test 
the above hypothesis. 
 Limitations 2.4.3
The current study bears several limitations. To begin with, we had to exclude 
nearly one thirds of participants for the fMRI analyses due to the huge individual 
difference of choice preference across participants. As previously mentioned, most 
participants were excluded mainly because that they failed to show sufficient al-
truistic choice in either or both types. Even in the remaining 25 participants, some 
of them showed strong preference and stick to one of the altruistic choice, which 
might lead to the unstable estimation of BOLD signal on the effect of the less pre-
ferred choice. As it is a common problem for fMRI studies related with decision-
making focusing on a certain type of choice, it is not easy to find a good solution. 
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Perhaps the easiest way is to increase the sample size so that we can guarantee 
enough participants who fit the aim of the study even after exclusion, which, on 
the other hand, causes other difficulty in practice (e.g., increasing the research 
budget).   
Another limitation is that since participants in the control trials did not need to 
respond (i.e., only observing the decisions made by the computer), we could not 
completely rule out the confounding difference in motor-relevant activity between 
the decision condition and the control condition. The current design has its ad-
vantages, namely that additional affective (e.g., anger) or cognitive (e.g., conflict) 
processes can be avoided due to the forced response (esp. if the indicated response 
was against with the voluntary response under a certain context). Given that stria-
tum is part of the motor network (Witt, Laird, & Meyerand, 2008) and also engag-
es in motivated action during decision-making (Guitart-Masip, Duzel, Dolan, & 
Dayan, 2014), however, the activation difference between choice and control con-
ditions in striatum might also be partly due to the difference in motor requirement. 
Although later analysis which explicitly modeled the button press still confirmed 
our main results (i.e., stronger activities in bilateral striatum were associated with 
both altruistic choice after controlling for the motor effect), further study should 
take this problem into account and make a better control (e.g., using the condition 
by asking participants to perform a simple comparison between the payoffs of the 
offender and the victim as a high-level control). 
 Summary 2.4.4
In a nutshell, the current fMRI study reveal, for the first time, the neural corre-
lates of costly help and punishment choices from third-party deciders by adopting 
a modified third-party paradigm. The common representation in the striatum dur-
ing both choice types in such context suggests a reward experience of the human 
altruism during costly restoring the social norm. Moreover, we again confirm the 
role of empathic concern in modulating third party’s altruistic choice preference, 
and further show the accompanying neural correlates in frontopolar regions, indi-
cating the mechanism underlying such empathy-dependent choice modulation. 
These results extend our horizon and knowledge in understanding third-party al-
truistic decision-making, a special form of human altruism (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2003; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). 
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3 Studies 2A and 2B: The Effect of Oxytocin on 
Third-Party Decision-Making and Its Neural 
Correlates7 
3.1 Hypotheses: Study 2A 
According to previous studies, we pose the following hypotheses to address our 
research questions: 
H1: At the behavioral level, we expect that third-party deciders will show more 
altruistic choices of either type after they are treated with intranasal OXT, 
compared with the PLC control group.  
H2: At the neural level, we expect that intranasal OXT will modulate the reward-
relevant processes (esp. in NAcc) as well as the mentalizing processes (esp. in 
ToM network, mainly TPJ and MPFC) during altruistic decision-making and 
the accompanying perception (i.e., observing other’s being helped or pun-
ished). 
3.2 Methods: Study 2A 
 Participants 3.2.1
We recruited 41 healthy males (mean age: 25.1 ± 3.9 yrs) to attend the present 
pharmacological-fMRI study. To make sure all participants fit the strict healthy 
criterion, we performed a clinical screen with the Mini-International Neuropsy-
chiatric Interview (Sheehan et al., 1998) for each participant separately before the 
MRI session. As a consequence, we ensured that all participants were without any 
current or past psychiatric or neurological disorders, were free of dependence and 
addiction to cigarettes, drug or alcohol abuse. Besides, we also guaranteed that all 
participants were in good health condition (i.e., no caffeine or alcohol intake, with 
regular sleep, without cold) on the day of fMRI study. This study was approved by 
the ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of Bonn. All partic-
ipants signed the written consent based on the Declaration of Helsinki (BMJ 1991; 
302: 1194).  
                                                 
7 The study based on this chapter (Study 2A) has been published during the PhD study period of 
the author with permission. The full citation is here: Hu, Y., Scheele, D., Becker, B., Voos, G., 
David, B., Hurlemann, R., & Weber, B. (2016). The Effect of Oxytocin on Third-Party Altruistic 
Decisions in Unfair Situations: An fMRI Study. Scientific Reports, 6. 
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 Design 3.2.2
A within-subject, double-blind, placebo-controlled design was adopted. The key 
independent variable was the drug treatment, which means that each participant 
attended the fMRI study twice, with one time getting OXT (24 Internet Unit; 
Sigma Tau; 3 puffs per nostril alternately, each with ~4 IU) and the other time 
getting PLC with self-administered intranasal spray. Both the experimenters and 
participants did not know the real treatment on the scanning day.  
 fMRI Paradigm 3.2.3
The fMRI task paradigm was basically the same as we used in Study 1, with the 
following exceptions. First, we shortened the length of the task by reducing the 
number of decision trials to 80 so that we finally only made one scanning run (i.e., 
80 decision trials with 40 control trials) for one session. Second, the stimuli were 
presented not via video goggles; instead they were projected on a 32-inch MRI 
compatible TFT LCD monitor (NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway) positioned at 
the rear of the magnet bore and participants saw the stimuli via an MRI compati-
ble mirror during the whole experiment. Last but not least, the deception rule was 
used for the current study. In specific, we did not collect the real choices from 
another independent group before the fMRI study so that participants’ decisions 
would not make real monetary consequence on others, which was unknown to 
them.  
 Procedure 3.2.4
As mentioned above, participants were assessed with MINI on a separate day be-
fore the MRI session. On the same day, they also filled out the empathic concern 
subscale of Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) scale for the measurement of em-
pathic concern as an individual trait (Davis, 1983).  
On the day of each scanning session, participants first filled out the a series of 
questionnaires including the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), commonly 
used for measuring the state anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, & Vagg, 
1970), and the Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS), commonly 
used for measuring the state emotion (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Next, 
participants were provided with the nasal spray and asked to administer a dose of 
24 IU of either OXT or PLC by themselves. After that, participants were informed 
about the third-party task together with other tasks via reading instructions, which 
was followed by the practice in a separate behavioral testing room. 
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The scanning started around 30 min after the intranasal administration8. Fol-
lowing a 6-min resting-state scanning (i.e., unrelated with the current study and 
will be reported in another study), the third-party task began and lasted about 30 
min. Besides, participants also completed another task that is irrelevant for this 
study. In total participants stayed in the scanner with functional scanning for about 
60 min. 
With a short break after scanning, participants finished a rating task for the 
monetary split they saw just now in the scanner. In particular, they were asked the 
following three questions, namely 1) ―How unfair is this monetary splits offered 
by Player A to Player B?‖, 2) ―To what degree do you think the proposer deserves 
punishment?‖, and 3) How much empathy do you feel for the recipient?‖ with the 
fixed order within each participant while the counterbalanced order across differ-
ent participants, by indicating their evaluation on a 9-point Likert scale (0 = Not at 
all, 8 = very much). Next participants’ anxiety and emotion state were measured 
again via STAI as well as PANAS. To further control the side effect of OXT on 
general cognitive ability, we also measured the attention performance via the d2 
task (Brickenkamp, 1995). In the very end of each session, participants were also 
asked to report whether they received OXT or PLC treatment in this session (see 
Figure 11 for iilustration of whole procedure). Participants were paid 60 € for their 
attendance together with the task-dependent extra payment (~ € 25) after the 2nd 
session of the MRI measurement. 
                                                 
8 We acquired a T1 anatomical scan for each participant before the drug administration when they 
did the task for the first time.  
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Figure 11. Experimental procedure for both measurements. D2 is a cognitive test used to 
check attention ability. Abbreviations: OXT = oxytocin, PLC = placebo, STAI = the state-trait 
anxiety inventory, PANAS = the positive and negative affective schedule, Rest = resting-state 
scanning, TPPH = third-party punishment and help, pre = before drug treatment, post = after 
drug treatment, min = minute. 
 Data Collection 3.2.5
All imaging data were collected via the 3-Tesla Siemens Trio platform at the Im-
aging Center of Life & Brain, University Hospital Bonn. The sequence used for 
both functional and structural images were the same as Study 1.  
 Data Quality Check and Analyses 3.2.6
Twenty-two (out of 41) participants were kept for the further data analyses. We 
excluded 13 participants as they failed to show enough decisions (i.e., with a leni-
ent criterion: at least 5 decisions per run) to help (n = 1), punish (n = 9), or both 
choices (n = 3) in either one or both sessions. Besides, we also excluded one par-
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ticipant who quitted during the scanning, 1 participants who received the same 
drug treatment for both sessions, 1 participants with extreme low IRI empathic 
concern level (i.e., out of 3 standard deviation of the whole sample) as well as 3 
participants with extreme headmotion (i.e., >  3mm). 
3.2.6.1 Behavioral Data  
Similar to Study 1, we calculated the mean proportion of choice behavior, the 
mean decision time as well as the mean transfer amount for help and punishment 
choice respectively for each participant in both sessions (see Table 8). The statisti-
cal approach with SPSS 22 (SPSS Inc.) was also similar to Study 1, except that 
we also used χ2 test to rule out the side effect of belief.  
3.2.6.2 fMRI Data 
3.2.6.2.1 Preprocessing 
We used SPM 8 (Wellcome Trust Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, 
UK) to analyze the fMRI data. The data was preprocessed following the same 
procedure in Study 1.  
3.2.6.2.2 General linear model (GLM) Analyses 
The GLM mass-univariate regression approach was adopted for the individual-
level fixed-effect analyses. For each session, a separate GLM was built, which 
focused on the decision-phase and included four regressors of interest within in 
each run according to the decisions participants or the computer made, namely 
onsets of stimuli presentation during help, punish, help_computer, as well as pun-
ish_computer conditions. We pooled other uninterested events to a single regres-
sor (i.e., other; same with Study 1) and also added the 6 parameters of head mo-
tion in the design matrix. Individual contrasts were built, including the contrast 
help vs. help_control, punish vs. punish_control, help vs. punish as well as regres-
sors of interest vs. implicit baseline (i.e., help, punish, help_computer, pun-
ish_computer vs. implicit baseline respectively).  
For the group-level random-effect analyses, we performed a 2 (i.e., treatment: 
OXT/PLC) × 2 (i.e., self-decision vs. computer: help vs. help_computer / punish 
vs. punish_computer) repeated measure flexible ANOVA to further test the three-
way interaction between three factors, namely treatment (OXT/PLC), agency 
(self-decision/computer), and decision (help/punish). To further explore whether 
OXT can modulate the effect of empathic concern on altruistic decision-making, 
we also performed an additional regression analysis with the contrast [PLC_(help 
vs punish) vs OXT_(help vs punish)] as the dependent variable and the empathic 
concern scores as the predictor. For the whole-brain analysis, we adopted the 
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threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected at peak voxel level with an extent threshold of 
k = 50. 
3.2.6.2.3 Region of interest (ROI) analyses 
Based on our hypotheses, we defined the following ROIs for the three-way inter-
action analyses mentioned above. Concerning the reward-relevant region, we fo-
cused on the bilateral NAcc, which were created based on the masks from the 
AAL template. Concerning the mentalizing process, we focused on two regions, 
namely bilateral TPJ and MPFC. Since these regions were not defined given the 
traditional anatomical template, we used the coordinate-based approach to draw 
the masks based on a recent meta-analysis literature on the neural correlates of 
mentalizing (Schurz, et al., 2014). Specifically, a sphere with the radium of 5mm 
centering on the following coordinates respectively (MNI space, x/y/z, with unit 
of mm): [-53/-59/20] for the left TPJ, [56/-56/18] for the right TPJ, and [-1/56/24] 
for the MPFC. All ROI masks were created via the Wake Forest University Picka-
tlas toolbox (WFU; http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/software/pickatlas ). For statistical 
analysis, we took the threshold of voxel-wise p < 0.05 and familywise error 
(FWE) corrected for multiple comparisons within the searching volume (i.e., the 
ROI). To further reveal the interaction, we extracted the parameter estimates (i.e., 
contrast values) of the peak voxel survived the FWE correction via MarsBar 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/ ). 
3.3 Results: Study 2A 
 Behavioral Results 3.3.1
3.3.1.1 Proportion of Altruistic Choice 
To test our first hypothesis (H1), we performed paired sample T-tests to compare 
the choice proportion between OXT and PLC treatment for the help and punish-
ment respectively. However, the results failed to support H1 by showing no differ-
ence of drug treatment in either choice (both ps > 0.7). An exploratory correlation 
analyses showed OXT could also not influence the relationship between the dif-
ference of choice proportion (i.e., help vs. punish) and empathic concern (r = 
−0.083, p = 0.714).  
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Table 8. Descriptive summary of behavioral measures during the fMRI task 
 help punish 
 Mean 
(S.D.) 
Mean  
(S.D.) 
 OXT PLC OXT PLC 
Choice Proportion (%) 52.67  
(20.74) 
53.64 
(20.65) 
38.30  
(19.28) 
37.16  
(20.97) 
Decision Time (ms) 1630.76 
(229.60) 
1732.08 
(399.76) 
1680.41 
(220.97) 
1801.77 
(427.63) 
Transfer Amount (MU) 11.99  
(5.92) 
12.70  
(5.86) 
15.13  
(5.57) 
15.50  
(5.82) 
Note: S.D.refers to standard deviation; MU refers to monetary unit. 
 
3.3.1.2 Other Measures 
To further test whether intranasal OXT affects the decision process and transfer 
amount, we focused on these trials in which participants made altruistic choices 
(i.e., at least transferred 5 MU) and performed a repeated measurement 2 (treat-
ment: OXT/PLC) × 2 (decision: help/punish) on the individual mean decision 
time (in ms) as well as mean transfer amount (in MU) respectively. We found a 
trend-to-significant main effect of treatment on decision time (F(1, 21) = 3.051, p 
= 0.095, partial η2= 0.093), namely that participants treated with intranasal OXT 
responded a bit faster in comparison to their choices in the PLC condition, regard-
less of whether they helped or punished. Besides, we also observed a main effect 
of decision on transfer amount (F(1, 21) = 6.295, p = 0.02, partial η2= 0.231), 
namely that participants punished the offender stronger than helped the victim.  
We also checked the effect of OXT on post-scanning subjective rating as well 
as other controlled measures (before and after the scanning), including state anxie-
ty, positive and negative state emotion and attention performance. With paired 
samples t-test, none of these above measures showed significant difference (see 
Table 9 and Table 10 for details). Apart from that, we ruled out the association 
between participant’s belief and real treatment (correct estimates: OXT, n = 10; 
PLC, n =14; χ2(1) = 0.376, p = 0.54). 
Chapter 3.  Studies 2A and 2B: The Effect of Oxytocin on Third-Party Decision-Making and Its Neural Correlates 
68 
Table 9. Descriptive summary of control measures 
 OXT PLC Paired t-test 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) t (p) 
Positive affect pre 29.50 (5.91) 30.73 (5.49) -1.144 (0.266) 
Positive affect post 25.45 (6.44) 25.32 (7.45) 0.168 (0.868) 
Negative affect pre 11.18 (1.01) 11.55 (1.79) -1.250 (0.225) 
Negative affect post 11.91 (2.54) 11.59 (2.13) 0.718 (0.481) 
State anxiety pre 44.09 (1.44) 44.18 (2.34) -0.153 (0.880)  
State anxiety post 44.05 (2.77) 43.68 (1.89) 0.584 (0.565) 
Attention  191.05 (78.00) 189.50 (86.96) 0.140 (0.890) 
Note: The PANAS was used for assessing positive/negative mood and STAI_state for state anxiety. 
Both mood and anxiety were measured before and after the treatment; the D2 test was used for 
assessing attention. S.D. refers to standard deviation; OXT refers to oxytocin, PLC refers to place-
bo, pre refers to before treatment, post refers to after the scanning task. 
Table 10. Descriptive summary of post-scanning rating 
 OXT PLC Paired t-test 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) t (p) 
Perceived unfairness of offer 4.73 (1.13) 4.95 (0.90) -1.755 (0.094) 
Deservedness for punishing the 
offender 
4.26  (1.39) 4.52 (1.00) -1.161 (0.259) 
Empathic concern for the victim 4.43 (1.12) 4.62 (0.86) -0.824 (0.419) 
Note: All the post-scanning ratings range from 0 (not at all) to 8 (very much). S.D. refers to stand-
ard deviation; OXT refers to oxytocin, PLC refers to placebo. 
 Imaging Results 3.3.2
3.3.2.1 ROI Findings 
Partially supporting H2, the ROI-based three-way interaction between treatment 
(OXT/PLC), agency (self- /computer-decision), and decision (help/punish), de-
fined by the contrast ―PLC_[(help vs help_computer) vs (punish vs pun-
ish_computer)] vs OXT_[(help vs help_computer) vs (punish vs pun-
ish_computer)]‖, showed the significant activation only in the left TPJ (peak MNI 
coordinates: -54/-54/22; t(63) = 3.54, p(FWE) = 0.005; see Figure 12) and trend-
to-significant activation in but not in the right TPJ (peak MNI coordinates: 50/-
58/20; t(63) = 2.35, p(FWE) = 0.079) as well as the MPFC (peak MNI coordi-
nates: -2/56/20; t(63) = 2.25, p(FWE) = 0.095; see Table 11 for other activations 
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at the whole-brain level), whereas we failed to observe any significant activation 
in NAcc with the same threshold. Given the results of statistical significance, we 
only did post-hoc analyses on the left TPJ. Post-hoc analyses on the parameter 
estimates extracted from the peak voxel in left TPJ showed a treatment 
(OXT/PLC) × decision (help/punish) interaction for both the computer-decision 
condition (F(1,21) = 10.536, p = 0.004, partial η2= 0.334) and the self-decision 
condition (F(1,21) = 4.901, p = 0.038, partial η2= 0.189) with different direction. 
However, the post-hoc paired T-test only showed the OXT-relevant increased ac-
tivity in left TPJ during trials in help_computer (vs. punish_computer) conditions 
(t(21) = 2.348, p = 0.029) but not in other contrasts (all ps > 0.16). 
 
Figure 12. Left TPJ reflecting three-way interaction between drug treatment, agency, and deci-
sion (i.e., [PLC_(help – help_computer) – (punish – punish_computer)] vs. [OXT_(help – 
help_computer) – (punish – punish_computer)]). Bar plots showed the contrast value in the 
peak voxel of the left TPJ in all conditions. Display threshold: p < 0.05 at voxel-level within the 
mask, uncorrected. Significance level: *p < 0.05; Error bars: SEM. Abbreviations: 
OXT=oxytocin, PLC=placebo, TPJ=temporo-parietal junction.  
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Table 11. Regions reflecting the three-way interaction between drug treatment (OXT/PLC), 
agency (self-decision/computer), and decision (help/punish) 
Brain Region Hemisphere Cluster 
Size 
MNI Coordi-
nates 
BA T-value 
   x y z   
[PLC_(help - help_computer) - (punish - punish_computer)] - [OXT_(help - help_computer) - 
(punish - punish_computer)] 
SFG/MFG R 234 32 16 54 6/8 4.07* 
IFG/MFG R 98 56 22 22 45/46 3.89 
TPJ/SMG/ST
G 
L 58 -52 -50 20 40 3.90 
IPL R 341 42 -46 46 40 4.18* 
SMA/PaCL B 337 -2 -12 70 6 4.67* 
MTG L 59 -44 -44 -8 37 3.85 
PCG/PoCG L 74 -54 -10 10 43 3.75 
PCG/PoCG R 141 52 -14 30 3/4 4.00 
Thalamus L 91 -18 -22 14  4.52 
[OXT_(help - help_computer) - (punish - punish_computer)] - [PLC_(help - help_computer) - 
(punish - punish_computer)] 
No cluster        
Note: Threshold is set to p < 0.001, k=50, uncorrected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise error 
(FWE) corrected at the cluster level. 
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling toolbox for 
SPM8): OXT=oxytocin, PLC=placebo; L=left, R=right, B=bilateral, BA=Brodmann Area; 
IFG=Inferior Frontal Gyrus, IPL=Inferior Parietal Lobule, MFG=Middle Frontal Gyrus, 
MTG=Middle Temporal Gyrus, PCG=Precentral Gyrus, PoCG=Postcentral Gyrus, 
PaCL=Paracentral Lobule, SFG=Superior Frontal Gyrus, SMA=Supplementary Motor Area, 
SMG=Supramarginal Gyrus, TPJ=Temporo-parietal Junction. 
 
3.3.2.2 Other Whole-Brain Level Findings 
Besides, regions engaged in decision-making as well as action preparation, includ-
ing the left middle frontal gyrus (BA 9/46), precentral gyrus (BA 3/4/7) as well as 
supplementary motor areas (BA 6/8) were observed with higher activity during 
trials in which participants made altruistic decisions (either help or punishment) 
themselves as opposed to observing the computer’s decision. In the reverse con-
trast, we found higher activation in mentalizing network, such as bilateral TPJ 
(BA 39/40) and MPFC (BA 9/10), responding to trials with computer’s decisions 
(see Figure 13; also see Table 12 for other activations). With the same threshold, 
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however, the whole-brain analyses did not detect other significant clusters in other 
main effect (i.e., treatment, decision) or interaction (i.e., the two way interaction: 
treatment × agency, treatment × decision, agency × decision; the three-way inter-
action). 
 
Figure 13. Regions reflecting the main effect of agency (upper panel contrast: self-decision vs. 
computer; lower panel contrast: computer vs. self-decision). Display threshold: p < 0.001 at 
the voxel-level, uncorrected. Abbreviations: MPFC = Medial Prefrontal Cortex; TPJ = Temporo-
parietal Junction.  
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Table 12. Regions reflecting the effect of agency 
Brain Region Hemi-
sphere 
Cluster 
Size 
MNI Coordi-
nates 
BA T-
value 
   x y z   
Self-decision - Computer-decision 
MFG/IFG L 146 -38 48 8 10/46 4.05 
MFG L 410 -38 32 26 9/46 6.31* 
IFG R 216 60 10 24 9/45 4.50 
Insula R 240 34 20 8 13 5.61* 
SMA/ACC/IPL/SPL/ 
Precuneus/PCG/PoCG/ 
Insula/ 
SFG/MFG 
B 13095 -6 10 50 2/3/4/ 
6/7/8/9/1
3/ 
24/32/40 
10.86* 
MOG/IOG L 377 -28 -90 -4 18/19 7.39* 
MOG/IOG/MTG R 556 32 -90 -4 18/19 7.08* 
Thalamus/Brainstem B 1052 -4 -26 -2  6.01* 
Computer-decision - Self-decision  
SFG B 361 4 46 48 8/9 4.74* 
MPFC/SFG B 588 -12 58 22 9/10 4.27* 
IFG/MFG R 678 50 42 2 45/46 6.33* 
SFG/MFG R 389 24 26 46 8 5.52* 
TPJ/IPL/SMG/AG/ 
MTG/STG 
L 1027 -48 -70 26 39/40 6.36* 
TPJ/IPL/SMG/AG/ 
MTG/STG 
R 4051 56 -52 18 21/22/ 
39/40 
7.97* 
Precuneus/PCC/MCC B 1036 -12 -52 32 7/31 4.90* 
MTG/STG L 1173 -56 -16 -8 21/22 5.63* 
PoCG L 122 -24 -40 60 3 3.88 
Precuneus/PoCG R 526 12 -50 62 3/5/7 4.81* 
PHG/FG L 319 -26 -50 -6 19 5.31* 
PHG/FG R 474 24 -44 -10 19 5.83* 
Cuneus/LG/SOG/MOG B 3692 -8 -94 12 7/17/ 
18/19/31 
8.92* 
Hippocampus/ 
PHG/Amygdala 
L 110 -24 -4 -14  4.20 
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Hippocampus/ 
PHG/Amygdala 
R 124 20 -4 -14  4.69 
Note: Threshold is set to p < 0.001, k = 50, uncorrected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise error 
(FWE) corrected at the cluster level.  
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling toolbox for 
SPM8): L = left, R = right, B = bilateral, BA = Brodmann Area; ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex, 
FG = Fusiform Gyrus, IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus, IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobule, IOG = Inferior 
Occipital Gyrus, LG = Ligual Gyrus, MCC = Mid-Cingulate Cortex, MFG = Middle Frontal Gy-
rus, MOG = Middle Occipital Gyrus, MPFC = Medial Prefrontal Cortex, MTG = Middle Temporal 
Gyrus, PCG = Precentral Gyrus, PoCG = Postcentral Gyrus, PHG =  Parahippocampa Gyrus, SFG 
= Superior Frontal Gyrus, SMA = Supplementary Motor Area, SMG = Supramarginal Gyrus, SOG 
= Superior Occipital Gyrus, SPL = Superior Parietal Lobule, STG = Superior Temporal Gyrus; 
TPJ = Temporo-parietal Junction. 
 
3.3.2.3 Regression Findings 
An explorative regression analysis showed that OXT, in comparison to PLC, re-
duced the positive correlation between individual empathic concern score (Mean 
± S.D. = 17.95 ± 2.72; Range: from 14 to 24) and neural activity in bilateral infe-
rior parietal lobules (IPL) during help (vs. punishment) choice (i.e., the contrast 
[PLC_(help - punish) - OXT_(help - punish)]). We extracted the parameter esti-
mates of the peak voxel in bilateral IPL from the two contrasts respectively (i.e., 
contrasts help vs punish in PLC and OXT) and ran post-hoc correlation analyses 
with empathic concern scores to further reveal the moderation effect. Under the 
PLC treatment, help-dominated IPL activity (i.e., the contrast help vs. punish) 
positively correlated with empathic concern score, which was disappeared under 
the OXT treatment (see Figure 14; also see Table 13 for other activations). 
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Table 13. Regions reflecting the influence of empathic concern on the OXT effect on third-
party altruistic decisions 
Brain Region Hemi-
sphere 
Cluster 
Size 
MNI Coordi-
nates 
BA T-
value 
   x y z   
[PLC_(help - punish) - OXT_(help - punish)] & Empathic Concern  
IPL L 122 -54 -40 46 40 4.72 
IPL R 276 44 -48 50 7/40 5.77* 
PCG/PoCG L 92 -34 -26 52 3/4 4.37 
[OXT_(help - punish) - PLC_(help - punish)] & Empathic Concern 
-        
Note: Threshold is set to p < 0.001, k=50, uncorrected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise error 
corrected at the cluster level. 
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling toolbox for 
SPM8): OXT = Oxytocin, PLC = Placebo; L = left, R = right, BA = Brodmann Area; IPL = Inferi-
or Parietal Lobule, PCG = Precentral Gyrus, PoCG = Postcentral Gyrus. 
 
Figure 14. Bilateral IPL reflecting the modulatory influence of empathic concern on the effect 
of OXT on altruistic decisions (i.e., PLC_(help – punish) vs. OXT_(help – punish)). Display 
threshold: p < 0.001 at voxel-level, uncorrected. Scatter plot of showed the relationship be-
tween empathic concern and contrast values in peak voxel of bilateral lPL of the contrast help 
vs. punish in each drug condition respectively. Significance level: *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, ***p < 
0.001. Abbreviations: OXT = oxytocin, PLC = placebo; IPL = inferior parietal lobule. 
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3.4 Hypotheses: Study 2B 
According to Study 2A and other previous studies, we pose the following hypoth-
eses in response to our research questions: 
H1: We expect that third-party deciders will be more likely to either help the vic-
tim or punish the offender after they are treated with intranasal OXT, com-
pared with the PLC control group.  
H2: We expect that third-party deciders will be faster in making the altruistic 
choices (i.e., help or punishment) after they are treated with intranasal OXT, 
compared with the PLC control group. 
 
3.5 Methods: Study 2B 
 Participants 3.5.1
We recruited 132 healthy males to the current study via ORSEE (for similar pro-
cedure, see Study 1). All participants had to fit the attendance criterion (for similar 
procedure, see Study 2A) and signed the written consent based on the Declaration 
of Helsinki (BMJ 1991; 302: 1194). Additionally, we recruited 121 female partic-
ipants from the same subject pool for an independent behavioral study. This study 
was approved by the ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of 
Bonn. 
 Design 3.5.2
A between-subject, double-blind, placebo-controlled design was adopted. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of the drug treatments, namely receiving 
either OXT (24 Internet Unit; Sigma Tau; 3 puffs per nostril alternately, each with 
~4 IU) or PLC intranasal spray. As usual, neither the experimenters nor the partic-
ipants knew the real treatment on the day of experiment.  
 Decision Collection and Behavioral Paradigm 3.5.3
One week before the current experiment, we collected the real choices from online 
participants, which were used for the later third-party task via Qualtrics 
(https://www.qualtrics.com/). Specifically, online participants (i.e., the role of 
Player A; offender) were endowed with 100 MU (1 MU = 0.05 €) and asked to 
choose one of the three splits (i.e., self/other payoff: 50/50, 60/40, 90/10) between 
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themselves and an anonymous Player B (i.e., victim). They were also informed 
that their decisions might be selected and forwarded to a group of third parties in a 
later study, whose decisions could affect their final payoff as well as that of their 
matched partners. In the end, we randomly selected 61 decisions (of Player A; 15, 
24, 22 choices for the split 50/50, 60/40, 90/10 respectively) from 121 participants 
and matched the rest of 60 participants (as the Player B) each with a different 
Player A.  
The behavioral paradigm of the present study differed from the paradigm of 
the Study 2A in the following aspects. First, it was a between-subject design, 
which meant that participants only received one of the drug treatments and fin-
ished the task. Second, it was a ―one-shot‖ game, namely participants made one 
decision in response to different possible monetary splits respectively, unlike the 
Study 2A in which participants made several decisions for each of the monetary 
splits. Third, the strategy method was used. Particularly, each participant, as third-
party decider, was not informed the real decision of the offender and needed to 
made one decision in terms of each possible choice of the offender. Fourth, partic-
ipants were endowed 100 MU which was always higher than what Player A kept 
for themselves. In this way we could rule out the possibility of disadvantageous 
inequality aversion (Jordan, McAuliffe, & Rand, 2014), another potential motiva-
tion for driving punishment behavior. Fifth, the option ―keep‖ was presented to-
gether with the other two options (i.e., ―increase‖, ―subtract‖) during the decision 
phase. Sixth, the unfairness rating (i.e., ―How unfair do you think of the split of-
fered by the Player A to the Player B?‖; a 9-point Likert scale: 0 = fair, 8 = very 
unfair) was placed immediately after the decision task (i.e., decision and transfer 
phase; see Figure 15 for details). Last, The stimuli were presented via z-Tree 3.5.1 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 
 Procedure 3.5.4
Participants (i.e., third party) were assessed with clinical interview and completed 
a series online questionnaires (including IRI) in the morning of the experiment 
days. In the afternoon of the same day, participants in a group of approximately 15 
people (i.e., 1 session; 10 sessions in total) arrived at the BonnEconLab. They 
were randomly assigned to independent cabins and self-administered a dose of 24 
IU of either OXT or PLC nasal spray. Next, participants were provided with in-
structions of the tasks (i.e., including the current task together with other three 
tasks). The current task lasted around 6 min, which started around 75 min after the 
intranasal administration (~ 30 min) and another 4 irrelevant tasks (~ 45 min; 
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would be reported in other studies)9. At the end of the experiment, participants 
were paid by cash accordingly (the payment dependent on the current task: ~ € 
4.6). Notably, we did not measure the state affect, anxiety and the attention per-
formance as what we did in Study 2A, due to 1) that no evidence (i.e., Study 2A 
and other previous studies) has shown that OXT shows the side-effect on these 
measures and 2) practical reasons (e.g., the duration of the whole experiment; see 
Figure 16 for details). 
 
Figure 15. Example of the trial procedure. In this example, the participant subtracted 2 MUs 
from Player A. Abbreviations: MU = monetary unit. 
                                                 
9 Note that the order of the first three tasks was always fixed. The order of the task reported here 
(task 4) and the rest task (task) was counterbalanced across participants (see Figure 16 for details). 
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Figure 16. Experimental procedure. Note that the order of Task 4 and Task 5 was counterbal-
anced across participants. Abbreviations: OXT = oxytocin, PLC = placebo, TPPH = third-party 
punishment and help, min = minute. 
 Data Collection & Analyses 3.5.5
All behavioral data was collected via the Z-tree 3.5.1. Raw data was re-organized 
to the long format for later analyses via R 3.3.0 (https://www.r-project.org/) and 
all plots were created via the ggplot2 R package (http://ggplot2.org/). Statistical 
analyses were performed in STATA 13 (College Station, TX: StataCorp LP; 
http://www.stata.com/). We adopted the regression as our main statistical approach 
and used the robust standard errors clustered on subject to account for the non-
independence of repeated measurement of the same participant (Hayes & Cai, 
2007). For each dependent measures, we ran three regressions in total. To test our 
main hypotheses (H1 & H2), the main regression was performed only with the 
drug treatment (i.e., dummy variable; PLC as the reference group) as the predic-
tor, the controlled regression was similar but additionally taking the monetary split 
(i.e., dummy variable; 50/50 as the reference group) into account, and the explora-
tory regression was with both variables and their interaction as the predictors. The 
descriptive summary for all measures was also listed (see Table 14). 
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Table 14. Descriptive summary of behavioral measures 
  help punish keep 
  Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
  OXT PLC OXT PLC OXT PLC 
Choice  
Proportion  
(%) 
50/50 2.60 3.43 1.56 0 29.17 29.90 
 60/40 7.29 8.82 5.73 4.90 20.31 19.61 
 90/10 9.90 8.33 14.58 11.27 8.85 13.73 
Response 
Time 
(s) 
50/50 14.01 
(4.81) 
16.97 
(10.76) 
11.92 
(4.87) 
NA 12.67 
(9.47) 
12.27 
(9.09) 
 60/40 15.73 
(7.46) 
22.66 
(18.27) 
19.79 
(12.01) 
27.53 
(18.84) 
14.11 
(12.16) 
12.90 
(14.22) 
 90/10 20.64 
(13.16) 
23.15 
(15.64) 
17.45 
(9.05) 
21.25 
(15.62) 
13.35 
(9.31) 
14.96 
(16.71) 
Transfer 
Amount 
(MU) 
50/50 22.20 
(21.43)  
10.43 
(9.93) 
4.00 
(5.20) 
NA 0 0 
 60/40 12.86 
(10.12) 
9.44 
(4.64) 
7.73 
(4.36) 
5.10 
(3.84) 
0 0 
 90/10 19.63 
(10.41) 
22.53 
(22.37) 
30.65 
(24.02) 
26.91 
(17.12) 
0 0 
Note: OXT refers to oxytocin, PLC refers to placebo, S.D. refers to standard deviation, MU refers 
to monetary unit, NA refers to not applicable. 
3.6 Results: Study 2B 
 Behavioral Results 3.6.1
3.6.1.1 Side Effect 
Similar to Study 2A, participant could not correctly guess the real drug treatment 
(correct estimates: OXT, n = 54; PLC, n =14; χ2(1) = 1.456, p = 0.23). 
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3.6.1.2 Choice 
To test our first hypothesis (H1), we performed three logistic regression on each 
of the possible choice (i.e., help vs. non-help; punishment vs. non-punishment; 
keep vs. non-keep) respectively. Contrary to our hypothesis, the main regression 
showed that OXT did not make third-party deciders more altruistic in either help-
ing the victim (Odds ratio = 0.952, z = -0.17, p = 0.866) or punishing the offender 
(Odds ratio = 0.874, z = -0.42, p = 0.678), nor did it make participants more self-
ish (i.e., keep; Odds ratio = 1.036, z = 0.15, p = 0.883; see Table 15 for regression 
details). The results hold if we controlled for the effect of split; besides, partici-
pants were more (less) likely to help or punish (keep) with the increasing inequali-
ty of the monetary split. No interaction effect was observed between drug treat-
ment and monetary split on the choice behavior (see Figure 17; also see Table 16 
for details). 
Table 15. Results of repeated-measure logistic regression predicting help, punishment, and 
keep choice by drug treatment 
 help punisha keep 
PLC (ref.)    
OXT 0.952 0.874 1.036 
 (-0.17) (-0.42) (0.15) 
Constant 0.259*** 0.320*** 1.72*** 
 (-6.92) (-5.26) (3.20) 
Pseudo-R2 0.0001 0.0007 0.0001 
Observations 396 264 396 
Note: Values refer to odds ratio. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Robust standard er-
rors clustered on subject for each independent variable are used. OXT refers to oxytocin, PLC 
refers to placebo, ref. refers to reference. 
Significance level:  *** p < .001. 
aFor punishment choice, data in the 50/50 case are not used due to inaccurate estimation because 
of sparse observation. 
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Table 16. Results of repeated-measure logistic regression predicting help, punishment, and 
keep choice by drug treatment, offer, and their interaction 
 help help punisha punisha keep keep 
PLC (ref.)       
OXT 0.950 0.738 0.870 1.204 1.043 0.803 
 (-0.17) (-0.49) (-0.42) (0.39) (0.15) (-0.40) 
50/50 (ref.)       
60/40 3.200*** 3.137** NA NA 0.191*** 0.164*** 
 (3.93) (2.86)   (-5.42) (-4.26) 
90/10 3.750*** 2.905* 2.300** 2.964** 0.094*** 0.080*** 
 (3.73) (2.21) (3.14) (2.87) (-7.62) (-5.86) 
OXT × 60/40  1.053  NA  1.359 
  (0.09)    (0.50) 
OXT × 90/10  1.715  0.588  1.383 
  (0.76)  (-1.00)  (0.52) 
Constant 0.102*** 0.115*** 0.202*** 0.172*** 7.642*** 8.714*** 
 (-6.71) (-5.40) (-5.85) (-5.11) (6.54) (5.40) 
Pseudo-R2 0.043 0.046 0.028 0.031 0.131 0.131 
Observations 396 396 264 264 396 396 
Note: Values refer to odds ratio. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Robust standard errors 
clustered on subject for each independent variable are used. OXT refers to oxytocin, PLC refers to 
placebo, ref. refers to reference, NA refers to not applicable. 
Significance level:  * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
aFor punishment choice, data in the 50/50 case are not used due to inaccurate estimation because 
of sparse observation. 
3.6.1.3 Decision Time 
To test our second hypothesis (H2), we performed two linear regressions on the 
decision time for each of the two altruistic choices (i.e., help and punishment) 
respectively. Since the decision times were not normally distributed (Jarque-Bera 
(S-K) test: χ2(2) = 225.77, p < 0.001), we adopted the log-transformed decision 
time instead. Contrary to our hypothesis, OXT did not facilitate either of the altru-
istic choice (help: b = -0.090, t = -0.59, p = 0.559; punishment: b = -0.177, t = -
1.13, p = 0.263) in the main regression (see Table 17 for regression details). The 
results hold if we controlled for the effect of split; besides, decision time for either 
choice did not vary in terms of the monetary split or its interaction with drug 
treatment (see Table 18 for regression details). 
Chapter 3.  Studies 2A and 2B: The Effect of Oxytocin on Third-Party Decision-Making and Its Neural Correlates 
82 
 
Figure 17. Proportion of each type of choices. Abbreviations: OXT = oxytocin, PLC = placebo. 
3.6.1.4 Explorative Analyses on Other Measures 
With the same procedure, we also found that intranasal OXT did not affect the 
transfer amount of either choice (help: b = 2.569, t = 0.75, p = 0.458; punishment: 
b = 1.340, t = 0.46, p = 0.793) in the main regression. The results hold if we con-
trolled for the effect of split. However, we found a differential effect of monetary 
split on transfer mount of different choice. Specifically, participants did not in-
crease the transfer amount to help the victim with the increasing inequality of 
monetary split (both p > 0.3), whereas they punished more for the most unequal 
case (i.e., 90/10: b = 22.355, t = 6.52, p < 0.001). No interaction effect was detect-
ed in both cases (see Figure 18).  
The main regression on the perceived unfairness also yielded non-significant 
effect of OXT (b = -0.047, t = -0.21, p = 0.832), which hold after controlling the 
effect of split. The controlled analyses also revealed that participants felt more 
unfair while the split went unequal (60/40: b = 2.303, t = 11.15, p < 0.001; 90/10: 
b = 5.780, t = 22.02, p < 0.001). Moreover, we observed an unexpected interaction 
effect in the exploratory analyses. In particular, participants with the OXT (vs. 
PLC) felt more unfair for the 50/50 (b = 0.724, t = 2.89, p = 0.005) split but less 
unfair for the unequal split (60/40: b = -1.074, t = -2.65, p = 0.009; 90/10: b = -
1.242, t = -2.39, p = 0.018; also see Table 17 and Table 18 for regression details). 
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Figure 18. Mean transfer amount of either help or punishment choice. Error bars: SEM. Ab-
breviations: MU = monetary unit, OXT=oxytocin, PLC=placebo. 
Table 17. Results of repeated-measure of linear regression predicting the other dependent 
variables by drug treatment 
 Log decision time Transfer Amount Rating 
 help punisha keep help punisha  
PLC (ref.)       
OXT -0.089 -0.177 0.041 2.569 1.340 -0.048 
 (-0.59) (-1.13) (0.49) (0.75) (0.26) (-0.21) 
Constant 2.832*** 2.933*** 2.342*** 14.90*** 20.30*** 3.157*** 
 (25.13) (27.03) (40.51) (6.01) (6.80) (21.05) 
R2 0.005 0.021 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.0001 
Observations 80 61 252 80 61 396 
Note: Values refer to unstandardized coefficient. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered on subject for each independent variable are used. OXT refers to 
oxytocin, PLC refers to placebo, ref. refers to reference. 
Significance level:  *** p < .001. 
aFor punishment choice, data in the 50/50 case are not used due to inaccurate estimation because 
of sparse observation. 
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Table 18. Results of repeated-measure linear regression predicting other dependent variables 
by drug treatment 
 Log Decision Time (s) Transfer Amount (MU) Rating 
 help help punisha punisha keep keep help help punisha punisha   
PLC (ref.)             
OXT -0.104 -0.051 -0.193 -0.289 0.040 0.010 1.781 11.77 3.348 2.627 -0.0475 0.724** 
 (-0.69) (-0.18) (-1.22) (-1.03) (0.48) (0.10) (0.49) (1.22) (0.74) (1.49) (-0.21) (2.89) 
50/50 (ref.)             
60/40 0.146 0.194 NA NA 0.008 -0.039 -4.433 -0.984 NA NA 2.303*** 2.824*** 
 (0.78) (0.64)   (0.09) (-0.32) (-1.02) (-0.27)   (11.15) (10.73) 
90/10 0.250 0.254 -0.177 -0.250 0.079 0.081 5.469 12.10+ 22.35*** 21.81*** 5.780*** 6.382*** 
 (1.30) (0.79) (-1.06) (-1.01) (0.82) (0.55) (1.02) (1.94) (6.52) (5.74) (22.02) (21.27) 
OXT × 60/40  -0.113  NA  0.096  -8.359  NA  -1.074** 
  (-0.32)    (0.54)  (-0.88)    (-2.65) 
OXT × 90/10  -0.019  0.148  -0.002  -14.67  1.107  -1.242* 
  (-0.05)  (0.44)  (-0.01)  (-1.32)  (0.16)  (-2.39) 
Constant 2.668*** 2.646*** 3.057*** 3.107*** 2.323*** 2.337*** 14.59** 10.43** 4.723+ 5.100*** 0.462** 0.0882 
 (15.31) (10.60) (18.59) (14.70) (36.87) (33.17) (3.41) (2.88) (1.93) (4.27) (3.29) (1.18) 
R2 0.023 0.024 0.040 0.044 0.004 0.005 0.109 0.140 0.300 0.300 0.586 0.593 
Observations 80 80 61 61 252 252 80 80 61 61 396 396 
Note: Values refer to unstandardized coefficient. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered on subject for each independent variable are used. OXT refers to 
oxytocin, PLC refers to placebo, ref. refers to reference, NA refers to not applicable. 
Significance level:  + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
aFor punishment choice, data in the 50/50 case are not used due to inaccurate estimation because 
of sparse observation. 
3.7 Discussion: Studies 2A and 2B 
 The Effect of Intranasal OXT on Altruistic Decisions in Third-3.7.1
Party Context 
Contrary to our original hypotheses (Study 2A: H1a; Study 2B: H1), intranasal 
OXT did not improve the proportion of either help or punishment choices, com-
pared with the PLC condition, in both studies with similar but slightly different 
design and paradigm. There was mixed evidence for the association between OXT 
and pro-social behaviors. Earlier studies explored that OXT could improve the 
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human altruism especially in the male sample. The most well-known example is 
the one on trust behavior (Kosfeld, et al., 2005), namely that healthy male with 
intranasal OXT treatment increased their investment for the anonymous trustee 
but not increased their risky behavior, in comparison with the PLC condition. 
However, the later studies showed the null effect of OXT in improving human 
altruism, indicating that the prosocial effect of OXT might be dependent on other 
factors. Concerning the altruistic giving behavior, Zak and colleagues (2007) 
found that participants receiving OXT only increased the amount giving to the 
other unknown recipients when they had the chance to reject the offer rather than 
in a standard dictator game, indicating that the intranasal OXT might only change 
the sanction-induced altruism (Zak, et al., 2007). A recent example is that people 
with intranasal OXT treatment increased their donating behavior only when the 
monetary donation aimed to benefit the people (i.e., prosocial frame) instead of to 
protect the environment (i.e., pro-environment frame) of the rainforest area in Af-
rica (Marsh et al., 2015). Besides, participants, under the OXT condition, were 
found to cooperate more often only with their in-group partner but not the out-
group partner, which was replicated in a series of experiments with different mod-
ified prisoner-dilemma paradigms (De Dreu, 2012; De Dreu, et al., 2010; De Dreu 
& Kret, 2016). Given the above evidence, we argue that the null effect of OXT in 
increasing third-party altruistic choices might be due to the following reasons: 
either all other parties involved in our paradigm were anonymous for the third-
party participants or they were not fear of any potential negative consequence for 
not being altruistic (i.e., all decisions they made were voluntary).  
Although intranasal OXT did not affect the third-party altruistic behavior in 
both studies, we observed an unexpected but interesting trend-to-significant effect 
of OXT in facilitating altruistic decision processes, indexed by reducing the aver-
age decision time for both help and punishment choices (vs. PLC) in Study 2A. 
This result is consistent with the social salience hypothesis (Shamay-Tsoory, 
2010; Shamay-Tsoory & Abu-Akel, 2016), which addresses the key role of OXT 
in enhancing the social cues in different contexts. In a recent review paper, Ma 
and colleagues (2016) proposed the social adaptation model of OXT, a more com-
prehensive theoretical framework in explaining the effect of OXT in social behav-
ior, which also covered the OXT-dependent social salience enhancement as one of 
the crucial underlying mechanisms (Ma, Shamay-Tsoory, Han, & Zink, 2016). 
However, this result was not replicated in the Study 2B. One possible reason 
could be that participants started the task in around 75 min after the intranasal 
administration, which would definitely reduce the effect of OXT. Thus whether 
OXT could affect the altruistic decision process should be cautiously treated and 
needs further replication. 
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 Intranasal OXT Modulates Neural Correlates of Different 3.7.2
Altruistic Decisions and Accompanying Perception Process 
Contrary to our original hypothesis (Study 2A: H2) based on previous literature as 
well as our finding in Study 1, intranasal OXT did not affect the neural processing 
during either altruistic decisions or perception process in the NAcc, the key region 
of the reward circuit (Haber & Knutson, 2009). Likewise, the evidence of OXT in 
enhancing reward-relevant activation is not robustly reported, indicating the in-
volvement of other potential modulators during this process. For instance, male 
participants with intranasal OXT treatment did not show higher neural activity in 
the striatum (including NAcc) in response to attractive women’s faces who were 
not familiar to them, although the intranasal OXT significantly increased the 
NAcc activity  when they viewed their romantic partner’s faces (Scheele, et al., 
2013). In another study, OXT even exerts a reversed effect by reducing the activa-
tion in reward neuro-circuits when fathers viewed their own kids’ faces in com-
parison with faces of other unknown children (Wittfoth-Schardt et al., 2012). The-
se evidence together suggests that the effect of OXT on reward system might be 
modulated by the social context, especially the social distance. Thus, the null ef-
fect of OXT in our case might be also due to the far social distance between par-
ticipants and other players involved. This explanation, however, should be tested 
by future studies with a similar paradigm in which the social distance should be 
explicitly manipulated (e.g., either the offender or the victim is a friend, an in-
group member or a stranger of the third-party participant). 
On the other hand, the result supports part of the H2 of Study 2A that intrana-
sal OXT modulated the mentalizing network (esp. left TPJ) during either the deci-
sion or perception process in such context, which specifically increased the activi-
ty of left TPJ when participants observed others being helped. Consistently, we 
also found the involvement of these regions during observation (computer) trials 
in comparison to decision trials, which is in favor of the explanation of these re-
gions as mentalizing-relevant process based on previous fMRI studies (Dodell-
Feder, Koster-Hale, Bedny, & Saxe, 2011; Schaafsma, et al., 2014; Schurz, et al., 
2014) and a lesion study highlighting the crucial contribution of left TPJ in such 
process (Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004).  
As mentioned before (see introduction), the ability of meantalizing and a rele-
vant process (e.g., empathy) is regarded as the precursor for the human altruism, 
especially when making altruistic decisions in such a complex situation (De Waal, 
2008). There is evidence from an earlier behavioral study finding that intranasal 
OXT could improve the mentalizing ability measured by the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test (RMET) (Domes, et al., 2007) (but also see (Radke & de Bruijn, 
2015)), a paradigm in which participants were asked to judge the emotion of the 
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target in the stimuli only in terms of their eyes (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & 
Suhre, 1986). Moreover, a recent study with a hypothetical third-party context 
revealed that participants with intranasal OXT had stronger harmful feelings for 
the victim but they rated higher for the deservedness to punish the offender whom 
were involved in the criminal scenarios (Krueger, et al., 2013), which further sug-
gested the asymmetry of OXT-dependent  enhancement for pro-social perception 
that are more sensitive to the victim. Besides, participants were also found show-
ing more empathy for other’s pain only when taking the perspective of others in-
stead of themselves (Abu-Akel, Palgi, Klein, Decety, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2015). 
Intriguingly, a recent study focusing on the female sample revealed that OXT 
promotes participant’s spontaneous anthropomorphism, measured by the way par-
ticipants used to interpret the geometric movement (Scheele et al., 2015)  
Regarding the neural processing, there is also some, but not much, evidence 
detecting the OXT-dependent change of TPJ activation in different paradigms 
requiring the ability of social cognition in close relationship with mentalizing, 
from both the healthy and the clinical samples. Based on the healthy male sample, 
Lancaster and colleagues (2015) showed the link between the left TPJ (as well as 
other regions) activity in response to the biological motion (e.g., the geometric 
shapes move in a regular way, compared with random movement), measured via 
the blood, and OXT plasma levels (Lancaster et al., 2015). Based on a sample of 
high-function autistic children and adolescents, a recent fMRI study detected the 
increased TPJ activity during the mentalizing-relevant task with the  RMET para-
digm (Gordon et al., 2013). On the basis of above evidence, our results indicate 
that OXT might also induce anthropomorphic tendency in males via modulating 
the activity in TPJ in such context, which may strengthen the social salience cue 
and then facilitate altruistic decisions as well as relevant prosocial processes. 
However, such interpretation should be treated with caution as the link between 
the OXT reception gene and the TPJ is still unknown (Haas, Anderson, & Smith, 
2013).   
 Intranasal OXT Modulates Empathy-Dependent Neural 3.7.3
Correlates of Different Altruistic Decisions 
The explorative analyses in Study 2A further revealed the modulatory role of 
OXT in altering the empathy-dependent neural activity in bilateral IPL during 
help (vs. punishment) choices. In particular, different activation between help and 
punishment in IPL was positively correlated with individual empathic concern 
scores, as what we observed in Study 1. However, such relationship was reduced 
under the intranasal OXT treatment. Since the IPL is a crucial part of the attention 
and control network (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 
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2002), our results indicate that OXT might change the salience of social cues rely-
ing on the attention system which is also modulated by the endogenous personali-
ty trait of empathic concern, in consistent with the social salience theory 
(Shamay-Tsoory & Abu-Akel, 2016). Again, this effect needs to be replicated by 
future studies.   
 Limitations 3.7.4
There are some limitations which might affect the generalizability of Study 2A 
and 2B. First and foremost, as in Study 1, we excluded several participants (~ 
46%) of Study 2A in the later analyses. Most of them were excluded because they 
failed to show sufficient help and punishment choice in either or both of the ses-
sions. The only solution might still be, within the scope of the fund and the time, 
to increase the sample size which can benefit the statistical power. An additional 
advantage of the large samples is that investigators can then divide the partici-
pants into different groups in terms of their social preference so that they can 
compare the difference between different groups both at the behavioral and the 
neural level. Another problem is that we only recruited male participants in both 
Study 2A and 2B. As more and more evidence indicated the gender difference in 
OXT-induced effect in social cognition and decisions (Chen et al., 2015; Feng et 
al., 2015; Gao et al., 2016; Rilling et al., 2014; Scheele et al., 2014), future studies 
should also recruit the healthy females and compare the effect of OXT on the 
same measures between genders. Last but not least, participants of Study 2B start-
ed the current task after three other non-relevant tasks due to practical reasons 
(i.e., ~75 min after intranasal administration), which might lead to the reduced 
effect of OXT and other potential confounding problems such as fatigue as well as 
proactive interference.  
 Summary 3.7.5
Studies 2A and 2B provide, to our knowledge, the first evidence of how intranasal 
OXT affects the altruistic decision-making of healthy males in the third-party so-
cial context. Moreover, Study 2A, adopting the fMRI technique, further reveals 
the effect of OXT on the neural correlates of decision and accompanying percep-
tion processes. In Study 2A, we showed that in the subsample of altruistic partici-
pants, OXT slightly facilitates altruistic choices (i.e., either help or punishment) 
by reducing the decision time, despite that it did not improve either the proportion 
or the intensity (i.e., transfer amount) for both altruistic choices. We replicated the 
null effect of OXT on the altruistic choice but did not observe the OXT-dependent 
change in decision time in Study 2B. At the neural level (i.e., only in Study 2A), 
OXT selectively increased the activity in left TPJ when participants viewed the 
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victim being helped, which indicated the plausible role of OXT in promoting the 
anthropomorphic tendency during mentalizing process. Besides, OXT also modu-
lated the empathy-dependent activity in IPL for help (vs. punishment) choices, 
suggesting its role in influencing the salience endogenously dependent on the em-
pathic concern via the attention system during altruistic decision-making. In sum, 
the current results extend our knowledge of the linkage between OXT and a 
unique form of human altruism in a more complex social context and the potential 
underlying neural mechanism.   
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4 Study 3: The Effect of Other-Regarding Focus on 
Third-Party Altruism and Its Neural Correlates 
4.1 Hypotheses 
According to previous findings and our research questions, we have the following 
hypotheses: 
H1: Compared with deciding naturally (i.e., baseline block, BB) we expect that 
participants as third-party deciders will choose to punish the offender more of-
ten when instructed to consider the (un)fairness of offender’s proposal (i.e., of-
fender-focus block, OB). Alternatively, participants are expected to increase 
the frequency to help the victim once they focus on the victim’s feelings after 
receiving the offer (i.e., victim-focus block, VB).  
H2: At the neural level, we expect that activation in TPJ will be higher during 
decision-making in both OB and VB, compared with BB. 
H3: At the neural level, we also expect that the control network (e.g., anterior cin-
gulate cortex, ACC; inferior frontal gyrus, IFG) will show stronger activation 
while making the decisions that cause conflicts with the focus (e.g., the choice 
of help conflicts with OB), compared with making the same decision in BB.  
4.2 Methods 
 Participants 4.2.1
We recruited 50 healthy participants to attend the current fMRI study (23 male; 
mean age = 24.6 ± 3.5; 4 left handedness) via online flyers at the University of 
Bonn and social media. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the 
University of bBonn and written informed consent was given by all participants 
according to the Declaration of Helsinki (BMJ 1991; 302: 1194).  
 Paradigm and Stimuli 4.2.2
The current study utilized a mixed fMRI design and comprised one functional 
scanning, which consisted of 18 blocks equally distributed to three conditions of 
other-regarding focus conditions (i.e., BB, OB, and VB; see Figure 19A). To min-
imize the potential confounding effect of proactive inference caused by experi-
mental manipulation, we fully randomized the order of blocks for each subject, 
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however we ensured no more than three consecutive blocks belonging to the same 
focus condition. Each block started after a 5-s instruction, which asked partici-
pants, as third-party decider, to either focus on the (un)fairness of Player A’s (i.e., 
OB) offer, focus on the feeling of Player B (i.e., VB), or decide naturally (i.e., 
without a specific focus; BB; see Figure 19B) before making decisions. Eight tri-
als began after the instruction, which consisted of seven target trials with an unfair 
offer (i.e., the payoff of the offender was at least twice as that of the victim) and 
one filler trial with a fair offer. The order of these trials was also randomized 
across participants. Within each trial, participants saw a monetary allocation be-
tween a specific Player A and Player B (the total amount ranged from € 9 to € 11), 
identified only by the initials, and then were asked to decide whether to decrease 
the payoff of Player A or increase the payoff of Player B by using their own en-
dowment (i.e., € 10) in 4 s (i.e., the decision phase). After a jittered ISI fixation (3 
~ 5 s), they were further asked to indicate the exact amount on a VAS ranging 
from 0 to 10 with the changing step of € 0.5, within 4 s (i.e., the transfer phase; 
see Figure 19C). The cost ratio was also set to 1:3. Any fast response (i.e., re-
sponding less than 200 ms) or missing response (i.e., not resonding in 4 s) during 
the decision phase was warned with a message and the endowment in that trial 
was deprived. For other details about the paradigm, see Study 1 and Study 2A. 
Notably, the current study adopted different stimuli to make the context closer 
to a real-life situation and reduce degree of losing attention from the participants 
due to repetition of exact the same stimuli (see Appendix Table 2 for all stimuli). 
First, Euro was used as the currency unit instead of an arbitrary monetary unit 
(MU). Second, we refined and increased the variation of payoff by keeping two 
digits round to the same integer (i.e., a random number within ± 0.2). Last but 
never the least, we ensured the average of total payoffs of all unfair trials (i.e., € 
10) to be the same across all blocks to rule out the confounding effect of monetary 
amount. 
 Procedure 4.2.3
Upon arrival, participants were informed about the context and given the first part 
of the instructions, which contained general information about the third-party par-
adigm without mentioning the focus manipulation (i.e., BB). Next, participants 
passed an comprehension quiz and performed some practice trials to be familiar-
ized with the task. After that, we provided them the second part of the instructions 
which explicitly indicated the other two focus conditions (i.e., OB and VB). Criti-
cally, participants were also told that they should always make the decisions they 
preferred, which aimed to reduce the demand characteristics as previous studies 
did (Hare, Malmaud, & Rangel, 2011). Then, they did another round of practice 
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that also included the instruction phase while in the scanner. The functional scan-
ning lasted around 40 min and was followed by a 6-min structural scanning. Af-
terwards, participants completed a rating task to indicate their unfairness feeling 
to offers that appeared during the fMRI experiment on a 9-point Likert (0 = not at 
all, 8 = very much). Participants were paid at the end of the experiment (up to € 
25). 
 
Figure 19. (A) Illustration for the mixed design; (B) Instructions screen presented before each 
block; (C) Example for the trial procedure. The offender was labeled as Player A, the victim 
was labeled as Player B in the whole experiment. In this example, the the participant added € 
1 to the victim (i.e., A.K.). Abbreviations: BB = baseline block, OB = offender-focused block, 
VB = victim-focused block, ISI = inter-stimulus interval, ITI = inter-trial interval. 
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 Data Collection 4.2.4
All imaging data were collected via the 3-Tesla Siemens Trio platform at the Im-
aging Center of Life & Brain, University Hospital Bonn. The sequence used for 
both functional and structural images were the same as Study 1 and Study 2A. 
 Data Quality Check and Analyses 4.2.5
We excluded four out of 50 participants from the analyses because of excessive 
head movement (N = 3) and quit of the scanning (N = 1). Given our research 
questions (also hypotheses) and the power of statistical analyses, we based our 
later analyses on the following three (sub)samples: i.e., the MAIN sample (N = 
46), the HELP subsample (N = 42; participants chose at least five times to help in 
all three focus conditions), the PUNISH subsample (N = 22; participants chose at 
least five times to punish in all three focus conditions). Additionally, we did an 
explorative analysis of the interaction effect between attention focus (i.e., BB, 
OB, and VB) and altruistic decision type (i.e., help and punish) on the decision-
relevant neural activities, which was performed on the HELPUN subsample (N = 
20; ; participants chose at least five times to both help and punish in all three fo-
cus conditions). 
4.2.5.1 Behavioral Data 
To test H1, we calculated the proportion of help and punishment choices in each 
focus condition in the MAIN sample and performed a repeated measure one-way 
ANOVA on each choice respectively. To check the robustness of this result, we 
did the same analyses on remaining three subsamples. Besides, we also checked 
the decision time and transfer amount of help choices in the HELP subsample and 
that of punishment choices in the PUNISH subsample, via the same analyses. 
Moreover, we adopted a 3 (attention focus: BB, OB, and VB) × 2 (altruistic 
choice type: help and punish) repeated-measure ANOVA to check the main effects 
and their interaction on the decision time and transfer amount in the HELPUN 
subsample. All of the above analyses were performed via SPSS 22 (SPSS Inc.). 
Mauchly’s sphericity test was used to check the assumption of sphericity for 
ANOVA and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied if this assumption was 
violated. Bonferroni correction was adopted to control for multiple comparisons 
in post-hoc analyses. All reported p-values were two-tailed and p < 0.05 was con-
sidered significant. 
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4.2.5.2 fMRI Data 
4.2.5.2.1 Preprocess 
We used SPM 8 (Wellcome Trust Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, 
UK) to analyze the fMRI data. The data was preprocessed following a similar 
procedure as used in Study 1 and Study 2A, except that we adopted a cut-off value 
of 286 s (i.e., twice the block duration; instead of the default 128 s) to model the 
block effect in the high-pass temporal filtering. 
4.2.5.2.2 General linear model (GLM) analyses 
To test H2, GLM1 was built on the MAIN sample, which included three regres-
sors of interest, namely onsets of decision phase during all choices for unfair trials 
in BB, OB, and VB (i.e., BBdec OBdec VBdec). To test H3, we also built GLM2 
and GLM3 based on the HELP and PUNISH subsample respectively. GLM2 con-
sisted of three regressors of interest, namely onsets of decision phase during help 
choices in BB, OB and VB (i.e., BBhelp, OBhelp, VBhelp). Similarly, GLM3 
included the same regressors, but with punishment choice instead (i.e., BBpunish, 
OBpunish, VBpunish). To exploratively test the interaction effect on choice-
relevant activation, we also built GLM4 on the HELPUN subsample with six re-
gressors of interested included: i.e., BBhelp, BBpunish, OBhelp, OBpunish, 
VBhelp, VBpunish (similar with previous GLMs). For all GLMs, the duration of 
these regressors was considered and set equivalent to the real decision time. For 
regressors of non-interested in all GLMs, see Table 19 for details. 
For each GLM, we creased the individual contrasts of regressors of interest 
and forwarded them to a one-way flexible factorial ANOVA model in which pair-
wise (and the reverse) comparisons were performed in terms of the corresponding 
samples respectively at the group level (see Table 19).  
Chapter 4.  Study 3: The Effect of Other-Regarding Focus on Third-Party Altruism and Its Neural Correlates 
95 
Table 19. Information of GLMs 
GLM Regressors of non-interested Target Contrast 
GLM1 
(MAIN sample;  
N = 46) 
1-3): onsets of BB, OB, and VB blocks 
(duration equals 143 s; the period from 
the offset of the instruction to the onset 
of the instruction of the next block); 
4) onsets of all transfer phases (duration 
equals 4 s);  
5) onsets of all instructions (duration 
equals 5 s);  
6) onsets of stimuli presentation during 
invalid decision phases (i.e., no response 
trials, duration equals the 4 s; trials with 
the decision time less than 200 ms or fair 
offers, duration equals the decision 
time); 
7-12) headmotion parameters 
Individual Level: 
BBdec vs implicit baseline  
OBdec vs implicit baseline  
VBdec vs implicit baseline 
Group Level: 
OBdec vs BBdec 
VBdec vs BBdec 
OBdec vs VBdec 
GLM2 
(HELP subsample;  
N = 42) 
1-5): same as GLM1; 
6) onsets of stimuli presentation during 
invalid decision phases (i.e., keep and 
punishment choice, duration equals the 
decision time; no response trials, dura-
tion equals the 4 s; trials with the deci-
sion time less than 200 ms or fair offers, 
duration equals the decision time); 
7-12) headmotion parameters 
Individual Level: 
BBhelp vs implicit baseline 
OBhelp vs implicit baseline  
VBhelp vs implicit baseline 
Group Level: 
OBhelp vs BBhelp 
VBhelp vs BBhelp 
OBhelp vs VBhelp 
GLM3  
(PUNISH subsample; 
N = 22) 
1-5): same as GLM1; 
6) onsets of stimuli presentation during 
invalid decision phases (i.e., keep and 
help choice, duration equals the decision 
time; no response trials, duration equals 
the 4 s; trials with the decision time less 
than 200 ms or fair offers, duration 
equals the decision time); 
7-12) headmotion parameters 
Individual Level: 
BBpunish vs  
implicit baseline 
OBpunish vs  
implicit baseline 
VBpunish vs  
implicit baseline 
Group Level: 
OBpunish vs BBpunish 
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VBpunish vs BBpunish 
OBpunish vs VBpunish 
GLM4 
(HEPUN subsample; 
N = 20) 
1-5): same as GLM1; 
6) onsets of stimuli presentation during 
invalid decision phases (i.e., keep choice, 
duration equals the decision time; no 
response trials, duration equals the 4 s; 
trials with the decision time less than 200 
ms or fair offers, duration equals the 
decision time); 
7-12) headmotion parameters 
Individual Level: 
BBhelp vs. BBpunish 
OBhelp vs. OBpunish 
VBhelp vs. VBpunish 
Group Level: 
OB(help-punish) vs 
BB(help-punish) 
VB(help-punish) vs 
BB(help-punish) 
OB(help-punish) vs 
VB(help-punish) 
Note: GLM refers to general linear model, dec refers to decision, BB refers to baseline block, OB 
refers to offender-focused block, VB refers to victim-focused block. 
4.2.5.2.3 Explorative functional connectivity analysis 
To further address how attention focus influences the functional connectivity be-
tween the bilateral TPJ and other brain regions, we performed exploratory anal-
yses by using the generalized form of context-dependent psycho-physiological 
interactions analysis (gPPI toolbox: https://www.nitrc.org/projects/gppi). Com-
pared to the standard PPI approach (K Friston, et al., 1997), gPPI spans the whole 
experimental space which allows modelling of more than two task conditions and 
furthermore improves the model fit by increasing the specificity for true negative 
findings and sensitivity for true positive findings (Cisler, Bush, & Steele, 2014; 
McLaren, Ries, Xu, & Johnson, 2012). To ensure a reasonable interpretation and 
to maintain sufficient statistical power, we only performed PPI analyses on GLM1 
with the left TPJ as the seed region as it was jointly activated in OBdec and 
VBdec (both compared with BBdec) at the group level. Specifically, the source 
mask was defined as a sphere with a radius of 4 mm centered at the peak voxel of 
the corresponding group-level contrasts within the left TPJ mask, which was ap-
plied to all participants in the MAIN sample. Afterwards we extracted its time 
series (physiological terms), which were deconvolved, multiplied by each regres-
sor in that GLM (psychological terms) and then reconvolved with the HRF to 
generate the PPI terms (Gitelman, et al., 2003). Next, all terms including the 6 
head motion parameters were forwarded to a new GLM. The individual contrasts 
were built, based on parameter estimates for the PPI terms. Finally, a group-level 
one-sample t-test analysis was performed to identify the brain regions displaying 
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increased functional connectivity with the seed regions during either OBdec or 
VBdec (both compared with BBdec).  
We reported our results in GLM 1-3 with a cluster-level whole-brain corrected 
(WBC) threshold of p < 0.05 while controlling for family-wise error (FWE) rate 
with an uncorrected voxel-level threshold of p < 0.001 (Eklund, Nichols, & 
Knutsson, 2016). An a priori TPJ mask (Hutcherson, Bushong, & Rangel, 2015) 
was used for small volume correction (SVC) given the initial hypotheses. Besides, 
we used a lenient uncorrected voxel-level threshold of p < 0.005 with the extent 
threshold of 100 for the results of GLM4 (due to the smaller sample size) as well 
as the explorative PPI analyses. Region labelling and data visualization followed 
the same procedure as Study 1. In addition, we extracted the beta values of the 
peak voxels in above-mentioned contrasts for display using the MarsBaR toolbox 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). 
4.3 Results 
 Behavioral Results  4.3.1
As predicted in H1, participants showed higher (lower) help proportion (main 
effect of attention focus: F(2,90) = 21.10, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.32; Post-hoc ps 
< 0.01) but lower (higher) punishment proportion (main effect of attention focus: 
F(2,90) = 17.91, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.29; Post-hoc ps < 0.01) in VB (OB), 
compared with BB, in the MAIN sample (see Figure 20). A similar behavioral 
pattern was also observed in the rest three subsamples (All Fs > 9, ps < 0.001, 
partial η2s  > 0.3; see Table 20 for descriptive summary of choice proportion). 
Regarding specific types of choice, it was found that participants in the HELP 
subsample took longer in deciding to help the victim in OB, compared with either 
BB or VB (main effect of attention focus: F(2,82) = 17.23, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 
0.30; Post-hoc ps < 0.001). No other effect was detected neither in transfer 
amount during help choices in the HELP subsample (p > 0.06) nor in both 
measures during punishment choices in the PUNISH subsample (both ps > 0.06). 
By analyzing both altruistic choices on each measure respectively in the HELPUN 
sample, we found that participants in general responded slower in OB (main effect 
of attention focus: F(2, 38) = 3.75, p = 0.047, partial η2 = 0.17; Post-hoc p = 
0.002, compared with BB) as well as during punishment (main effect of altruistic 
choice type: F(1, 19) = 5.84, p = 0.026, partial η2 = 0.23; Post-hoc p = 0.026). 
Apart from that we did not observe any other effect on both measures (all p > 
0.06; see Table 21 for descriptive summary of decision time and transfer amount). 
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In addition, participants in all (sub)samples reported significantly higher feel-
ings of unfairness to target unequal offers than to filler equal offers (all ts > 23, p 
< 0.001;  see Table 22 for descriptive summary of rating). 
 
Figure 20. Proportion of altruistic choices in different focus conditions in the MAIN sample. 
Significance level: *p <0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, Bonferroni correction; Error bars: SEM. 
Abbreviations: BB = baseline block, OB = offender-focused block, VB = victim-focused block. 
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Table 20. Descriptive summary of altruistic choice proportion (%) during the fMRI task 
 help  punish 
 Mean (S.D.)  Mean (S.D.) 
 BB OB VB  BB OB VB 
MAIN sample  
(N = 46; GLM1) 
72.57 
(25.99) 
61.69 
(26.86) 
82.45 
(21.22) 
 23.19 
(23.33) 
33.44 
(26.73) 
15.99 
(20.44) 
HELP subsample 
(N = 42; GLM2) 
76.36 
(20.23) 
67.35 
(20.99) 
83.44 
(17.65) 
 21.43 
(19.45) 
28.00 
(20.25) 
14.85 
(16.49) 
PUNISH subsample  
(N = 22; GLM3) 
55.75 
(19.47) 
46.86 
(18.84) 
67.21 
(21.88) 
 41.88 
(19.11) 
48.91 
(20.27) 
30.85 
(20.96) 
HELPUN subsample  
(N = 20; GLM4) 
59.77 
(14.36) 
51.55 
(11.74) 
69.53 
(16.21) 
 37.74 
(13.24) 
43.81 
(12.32) 
28.34 
(14.43) 
Note: S.D. refers to standard deviation, BB refers to baseline block, OB refers to offender-focused 
block, VB refers to victim-focused block. 
Table 21. Descriptive of decision time and transfer amount during the fMRI task 
Note: S.D. refers to standard deviation, BB refers to baseline block, OB refers to offender-focused 
block, VB refers to victim-focused block. 
 Target offer with unequal mon-
etary allocation 
 Filter offer with equal mone-
tary allocation 
 Mean (S.D.)  Mean (S.D.) 
MAIN sample  
(N = 46; GLM1) 
5.95 (0.60)  0.54 (0.80) 
 
HELP subsample 
(N = 42; GLM2) 
5.97 (0.62) 
 
 0.57 (0.82) 
PUNISH subsample  
(N = 22; GLM3) 
5.92 (0.58) 
 
 0.54 (0.62) 
HELPUN subsample 
(N = 20; GLM4) 
5.91 (0.59)  0.54 (0.63) 
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Table 22. Descriptive summary of post-scanning rating 
  BB OB VB 
  Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
All valid choices of MAIN sample (N = 46; GLM1) 
Decision Time 
(ms) 
 1562.12 (386.98) 1736.47 (398.72) 1563.49 (402.20) 
Transfer 
Amount (€) 
 2.28 (1.28) 2.30 (1.27) 2.50 (1.35) 
Help choices of HELP subsample (N = 42; GLM2) 
Decision Time 
(ms) 
 1571.22 (399.38) 1731.18 (438.56) 1569.66 (416.95) 
Transfer 
Amount (€) 
 2.28 (1.28) 2.30 (1.27) 2.50 (1.35) 
Punishment choices of PUNISH subsample (N = 22; GLM3) 
Decision Time 
(ms) 
 1814.82 (364.88) 1901.08 (368.29) 1945.22 (363.91) 
Transfer 
Amount (€) 
 2.09 (0.89) 2.12 (0.62) 2.26 (1.05) 
Help and punishment choices of HELP UN subsample (N = 20; GLM4) 
Decision Time 
(ms) 
Help 1800.85 (375.72) 1913.37 (418.93) 1778.45 (420.36) 
 Punishment 1844.99 (366.26) 1934.31 (360.70) 1958.63 (379.40) 
Transfer 
Amount (€) 
Help 2.13 (1.00) 2.18 (1.22) 2.44 (1.39) 
 Punishment 2.16 (0.91) 2.15 (0.63) 2.30 (1.07) 
Note: Unfairness ratings range from 0 (not at all) to 8 (very much); S.D. refers to standard devia-
tion, BB refers to baseline block, OB refers to offender-focused block, VB refers to victim-focused 
block. 
 Imaging Findings  4.3.2
4.3.2.1 General Effect of Attention Focus on Decision-Relevant Activities 
As predicted in H2, participants in the MAIN sample (GLM1) showed higher ac-
tivation in bilateral TPJ during decision-making while considering the unfairness 
of the offender’s behavior (vs. BB). Similarly, we also observed increased deci-
sion-relevant activities in the left TPJ while participants took the victim’s feeling 
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into account (vs. BB; see Figure 21). For other activations yielded from above-
mentioned and remaining contrasts, see Table 23 for details.  
Table 23. Decision-relevant activities reflecting the effect of different attention focus in the 
MAIN sample (N = 46; GLM1) 
Brain Region Hemisphere Cluster Size MNI Coordinates BA T-value 
   x y z   
OBdec vs. BBdec 
TPJ L 508 -54 -50 22 40 4.71* 
TPJ R 126 62 -46 30 40 3.93† 
IFG/AI L 114 -46 30 -6 47 4.14 
PCG L 274 -42 2 58 6/8 4.52* 
BBdec vs. OBdec 
No cluster        
VBdec vs. BBdec 
TPJ L 165 -50 -48 22 40 4.07† 
BBdec vs. VBdec 
No cluster        
OBdec vs. VBdec 
ACC/MCC/SMA B 626 6 22 46 6/8/32 5.00* 
Thalamus/Caudate/ 
Lateral Ventricle 
B 194 -2 -2 16  4.95* 
VBdec vs. OBdec 
No cluster        
Note: Threshold is set to p < 0.001, k = 100, uncorrected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise 
error corrected at the cluster level; †Significant at p < 0.1 family wise error (FWE) rate corrected at 
the cluster level.  
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling template 
toolbox for SPM8): dec = decision, BB = baseline block, OB = offender-focused block, VB = 
victim-focused block; L = left, R = right, B = bilateral, BA = Brodmann Area; ACC = Anterior 
Cingulate Cortex, AI = Anterior Insula, IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus, MCC = Mid-Cingulate Cor-
tex, PCG = Precentral Gyrus, SMA = Supplementary Motor Area, TPJ = Temporo-parietal Junc-
tion. 
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Figure 21. Choice-relevant activities in TPJ reflecting the effect of attention focus. Display 
threshold: p < 0.001 at the voxel-level, uncorrected. Abbreviations: BB = baseline block, OB = 
offender-focused block, VB = victim-focused block; dec=decision, TPJ = temporo-parietal 
junction. 
4.3.2.2 The Effect of Attention Focus on Activities of Specific Decision  
Regarding the effect of attention on help-relevant activities, we found in the 
HELP subsample (GLM2) that higher activation in the dorsal part of ACC extend-
ing to the supplementary motor area (SMA) and bilateral IFG extending to the 
anterior insula (AI) while participants made help choice in OB, compared to either 
VB or BB (i.e., OBhelp vs. VBhelp, and OBhelp vs. VBhelp; see Figure 22; also 
see Table 24 for other activations). For punishment-relevant neural activation, 
participants in the PUNISH subsample (GLM3) exhibited reduced activation only 
in the right IFG in OB compared with BB (i.e., OBpunish vs. BBpunish; see Fig-
ure 22). No other significant activations were observed in remaining contrasts. In 
sum, these results were consistent with H3. 
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Table 24. Help-relevant activities reflecting the effect of attention focus in the HELP subsample 
(N = 42; GLM2) 
Brain Region Hemi-
sphere 
Cluster 
Size 
MNI Coordinates BA T-value 
   x y z   
OBhelp vs. BBhelp 
IFG L 217 -54 16 6 45/47 4.46* 
AI L 141 -28 18 -6 13 4.54† 
IFG/AI R 420 48 24 4 13/45/47 5.26* 
PCG/MFG L 291 -44 12 46 6/8 4.40* 
MFG R 128 38 26 38 9 4.26 
ACC/MCC /SMA B 173 0 30 44 6/8/9 4.11* 
MeFG/SFG R 115 12 6 64 6/8/9 4.04 
TPJ L 191 -50 -48 22 40 4.58* 
TPJ/IPL R 323 58 -46 34 40 4.24* 
BBhelp vs. OBhelp 
No cluster        
VBhelp vs. BBhelp 
No cluster        
BBhelp vs. VBhelp 
No cluster        
OBhelp vs. VBhelp 
IFG/AI R 161 42 20 -8 13/45/47 4.28† 
IFG/MFG R 118 38 46 6 10 4.50 
ACC/MCC/SMA B 1104 6 22 46 6/8/9/32 5.13* 
IPL R 214 54 -50 42 40 4.42* 
Caudate/Lateral Ventricle B 191 -4 -2 16  4.38* 
VBhelp vs. OBhelp 
No cluster        
Note: Threshold is set to p < 0.001, k = 100, uncorrected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise 
error corrected at the cluster level; †Significant at p < 0.1 family wise error (FWE) rate corrected at 
the cluster level. 
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling template 
toolbox for SPM8): BB=baseline block, OB=offender-focused block, VB=victim-focused block, 
L=left, R=right, B=bilateral, BA=Brodmann Area; ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex, AI = Anteri-
or Insula, IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus, IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobule, MCC = Mid-Cingulate 
Cortex, MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus, MeFG = Medial Frontal Gyrus, PCG = Precentral Gyrus, 
SFG = Superior Frontal Gyrus, SMA = Supplementary Motor Area, TPJ = Temporo-parietal Junc-
tion. 
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Figure 22. Regions reflecting the conflict between the effect of attention focus and the choice. 
Display threshold: p < 0.001 at the voxel-level, uncorrected. Abbreviations: BB = baseline 
block, OB = offender-focused block, VB = victim-focused block, ACC = anterior cingulate cor-
tex, IFG = inferior frontal gyrus. 
4.3.2.3 Interaction Effect on Decision-Relevant Activities 
Focusing on the HELPUN subsample (GLM 4), we found that the differential 
activation in the right IFG extending to AI between help and punishment was 
higher when participants considered the offender’s unfairness,compared to decid-
ing naturally (i.e., [OBhelp − OBpunish] vs [BBhelp − BBpunish]; see Figure 23). 
Besides, helping in OB resulted in stronger activitions in the dACC/SMA as well 
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as the right inferior parietal lobule in OB than that in VB (i.e., [OBhelp − OBpun-
ish] vs [VBhelp − VBpunish]; see Table 25 for other activations). 
Table 25. Differential activities between help vs. punishment reflecting the effect of attention 
focus in the HELPUN subsample (N = 20; GLM4) 
Brain Region Hemisphere Cluster 
Size 
MNI Coordinates BA T-value 
   x y z   
OB(help - punish) vs. BB(help - punish) 
IFG/AI R 493 48 20 14 13/44/45/47 4.42† 
IPL R 129 52 -44 34 40 3.22 
BB(help - punish) vs. OB(help - punish) 
No cluster        
VB(help - punish) vs. BB(help - punish) 
MTG/MOG/SOG R 101 28 -68 20 31 3.35 
BB(help - punish) vs. VB(help - punish) 
No cluster        
OB(help - punish) vs. VB(help - punish) 
IFG/AI R 136 48 24 2 13/45/47 3.43 
ACC/OFC B 167 -4 28 -4 10/24/32 4.08 
SFG/SMA/MCC  B 1134 18 14 48 6/8 4.83* 
IPL R 356 54 -56 48 40 4.22† 
VB(help - punish) vs. OB(help - punish) 
No cluster        
Note: Threshold is set to p < 0.005, k = 100, uncorrected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise 
error (FWE) corrected at the cluster level; †Significant at p < 0.1 family wise error (FWE) rate 
corrected at the cluster level. 
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling template 
toolbox for SPM8): BB = baseline block, OB = offender-focused block, VB = victim-focused 
block; R = right, BA = Brodmann Area; AI  = Anterior Insula, IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus, MCC 
= Mid-Cingulate Cortex, MOG = Middle Occipital Gyrus, MTG = Middle Temporal Gyrus, SFG = 
Superior Frontal Gyrus, SMA = Supplementary Motor Area, SOG = Superior Occipital Gyrus. 
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Figure 23. IFG reflecting the interaction between the effect of attention focus (in OB) and the 
choice in the HELPUN subsample. The line plot showed the beta value in the peak voxel of 
the right IFG in all conditions, only with the goal of illustration. Display threshold: p < 0.005 at 
the voxel-level, uncorrected; Error bars: SEM. Abbreviations: BB = baseline block, OB = of-
fender-focused block, VB = victim-focused block, IFG = inferior frontal gyrus. 
4.3.2.4 Focus-Dependent Functional Connectivity During Decision-Making 
Given the results of GLM1, the conjunction analyses showed that only the left 
TPJ was more activated during decision-making in OB and VB compared with 
BB (i.e., GLM1: conjunction between OBdec vs. BBdec and VBdec vs. BBdec, 
MNI coordinates of peak voxel: -50/-48/22). Hence, we only performed the ex-
ploratory PPI analyses in GLM1 with the left TPJ as seed regions. We found that 
the left AI/IFG exhibited an enhanced connectivity with the left TPJ during the 
decisions making in OB compared with BB (i.e., OBdec > BBdec), which also 
held true in the contrast of VBdec vs. BBdec with a more lenient threshold (p < 
0.005 uncorrected with k = 100; see Figure 24; also see Table 26 for other activa-
tions). 
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Figure 24. Regions reflecting enhanced functional connectivity with left TPJ during decisions 
in OB and VB (vs. BB respectively) in the MAIN sample. Bar plots showed the beta value of 
PPI in the peak voxel of left AI/IFG with left TPJ in all conditions, only with the goal of illustra-
tion. Display threshold: p < 0.005 at voxel-level, uncorrected; Error bars: SEM. Abbreviations: 
PPI = psycho-physiological interaction, BB = baseline block, OB = offender-focused block, VB 
= victim-focused block, dec = decision, AI = anterior insula, IFG = inferior frontal gyrus, TPJ = 
temporo-parietal junction. 
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Table 26. Regions reflecting enhanced functional connectivity with the left TPJ during deci-
sion-making in OB or VB (both vs. BB) in the MAIN sample (N = 46; GLM1) 
Brain Region Hemisphere Cluster Size MNI Coordinates BA T-value 
   x y z   
OBdec vs. BBdec 
IFG/AI/Thalamus/ 
Putamen/Lateral Ventricle 
L 1847 -50 8 4 13 3.47* 
Thalamus R 329 16 -24 10  3.72† 
Caudate/Putamen/Insula R 153 32 20 18 13 3.83 
MFG/SMA R 124 18 -8 66 6 3.76 
BBdec vs. OBdec        
No cluster        
VBdec vs. BBdec        
IFG/AI/PCG L 196 -46 10 4 13/44 3.77 
PoCG/PCG R 178 64 -14 38 2/3/4/6 3.56 
BBdec vs. VBdec        
No cluster        
Note: Threshold is set to p < 0.005, k = 100, uncorrected; * Significant at p < 0.05 family wise 
error corrected at the cluster level; †Significant at p < 0.1 family wise error (FWE) rate corrected at 
the cluster level. 
Abbreviations (brain regions are labeled according to the automated anatomic labeling template 
toolbox for SPM8): dec=decision, BB=baseline block, OB=offender-focused block, VB=victim-
focused block, L=left, B=bilateral, BA=Brodmann Area; AI = Anterior Insula, IFG = Inferior 
Frontal Gyrus, MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus, PCG = Precentral Gyrus, PoCG = Postcentral Gy-
rus, SMA = Supplementary Motor Area, TPJ = Temporo-parietal Junction. 
4.4 Discussion 
 The Effect of Attention Focus on (Altruistic) Choice 4.4.1
Preference in a Third-Party Context  
Behavioral results on choices showed that manipulating the focus of third-party 
deciders is an effective way to reshape their choice pattern, namely that they in-
creased (reduced) the frequency to punish (help) while considering the unfairness 
of offenders but were more (less) likely to help (punish) when they thought about 
the feelings of the victim. These findings are consistent with our prediction in H1 
and previous studies testing the causal relationship between attention focus and 
choice in other domains. For instance, hungry but non-dieting participants were 
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more likely to choose healthy but less delicious food when they considered the 
healthinessof the food during decision-making, compared with their choices when 
deciding naturally (Hare, et al., 2011). In a recent unpublished study, participants, 
as the role of proposer in the dictator game, became more generous in sharing the 
money with the unknown recipients when they thought more on either the right 
thing to do or the recipient’s feeling (Hutcherson & Rangel, 2014). Our current 
study thus extends such attention-induced effect on decision-making to an incen-
tivized third-party context. Moreover, we observed the similar results across dif-
ferent subsamples, indicating that this effect could hardly be affected by individu-
al difference.  
 
 TPJ: A Key Region Reflecting the Effect of Other-regarding 4.4.2
Focus during Decision-making 
As predicted in H2, decision-relevant TPJ activation was stronger in both condi-
tions where participants were asked to consider aspects of other parties, either the 
offender’s unfair behavior or the victim’s feeling. TPJ has been shown to be in 
close link with theory-of-mind (ToM)/mentalizing ability in a large amount of 
literature (Schaafsma, et al., 2014; Schurz, et al., 2014). Since that either OB or 
VB reuired more perspective-taking process, highly relevant with mentalizing 
ability, compared with deciding naturally, it is plausible to label the activation of 
TPJ during decision-making (esp. help choice) as the mark of mentalizing in these 
two conditions. However, this explanation should be treated cautiously due to the 
reverse inference problem (Poldrack, 2006) and the multifunction of TPJ, which is 
not limited to ToM but extend to other cognitive ability like attention reorientation 
(Corbetta, et al., 2008; Lee & McCarthy, 2014; Mars et al., 2012; Mitchell, 2008).   
 
 Engagement of Control Network in Modulating the Decision 4.4.3
Process Influenced by Attention Focus 
In line with our prediction in H3, we found that the control neural network, espe-
cially the IFG/AI and the dACC/SMA, was strongly involved in resolving the 
conflict between the goal of specific other-regarding focus and specific choice 
made. Particularly, both regions were strongly activated when third parties decid-
ed to help the victim in OB, compared with either VB or BB. The right IFG/AI 
also displayed lower activation during punishment choice when participants con-
sidered the offender’s unfair behavior than when they decided without any specif-
ic focus. The reverse activation pattern of IFG/AI during different altruistic choic-
es in OB and BB reasonably yielded its significant interaction in the HELPUN 
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subsample. Previous studies have already shown that the IFG/AI contributed cru-
cially to cognitive control, such as response inhibition, or task switching (Aron, 
Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Nelson et al., 2010); but also see (Aron, Robbins, & 
Poldrack, 2014) and was considered as one of the key regions in the ventral atten-
tion network (Dosenbach, et al., 2008; Vossel, Geng, & Fink, 2014). More rele-
vantly, Hare and colleagues (2011) observed the stronger activation in the IFG/AI 
when participants took into account the healthiness of food in a food choice task, 
indicating its potential role in reflecting the attention-induced change during deci-
sion-making. Together with the results of attention-induced change of choice (i.e., 
higher punishment proportion but lower help proportion in OB), these findings 
suggest that this region could be the neural hub for modulating choices depending 
on different attention focus.  
Notably, the dACC/SMA, a region tightly associated with cognitive control 
(Shackman et al., 2011), especially the monitor and resolution of conflict 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 
2004), also participated in the modulation of attention focus during help choices. 
Given the fact that the process of conflict resolution was usually reflected by the 
change of decision time, such as the classical ―Stroop‖ task (MacDonald, Cohen, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2000; Pardo, Pardo, Janer, & Raichle, 1990), we could proba-
bly explain the engagement of dACC in our results in modulating the decision-
making process, not the choice per se, given different focus condition. Consistent 
with this interpretation, we also observed the significant delay during help choice 
in OB, compared with either VB or BB. 
 Cross-Talk between TPJ and Control Network during 4.4.4
Decision Process Dependent on Attention Focus 
Our explorative PPI analyses showed that the left TPJ enhanced its task-dependent 
functional connectivity with the left AI/IFG during decision-making in either OB 
or VB (vs. BB). Consistently, two recent studies also showed a strong functional 
coupling between TPJ (esp. the anterior and right part) and bilateral AI extending 
to IFG via connectivity-based data-driven analyses (Bzdok et al., 2013; Mars, et 
al., 2012). Given the role of the AI/IFG in attention and cognitive control, our PPI 
results indicate that ToM processes are connected to inhibitory control reflected 
by the enhanced functional link between TPJ and AI/IFG, which influences third 
parties’ (altruistic) choices. This finding also sheds light on the mechanism under-
lying the shift of attention-dependent altruism preference from a network perspec-
tive. However, we could not rule out alternative explanations as the AI is also in-
volved in equally relevant psychological functions such as empathy (Bernhardt & 
Singer, 2012; Fan, Duncan, de Greck, & Northoff, 2011; Gu et al., 2012).  
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 Limitations 4.4.5
To begin with, we had comparatively few observations of punishment choice es-
pecially when participants were instructed to think about the feeling of the victim, 
which thus led to the unreliable estimation of the BOLD signal for this condition 
due to insufficient statistical power. Since participants could voluntarily make the 
decisions in the current design, it is not possible to control their choice. Neverthe-
less, previous studies also showed that participants preferred helping to punishing 
if both options were available (Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016; Lotz, 
Okimoto, et al., 2011). Future studies could use cases with other types of more 
severe norm violations (e.g., criminal scenes), instead of the fairness norm viola-
tion, which might help to elicit more punishment behaviors (Buckholtz, et al., 
2008; Krueger, et al., 2014). A relevant disadvantage is that we could investigate 
the effect of attention focus on specific altruistic choice only based on 
(sub)samples with different participants (either the number or the identity), which 
sets limitations to the consistency as well as the generalization of our findings.   
 Summary 4.4.6
In sum, Study 3 provides the first empirical evidence of how simple manipulation 
in changing the focus on different aspects of a third-party incentivized context 
affects the way of third-party observers adopt to costly intervene in a situation of 
injustice, which helps to maintain the justice and social norm. Furthermore, it tries 
to clarify the neural basis underlying this modulation, with the help of the fMRI 
technique, and indicates the role of TPJ and control network (esp. AI/IFG, 
dACC/SMA) in this attention-dependent decision process. Regarding the practical 
implications, we hope to shed light on our understanding of the process behind 
legal judgment, as it is a highly complex decision-making process in a social con-
text that is easily influenced and reshaped by different attention foci. 
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5 Study 4: The Cognitive Basis Underlying Third-
Party Altruistic Decision-Making 
5.1 Hypotheses 
Based on previous findings and our research questions, we derived the following 
three sets of hypotheses. For each set of hypotheses, three sub-hypotheses were 
provided basedb on different dependent measures in which we were interested 
(i.e., choice proportion, processing speed/general processing depth, and fixation-
based attention proportion). 
H1: Empathic concern will influence third-party altruistic decisions and infor-
mation search patterns in the baseline block (BB). 
H1a: Third parties will choose to help more often with an increasing empathic 
concern level and choose to punish more often with a decreasing empathic 
concern level in the BB.  
H1b: Decision time (DT) and the number of fixations when deciding to help 
will be smallest for those participants with a high empathic concern level, 
whereas they will be largest for punishment decisions in the BB. 
H1c: Higher empathic concern level will result in a higher proportion of fixa-
tion towards victim-relevant payoff information in the BB. 
H2: Directing attention towards different focuses will influence third-party altruis-
tic choices and information search patterns. 
H2a: Third parties will choose to help more often in the victim-focused block 
(VB) and will choose to punish more often in the offender-focused block 
(OB), compared to the BB.  
H2b: The DT and number of fixations in help (punishment) decisions in the VB 
will be the smallest (largest) and those in the OB will be the largest 
(smallest). 
H2c: Third parties will show an increase in the proportion of fixation directed 
towards victim-related payoff information in the VB and a decrease in the 
OB (compared with the BB). 
H3: The empathic concern level will modulate the attention effect on third-party 
altruistic choices and information search patterns. 
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H3a: The empathic concern level will positively correlate with the help propor-
tion in the VB and the BB; the slope in the VB will thereby be larger than 
in the BB. The empathic concern level will negatively correlate with the 
punishment proportion in the OB and BB; the slope in the OB will be larg-
er than that of the BB.  
H3b: An increase in empathic concern level will lead to a decrease in DT and 
the number of fixations in decisions to help. This effect will be strong in 
the BB and even stronger in the VB. A higher empathic concern level will 
result in a longer DT and a larger number of fixations in punishment deci-
sions. This effect will be particularly strong in the BB and even stronger in 
the OB. 
H3c: A higher empathic concern level will result in a higher proportion of fixa-
tion towards victim-relevant payoff information. This effect will be accen-
tuated in the VB. 
5.2 Methods 
 Participants 5.2.1
Forty-seven healthy German participants were recruited as third parties for the 
current eye-tracking study (17 males: mean age = 24.26 ± 6.02 yrs). They were 
recruited via the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (Greiner, 
2004). Following the rule of ―no deception‖ in experimental economics, we re-
cruited additional 47 pairs of first (i.e., offender) and second party (i.e., victim) 
from the same subject pool for an online study to collect the real choices and used 
them as the stimuli for the eye-tracking study. 
 Online Decision Collection 5.2.2
Online choices from the first-party (i.e., offender) were collected 5 days before the 
eye-tracking study via Unipark (http://www.unipark.com/de/). The online task 
basically followed the procedure used in the Study 1, but with the following ex-
ceptions. First, all 94 participants played the role of dictators (i.e., offender) and 
they were told that some of their choices (i.e., half of them) would be chosen for 
the other experiment. In particular, each of the selected choice was matched with a 
real person as the recipient (i.e., victim) and then forwarded to a third person (i.e., 
third-party decider, namely participants in the eye-tracking part), together with the 
initials of both parties, who could affect their final payoffs. Second, each partici-
pant was presented with 99 binary decision tasks. In each task, participants needed 
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to choose one of the two given options which characterized the different money 
split between themselves and another anonymous recipient. Third, we intentional-
ly paired the target option (i.e., the unequal monetary split used in the eye-
tracking part as stimulus) with an unattractive option (i.e., an equal split but with 
very low joint payoff) in each binary decision task. In this way participants’ 
choices were biased so that we obtained all target choices. 
 Eye-Tracking Stimuli 5.2.3
In terms of the real decisions from the offenders in the online part, we first created 
the template including 28 unequal splits with different money allocations as the 
target trials plus 5 equal splits as the filler trial for the eye-tracking study. Unequal 
template splits were selected using the following rules: (a) the sum payoff ranges 
from €6 to €14; (b) the payoff for both offender and victim should be less than 
€10 to avoid the difference in eye-movements due to the different digits in payoff 
(i.e., splits like (10,0), (11,2), (12,1) were not used) as well as the proportion (i.e., 
splits like (6,0), (7,0), (8,0), (9,0) were not used; see Table 27 for details).  
Each template split occurred once in each of the three block but with slight 
different form, to increase the complexity of the stimuli and reduce the repetition. 
In specific, we further modified the template stimuli by adding a random fluctua-
tion within the range of +/- 0.2 on the integer so that it is with two more digits. As 
a consequence, three differential sets of stimuli were generated with the same av-
erage payoff. We randomly assigned these three sets of stimuli to each of the fo-
cus blocks (i.e., conditions) respectively across participants in the eye-tracking 
study (see Appendix Table 3 for all stimuli). 
Table 27. The template stimuli for the eye-tracking study 
Total Payoff (Offender, Victim; €) 
6 7 8  9  10  11  12  13 14 
(3,3)*         
(4,2) (4,3) (4,4)*       
(5,1) (5,2) (5,3) (5,4) (5,5)*     
 (6,1) (6,2) (6,3) (6,4) (6,5) (6,6)*   
  (7,1)  (7,2) (7,3) (7,4) (7,5), (7,6) (7,7)* 
   (8,1) (8,2) (8,3)  (8,4) (8,5) (8,6) 
    (9,1) (9,2) (9,3) (9,4) (9,5) 
Note: * Equal split is used in the filler trial. 
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 Eye-Tracking Paradigm 5.2.4
The eye-tracking session included three blocks differing in instructed focuses, 
namely the baseline block (i.e., deciding naturally; BB), the offender-focused 
block (i.e., thinking about the (un)fairness of the offender’s behavior and its link 
with social norm before deciding; OB), or the victim-focused block (i.e., thinking 
about the feeling of victim affected by the offender’s behavior; VB). In order to 
remove the proactive inhibition from the previous condition, we deliberately put 
the BB as the 1st block and introduce another two blocks with the order counter-
balanced across participants to them only when they completed the BB. Thus, 
participants were given the instruction of BB, including the general information 
about the previous online task and the upcoming eye-tracking third-party task, 
once they arrived. For instructions of another blocks (i.e., OB, VB), participants 
were only informed at the beginning of each block after BB.   
Within each block, participants started with five practice trials to familiarize 
themselves with the display and response after reading the instruction, and then 
performed 33 incentive trials. The trial procedure was similar to that used in Study 
3, with the following exceptions (see Figure 25). First, all texts were in white 
which avoided the confounding factor of lower-level features driving different 
fixations. Second, the relative payoff information (%) was added together with the 
absolute payoff information and they were put in a white ellipse equally divided 
into four parts. In this way we could increase the amount of information so that 
we gained more fixations and meanwhile the fixations towards the specific piece 
of information were easily separated. Third, we kept the same display within each 
participant but balanced the location of the offender as well as the victim together 
with their payoff information (i.e., both absolute and relative) across participants 
to rule out the eye-movement effect led by specific display of information (see 
Figure 26). Fourth, neither did the decision phase nor the transfer phase has a time 
limitation. Fifth, a 2s black phase was adopted at the beginning of each trial to 
refresh the eye-movement pattern. Stimuli were displayed on either a 17'' or a 19'' 
color monitor with a native resolution of 1280 × 1024 and presented via Presenta-
tion 14.9 (Neurobehavioral System, Albana, Canada). The pixel size of the infor-
mation presented was kept constant with all three eye-trackers. 
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Figure 25. Example of the trial procedure. In this example, the participant added € 1 to the 
victim (i.e., A.M., labeled as Player B) instead of subtract the money from the offender (i.e., 
L.B., labeled as Player A). 
 
Figure 26. Four types of display used in the current study. Upper-left: the offender (victim) 
labeled as Player A (B) with the absolute (relative) payoff listed in the upper (lower) half of the 
ellipse. Upper-right: the offender (victim) labeled as Player A (B) with the absolute (relative) 
payoff listed in the lower (upper) half of the ellipse. Lower-left: the offender (victim) labeled as 
Player B (A) with the absolute (relative) payoff listed in the upper (lower) half of the ellipse. 
Lower-right: the offender (victim) labeled as Player B (A) with the absolute (relative) payoff 
listed in the lower (upper) half of the ellipse. 
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 Procedure 5.2.5
At least 12 hours prior to the eye-tracking experiment, all participants (i.e., third 
parties in the eye-tracking session) completed the online measurement of empath-
ic concern (Mean ± S.D. = 18.39 ± 3.72; Range: 9 to 26) by IRI (same as used in 
previous studies) as well as demographical questions via Unipark. Upon arrival, 
they were given the instruction about the BB and then completed the task in the 
BB with both their behaviors and eye-movement recorded. Unknown to them, 
they were asked to do the same task in another two blocks (i.e., OB and VB). Af-
ter the decision task, participants finished another task which would be reported 
separately. Finally, participants received a € 5 participation fee and one trial was 
randomly selected to pay all three parties correspondingly. 
 Data Collection 5.2.6
Behavioral data were collected via Presentation 14.9. Data of gaze behavior were 
recorded by the eye gaze binocular system (LC Technologies; see Figure 27) with 
a remote binocular sampling rate of 120 Hz and an accuracy of about 0.45˚.  
 
Figure 27. Illustration for the LC eye gaze binocular system in the Decision Lab, Max Planck 
Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn. Source for the left figure (with small adapta-
tion): https://www.coll.mpg.de/node/7417; source for the right figure: http://eyegaze.com/wp-
content/uploads/EAS%20Binocular%20Technical%20Specifications.pdf. 
 Data Analyses 5.2.7
5.2.7.1 Pre-processing & Areas of Interested (AOI) of Eye-tracking Data 
We pre-processed the raw data with an in-house algorithm to define valid fixa-
tions, namely periods of relatively stable gazes (located within a radius of 30 pix-
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els) between two saccades lasting at least 50 ms. To ensure the fixations of later 
analyses locating within the information we were most interested, we limited all 
fixations within the following four non-overlapping areas of interest (AOIs), 
namely one square area (i.e., size: 100×100 pixels) covering the information of 
either absolute/relative payoff of the offender or the victim respectively (see Fig-
ure 28). Besides, we also created three text AOIs (i.e., two AOI covering either the 
initial of the offender or the victim with the size of 100×100 pixels; one AOI 
covering the reminder of each block with the size of 390×100 pixels) which were 
used as the additional criteria to check the quality of the eye-tracking measure-
ment. Moreover, we combined the absolute and relative payoff AOI for the of-
fender and the victim respectively, to simplify the later analyses.  
 
Figure 28. Illustration for the payoff-relevant AOIs (marked with red frame). 
5.2.7.2 Exclusion Criteria for Different Analyses 
For choice behavior, we adopted the 3,864 out of 4,653 trials in total for analyses 
by excluding trials with the missing response of empathic concern scale (99 trials, 
appro. 2.1%) together with filler trials (i.e., trials with equal splits; 690 trials, ap-
pro. 14.8%). 
On top of that, we applied additional rules for excluding trials in analyses of 
process measures (i.e., fixation numbers/decision time, fixation proportion), 
namely 1) trials with extreme decision time (i.e., < 200 ms or > mean + 3SD of 
certain participant; 95 trials, appro. 2.0%); 2) trials with poor recording of eye-
movement (i.e., trials with 50% fixations falling outside of all AOIs or those with 
all fixations within text AOIs; 472 trials, appro. 10.14%); 3) trials with keep 
choices (i.e., trials in which participants transferred € 0; 802 trials, appro. 17.2%). 
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5.2.7.3 General Statistical Approach 
We performed all statistical analyses via STATA 13 (College Station, TX: 
StataCorp LP). Given the repeated measure panel data (i.e., multiple observation 
for each condition per participant) and unbalanced observations within each con-
dition (i.e., different numbers of each choice per participant), we adopted the 
mixed-effect regression (i.e., linear or logistic regression; main STATA command: 
xtlogit or xtreg) which treated the effect of participant as the random effect.  
Our analyses were performed in a way to directly test the proposed hypothe-
ses. In particular, we highlighted the following measures as dependent variables, 
which included choice behavior (H1a, H2a, H3a), fixation number in 4 payoff-
relevant AOIs along with decision time as the measure of the general information 
search behavior (H1b, H2b, H3b), and fixation proportion towards the victim pay-
off-relevant AOIs as the measure of attention distribution towards the specific 
piece of information (H1c, H2c, H3c). In addition we also checked other measures 
(i.e., behavior: transfer amount of altruistic choices; eye-movement: the distribu-
tion of the first- and the last fixation) as the explorative analyses. Notably, the 
fixation numbers and decision times were log-transformed before the analyses 
since they were not normally distributed (Jarque-Bera (S-K) test: fixation number: 
χ2(2) = 1237.52, p < 0.001; decision time: χ2(2) = 1461.52, p < 0.001). For de-
scriptive summary of all measures mentioned above, see Table 28 for details. 
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Table 28. Descriptive summary of all measures 
 BB OB VB 
 Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
 help punish help punish help punish 
Choice Proportion (%)a 58.2 13.5  58.5  16.4  62.7 11.1 
 (34.9) (25.2) (37.5) (27.9) (37.1) (23.8) 
Transfer Amount (€)a 1.67 2.01 1.63 1.58 1.67 1.73 
 (0.87) (1.51) (0.92) (0.75) (1.04) (1.43) 
Decision Time (s)b 3.05  3.41  2.12 2.95  2.02 2.85  
 (1.36) (1.46) (1.16) (2.08) (1.13) (1.71) 
Fixation Numberb 9.86  11.06  7.84  10.01  7.38  9.94  
 (4.27) (5.70) (4.15) (6.27) (4.06) (6.59) 
Fixation Proportion  
towards victim-payoff AOI (%)b 
61.05  44.21  60.45  42.24  59.01  39.84  
 (6.49) (9.85) (10.97) (16.07) (13.75) (16.64) 
First Fixation Proportion  
towards victim-payoff AOI (%)b 
72.01  57.13  74.73  50.18  75.04  60.80  
 (36.01) (42.70) (34.25) (43.11) (35.97) (44.90) 
Last Fixation Proportion  
towards victim-payoff AOI (%)b 
77.68  19.18  66.30  
 
24.03  
 
66.63  
 
16.17  
 (13.96) (26.52) (21.47) (32.74) (21.83) (25.74) 
Note: a The total observation equals 3864 (trials). bThe total observation equals 2945 (trials) due to 
additional criteria for process measures (see Supplementary Information for details). S.D. refers to 
standard deviation. 
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5.3 Results 
 Baseline Block (BB)  5.3.1
The goal of this part analyses was to investigate the effect of empathic concern on 
altruistic choices and eye-movement during decision-making in the BB (H1a-c). 
Thus the only main predictor for the following analyses was the empathic concern 
level. Besides, the trial as an index of time was also added to these regression 
analyses to rule out the effect of practice. 
5.3.1.1 Choice Behavior 
We found that third parties with a higher level of empathic concern were more 
likely to help the victim (Odds ratio = 1.20, z = 1.93, p = 0.053) but less likely to 
punish the offender (Odds ratio = 0.77, z = 1.92, p = 0.055), as we predicted in 
H1a. Besides, we did not observe the effect of empathic concern on the behavior 
of keep (i.e., whether to intervene or not; Odds ratio = 0.96, z = 0.46, p = 0.650; 
see Figure 29A; also see Table 29 for regression details). 
Table 29. Results of repeated-measure mixed-effect logistic regression predicting the help, 
punishment or keep choice by empathic concern with the time effect (i.e., trials) controlled in 
the baseline block (BB) 
 help punish keep 
Empathic concern 1.215+ 0.769+ 0.959 
 (1.93) (-1.92) (-0.46) 
Trial 1.017* 0.952*** 1.005 
 (2.09) (-3.85) (0.56) 
Constant 0.024+ 5.638 0.532 
 (-1.96) (0.68) (-0.37) 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.085 0.212 0.006 
Observations 1288 1288 1288 
Note: Values refer to odds ratio. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Data clusters specific 
to subject were treated as random effect.  
Significance level: + p < .10, * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 29. (A) Choice proportion predicted by empathic concern level in BB; (B) Choice pro-
portion predicted by empathic concern level in all conditions. The curve plot showed the frac-
tional polynomial relationship between choice proportion and empathic concern level for each 
type of choices respectively. 
5.3.1.2 Transfer Amount 
Empathic concern could predict the amount of third parties to neither help the 
victim (b = -0.027, z = -0.67, p = 0.500) nor punish the offender (b = 0.012, z = 
0.14, p = 0.891).  
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5.3.1.3 Indices of Information Searching 
In contrast to H1b, we found that neither (log-transformed) fixation number (help: 
b = 0.002, z = 0.12, p = 0.907; punishment: b = -0.004, z = -0.12, p = 0.901) nor 
(log-transformed) decision time (help: b = -0.014, z = -0.70, p = 0.487; punish-
ment: b = -0.011, z = -0.44, p = 0.662) of either altruistic choices could be pre-
dicted by empathic concern of third parties. 
5.3.1.4 Fixation Proportion towards Victim-payoff AOIs 
In consistency with H1c, we found that third parties with a higher empathic con-
cern level distributed a higher fixation proportion towards victim-relevant infor-
mation (i.e., victim-payoff AOIs; b = 1.046, z = 2.83, p = 0.005). Post-hoc anal-
yses showed that this effect existed in both help (b = 0.679, z = 2.34, p = 0.020) 
and punishment choices (b = 1.021, z = 2.50, p = 0.013; see Figure 30A; also see 
Table 30 for regression details of all above measures). 
Table 30. Results of repeated-measure mixed-effect linear regression predicting the transfer 
amount, log-transformed fixation number, log-transformed decision time and fixation propor-
tion by empathic concern for help and punishment choices in the BB 
 Transfer Amounta  
(in €) 
Fixation Number  
(Log) 
Decision Time  
(Log; in ms) 
Fixation Proportion 
 help punish help punish help punish help+punish help punish 
Empathic 
concern 
-0.027 0.012 0.002 -0.004 -0.014 -0.011 1.046** 0.679* 1.021* 
 (-0.67) (0.14) (0.12) (-0.12) (-0.70) (-0.44) (2.83) (2.34) (2.50) 
Trial -0.006 -0.028* -0.015*** -0.013** -0.022*** -0.012** 0.129* 0.072 0.098 
 (-1.53) (-2.31) (-7.97) (-2.98) (-11.52) (-3.24) (2.35) (1.20) (0.79) 
Constant 2.312** 2.377 2.395*** 2.475*** 8.564*** 8.375*** 35.35*** 46.66*** 21.90** 
 (2.97) (1.45) (6.31) (4.40) (21.96) (18.57) (5.03) (8.20) (2.93) 
R2(overall) 0.008 0.035 0.052 0.056 0.103 0.092 0.052 0.018 0.061 
Observa-
tions 
750 174 673 148 673 148 821 673 148 
Note: Values refer to unstandardized coefficients. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Data 
clusters specific to subject were treated as random effect. Time effect (as trials) was controlled in 
the analysis. BB refers to the baseline block. 
Significance level: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
aAnalyses on transfer amount keeps the same dataset used for choice behavior. 
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5.3.1.5 Distribution of the First and Last Fixation 
Besides the hypothesized measures, we also took a look at the fixation at certain 
time point during decision-making as explorative analyses. The most representa-
tive fixations were the first and the last fixation. We found that the empathic con-
cern level could even bias the third party’s attention towards the victim-relevant 
information at the very beginning (Odds ratio = 1.305, z = 1.79, p = 0.074), which 
also showed a similar trend on the last fixation (Odds ratio = 1.080, z = 1.50, p = 
0.134; see Table 31 for regression details).  
Table 31. Results of repeated-measure mixed-effect logistic regression predicting the distribu-
tion of the first and the last fixation (towards victim payoff-relevant AOIs) by empathic concern 
for help and punishment choices respectively in the BB. 
 First Fixation Last Fixation 
 help+punish help punish help+punish help punish 
Empathic  
Concern 
1.305+ 1.312 1.353 1.080 1.048 1.016 
 (1.79) (1.55) (1.64) (1.50) (1.26) (0.20) 
Trial 1.032* 1.043** 0.988 1.005 0.983+ 1.042+ 
 (2.49) (2.74) (-0.44) (0.54) (-1.68) (1.70) 
Constant 0.028 0.033 0.010 0.505 2.278 0.072+ 
 (-1.28) (-1.03) (-1.41) (-0.69) (1.12) (-1.81) 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.117 0.149 0.11 0.019 0.089 0.337 
Observations 821 673 148 821 673 148 
Note: Values refer to odds ratio. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Data clusters specific 
to subject were treated as the random effect. Time effect (as trials) was controlled in the analysis. 
BB refers to the baseline block. 
Significance level: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 All Blocks  5.3.2
The goal of this part analyses was to investigate the effect of attention focus (H2a-
c) and its interaction with empathic concern (H3a-c) on altruistic choice and eye-
movement during decision-making in all three blocks. Thus the main predictors 
for the analyses relevant to H2a-c included attention focus (reference condition: 
BB; two dummy variables coding for OB and VB) and empathic concern level. 
The main predictors for the analyses relevant to H3a-c were the same except the 
attention focus × empathic concern interaction terms (dummy variables; two 
dummy variables coding for OB × empathic concern, and VB × empathic con-
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cern). To minimize the effect of collinearity between the regressors in the analyses 
relevant to H3a-c, the empathic concern score was always mean-centered which 
was then used to create dummy variables coding for the interaction. Similarly, the 
trial as an index of time was also added to these regression analyses to rule out the 
effect of practice. 
5.3.2.1 Choice Behavior 
Regarding the effect of attention focus (H2a), we found that third parties increased 
the possibility to punish (Odds ratio = 2.213, z = 3.17, p = 0.002) and reduced the 
likelihood to keep (Odds ratio = 0.661, z = -2.07, p = 0.039) when they considered 
the unfairness of the offender. Although the results did not reach statistical signifi-
cance, there was a trend showing that third parties were more likely to help the 
victim in the VB (Odds ratio = 1.302, z = 1.43, p = 0.153). These findings were 
basically consistent with our predictions in H2a. 
Regarding the interaction effect (H3a), we found that participants with higher 
level of empathic concern were more likely to punish in the OB (Odds ratio = 
1.125, z = 3.09, p = 0.002) but withdraw to help in either the OB (Odds ratio = 
0.885, z = -3.88, p < 0.001) or the VB (Odds ratio = 0.925, z = -2.44, p = 0.015). 
These results were not in line with our expectations in H3a (see Figure 29B; also 
see Table 32 for regression details). 
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Table 32. Results of repeated-measure mixed-effect logistic regression predicting the help, 
punishment or keep choice by attention focus, empathic concern (odd columns) and their 
interaction (even columns) in all conditions 
 help help punish punish keep keep 
BB (ref)       
OB 0.916 0.980 2.213** 1.954** 0.661* 0.660* 
 (-0.49) (-0.11) (3.17) (2.58) (-2.07) (-1.98) 
VB 1.302 1.377+ 0.941 0.793 0.729 0.726 
 (1.43) (1.70) (-0.23) (-0.83) (-1.56) (-1.53) 
Empathic Concern (EC) 1.195 1.279* 0.862 0.817+ 0.983 0.948 
 (1.55) (2.11) (-1.26) (-1.68) (-0.17) (-0.52) 
BB (ref) × EC       
OB × EC  0.885***  1.125**  1.055+ 
  (-3.88)  (3.09)  (1.65) 
VB × EC  0.925*  1.007  1.062+ 
  (-2.44)  (0.17)  (1.86) 
Trial 1.002 1.001 0.993+ 0.996 1.002 1.002 
 (0.73) (0.40) (-1.83) (-0.99) (0.74) (0.62) 
Constant 0.033 0.871 0.472 0.028*** 0.423 0.312** 
 (-1.58) (-0.32) (-0.34) (-7.58) (-0.45) (-3.00) 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.039 0.042 0.037 0.044 0.002 0.003 
Observations 3864 3864 3864 3864 3864 3864 
Note: Values refer to odds ratio. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Data clusters specific 
to subject were treated as the random effect. Time effect (as trials) was controlled in the analysis. 
ref refers to reference, BB refers to baseline block, OB refers to offender-focus block, VB refers 
to victim-focus block. 
Significance level: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
5.3.2.2 Transfer Amount 
Unlike choice behavior, transfer amount of neither help nor punishment could be 
predicted by attention focus, empathic concern or their interaction (all ps > 0.15; 
see Table 33 for regression details). 
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Table 33. Results of repeated-measure mixed-effect linear regression predicting the transfer 
amount of help and punishment choice by attention focus, empathic concern (odd columns) 
and their interaction (even columns) in all conditions. 
 help help punish punish 
BB (ref)     
OB -0.009 -0.017 -0.0005 0.112 
 (-0.11) (-0.20) (-0.00) (0.42) 
VB -0.004 -0.012 0.137 0.252 
 (-0.05) (-0.15) (0.56) (0.97) 
Empathic Concern (EC) -0.031 -0.028 -0.017 0.007 
 (-0.79) (-0.76) (-0.33) (0.13) 
BB (ref) × EC     
OB × EC  0.0006  -0.053 
  (0.04)  (-1.43) 
VB × EC  -0.010  0.003 
  (-0.68)  (0.07) 
Trial -0.00002 0.0001 -0.005 -0.0075* 
 (-0.02) (0.11) (-1.61) (-2.07) 
Constant 2.243** 1.655*** 2.360* 2.135*** 
 (2.98) (12.66) (2.52) (9.40) 
R2(overall) 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.005 
Observations 2311 2311 528 528 
Note: Values refer to unstandardized coefficients. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Data 
clusters specific to subject were treated as the random effect. Time effect (as trials) was controlled 
in the analysis. ref refers to reference, BB refers to baseline block, OB refers to offender-focus 
block, VB refers to victim-focus block. 
Significance level: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
5.3.2.3 Indices of Information Searching 
Partially supporting our predictions in H2b, we observed that third parties in-
creased the either (log-transformed) fixation numbers (help: b = 0.104, z = 2.40, p 
= 0.017; punishment: b = 0.189, z = 1.78, p = 0.075) or (log-transformed) decision 
times (help: b = 0.122, z = 2.83, p = 0.005; punishment: b = 0.158, z = 1.65, p = 
0.099) during either altruistic choices only in OB (for above analyses in VB: all 
ps > 0.3). 
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Table 34. Results of repeated-measure mixed-effect linear regression predicting the fixation 
number and decision time of help and punishment choice by attention focus, empathic con-
cern (odd columns) and their interaction (even columns) in all conditions. 
 Fixation Number  
(Log) 
Decision Time  
(Log; in ms) 
 help help punish punish help help punish punish 
BB (ref.)         
OB 0.104* 0.111* 0.189+ 0.235* 0.122** 0.119** 0.158+ 0.192+ 
 (2.40) (2.49) (1.78) (2.14) (2.83) (2.69) (1.65) (1.93) 
VB 0.029 0.036 -0.012 0.033 0.036 0.035 0.013 0.044 
 (0.68) (0.84) (-0.12) (0.30) (0.87) (0.80) (0.14) (0.46) 
Empathic  
Concern (EC) 
0.001 0.006 0.009 -0.008 -0.017 -0.010 0.009 -0.010 
 (0.05) (0.30) (0.32) (-0.25) (-0.82) (-0.50) (0.37) (-0.37) 
BB (ref) × EC         
OB × EC  -0.012  0.014  -0.010  0.021 
  (-1.40)  (0.72)  (-1.18)  (1.20) 
VB × EC  -0.004  0.046*  -0.011  0.045* 
  (-0.54)  (2.14)  (-1.39)  (2.30) 
Trial -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (-11.28) (-11.01) (-5.32) (-5.33) (-14.97) (-14.23) (-5.92) (-5.75) 
Constant 2.224*** 2.244*** 2.304*** 2.468*** 8.312*** 7.994*** 8.042*** 8.202*** 
 (5.75) (32.66) (4.58) (21.29) (21.24) (120.76) (17.78) (78.48) 
R2(overall) 0.087 0.087 0.095 0.101 0.151 0.152 0.117 0.121 
Observations 2063 2063 432 432 2063 2063 432 432 
Note: Values refer to unstandardized coefficients. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Data 
clusters specific to subject were treated as the random effect. Time effect (as trials) was controlled 
in the analysis. ref refers to reference, BB refers to baseline block, OB refers to offender-focus 
block, VB refers to victim-focus block. 
Significance level: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
Concerning the interaction effect (H3b), we found that participants with a 
higher empathic concern level increased the effort of information searching (log-
transformed fixation number: b = 0.046, z = 2.14, p = 0.032; log-transformed de-
cision time: b = 0.045, z = 2.30, p = 0.021) during punishment choice when they 
focused on the feeling of the victim. These findings were not consistent with our 
expectations in H3b (see Table 34 for regression details). 
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5.3.2.4 Fixation Proportion towards Victim-Payoff AOIs 
Against our predictions in H2c, we did not observe the attention-induced change 
in fixation proportion towards victim-relevant information in either the OB (b = -
0.930, z = -0.40, p = 0.486) or the VB (b = 0.083, z = 0.06, p = 0.949). Analyzing 
the interaction effect revealed that third parties with a higher level of empathic 
concern paid less attention to the victim-relevant information in either the OB (b = 
-0.511, z = -2.04, p = 0.042) or the VB (b = -0.552, z = -2.15, p = 0.032), which 
was not expected in H3c (see Figure 30B; see Table 35 for regression details). 
Table 35. Results of repeated-measure mixed-effect linear regression predicting the fixation 
proportion of attention towards victim-relevant information for help, punishment and both 
choice by attention focus, empathic concern (odd columns) and their interaction (even col-
umns) in all conditions. 
 help+punish help+punish help help punish punish 
BB (ref.)       
OB -0.930 -0.928 0.902 0.536 -5.827+ -6.726+ 
 (-0.70) (-0.67) (0.63) (0.37) (-1.75) (-1.93) 
VB 0.083 0.090 0.491 0.168 -6.876* -7.694* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.36) (0.12) (-2.08) (-2.23) 
Empathic Concern (EC) 0.685 1.018* 0.454 0.725+ 0.796+ 0.403 
 (1.45) (2.05) (1.15) (1.75) (1.87) (0.69) 
BB (ref) × EC       
OB × EC  -0.511*  -0.272  0.716 
  (-2.04)  (-0.97)  (1.21) 
VB × EC  -0.552*  -0.568*  0.171 
  (-2.15)  (-2.09)  (0.25) 
Trial -0.010 -0.009 -0.021 -0.013 0.033 0.051 
 (-0.53) (-0.49) (-1.05) (-0.66) (0.76) (1.10) 
Constant 44.29*** 56.89*** 52.76*** 60.96*** 27.18*** 40.76*** 
 (5.00) (32.08) (7.07) (42.35) (3.40) (18.01) 
R2(overall) 0.015 0.017 0.003 0.005 0.071 0.064 
Observations 2495 2495 2063 2063 432 432 
Note: Values refer to unstandardized coefficients. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Data 
clusters specific to subject were treated as the random effect. Time effect (as trials) was controlled 
in the analysis. ref refers to reference, BB refers to baseline block, OB refers to offender-focus 
block, VB refers to victim-focus block. 
Significance level: + p < .10, * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
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Figure 30. (A) Fixation proportion towards the victim-payoff AOIs predicted by empathic con-
cern level in BB; (B) Fixation proportion towards the victim-payoff AOIs predicted by empathic 
concern level in all conditions. The line plot showed the linear relationship between fixation 
proportion and empathic concern level for altruistic choices (i.e., help and punishment). 
5.3.2.5 Distribution of the First and Last Fixation 
We also ran similar regressions as explorative analyses on the first and the last 
fixation. Participants were less likely to pay attention to the victim-relevant in-
formation at the first glance while considering the unfairness of the offender 
(Odds ratio = 0.550, z = -2.18, p = 0.030). Besides we found that third parties with 
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higher levels of empathic concern were less likely to look at the victim-relevant 
information in either the OB (Odds ratio = 0.809, z = -4.22, p < 0.001) or the VB 
(Odds ratio = 0.828, z = -3.52, p < 0.001; see Table 36 for regression details). 
Analyses of the last fixation mirrored the findings of the first fixation (see Table 
37 for regression details). 
Table 36. Results of repeated-measure mixed-effect logistic regression predicting the distribu-
tion of the first fixation towards victim-relevant information for help, punishment and both 
choice by attention focus, empathic concern (odd columns) and their interaction (even col-
umns) in all conditions. 
 help+punish help+punish help help punish punish 
BB (ref.)       
OB 0.550* 0.539* 0.712 0.591 0.363 0.337 
 (-2.18) (-2.19) (-1.06) (-1.60) (-1.25) (-1.35) 
VB 0.998 0.964 0.863 0.689 0.778 0.697 
 (-0.01) (-0.13) (-0.47) (-1.10) (-0.35) (-0.50) 
Empathic Concern (EC) 1.109 1.261+ 1.136 1.266 1.071 1.271 
 (0.84) (1.83) (0.90) (1.62) (0.46) (1.36) 
BB (ref.) × EC       
OB × EC  0.809***  0.844**  0.804+ 
  (-4.22)  (-2.72)  (-1.70) 
VB × EC  0.828***  0.819**  0.726* 
  (-3.52)  (-3.15)  (-1.99) 
Trial 1.012** 1.010** 1.015** 1.016** 1.005 1.002 
 (3.13) (2.60) (3.22) (3.26) (0.54) (0.17) 
Constant 0.476 3.569** 0.448 5.107*** 0.450 2.062 
 (-0.32) (2.80) (-0.30) (3.32) (-0.28) (1.08) 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.023 0.028 0.029 0.029 0.017 0.033 
Observations 2495 2495 2063 2063 432 432 
Note: Values refer to odds ratio. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Data clusters specific 
to subject were treated as the random effect. Time effect (as trials) was controlled in the analysis. 
ref refers to reference, BB refers to baseline block, OB refers to offender-focus block, VB refers 
to victim-focus block. 
Significance level: + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 37. Results of repeated-measure mixed-effect logistic regression predicting the distribu-
tion of the last fixation towards victim-relevant information for help, punishment and both 
choice by attention focus, empathic concern (odd columns) and their interaction (even col-
umns) in all conditions. 
 help+punish help+punish help help punish punish 
BB (ref.)       
OB 0.727+ 0.751 0.701+ 0.687+ 1.834 1.917 
 (-1.79) (-1.55) (-1.73) (-1.79) (1.10) (1.12) 
VB 0.860 0.890 0.772 0.758 1.035 1.075 
 (-0.84) (-0.63) (-1.26) (-1.30) (0.06) (0.12) 
Empathic Concern (EC) 1.031 1.082+ 1.033 1.059 0.997 1.011 
 (0.72) (1.68) (0.82) (1.23) (-0.06) (0.13) 
BB (ref.) × EC       
OB × EC  0.920*  0.970  0.975 
  (-2.55)  (-0.77)  (-0.29) 
VB × EC  0.940+  0.960  0.993 
  (-1.86)  (-1.05)  (-0.06) 
Trial 0.996 0.996 0.995* 0.995+ 0.998 0.997 
 (-1.45) (-1.62) (-1.98) (-1.75) (-0.27) (-0.35) 
Constant 1.376 2.470*** 2.437 4.452*** 0.188 0.182*** 
 (0.39) (5.20) (1.16) (8.72) (-1.48) (-4.58) 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2 0.015 0.019 0.028 0.029 0.016 0.017 
Observations 2495 2495 2063 2063 432 432 
Note: Values refer to odds ratio. The z statistics are provided in parentheses. Data clusters specific 
to subject were treated as the random effect. Time effect (as trials) was controlled in the analysis. 
ref refers to reference, BB refers to baseline block, OB refers to offender-focus block, VB refers 
to victim-focus block.  
Significance level: + p < .10, * p < .05, *** p < .001. 
5.4 Discussion 
 Empathic Concern Can Not Only Predict Third-Party 5.4.1
Altruistic Choice But Also Gaze Searching  
Testing the link between empathic concern and choice behavior, as well as the 
attentional-gaze distribution during decision-making in the third-party context, is 
the main aim of Study 4 (H1a). Regarding choice behavior, we replicated previous 
findings showing that the level of empathic concern could positively (negatively) 
predict the costly helping (punishing) behavior of a third-party bystander in re-
sponse to the violation of a social norm (i.e., unfairness in this case) (Leliveld, et 
al., 2012). 
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More importantly, empathic concern does not only influence altruistic choices, 
but also exerts an impact on eye-movement, albeit, in a specific manner. Despite 
not observing the expected relationship between empathic concern and the extent 
of information searching behavior (indexed by decision time and fixation number 
respectively; H1b), our results revealed an association between empathic concern 
and attention distribution to victim-relevant information (i.e., AOIs covering both 
the absolute and relative monetary payoff made to the victim), reflected by the 
fixation proportion (H1c). Particularly, the fixation proportion towards victim 
payoff-relevant information increased with empathic concern level when partici-
pants decided naturally, regardless of the altruistic choice participants made. The-
se findings demonstrate that the proportion of fixations to a specific piece of in-
formation recorded by eye-tracking equipment provides a direct and accurate 
measure of underlying empathic concerns for investigating cognitive processing 
and information searching, which can thus be used as a reliable index for measur-
ing how people’s attention is allocated during the decision-making process 
(Fiedler & Glöckner, 2015; Orquin & Loose, 2013). Notably, the fixation propor-
tion to a specific piece of information seems to be crucial as it can clearly disen-
tangle different sources contributing to the attentional effect. Hence, the contin-
gency between the fixation proportion on the victim’s payoff and empathic 
concern indicates that more empathic third parties allocate more attention specifi-
cally to the victim rather than to the offender, instead of enhancing general pro-
cessing depth during decision-making. As a result, highly empathic people might 
consider the feelings of the victim more and ultimately be more likely to help the 
victim.  
We also noticed that the empathy-driven attentional effect was more salient at 
the very begianning. Visual perceptual studies have shown that first fixation is 
usually driven by the properties of the stimuli themselves, such as their saliency 
(Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002). Nevertheless, this cannot explain our findings 
since the basic visual properties of the stimuli (esp. the number of digits in all 
payoffs) for both victim- and offender-relevant information were the same for all 
participants. Given that the location of the payoff-relevant content is fixed for 
each participant across trials in the current paradigm, participants might be aware 
of the target information beforehand. Therefore, this finding suggest that empathic 
concern could direct the attention of third parties paid towards the victim’s payoff 
information, even on first glance. Interestingly, such an effect was dampened on 
the last fixation. This is probably due to the fact last fixation is more closely relat-
ed to final choice, as hinted at previous evidence. For instance, in a value-based 
binary food choice task, the final choices (left or right item) of participants were 
predicted by the location of the last fixation unless that item was much worse than 
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the alternative one  (Krajbich, et al., 2010). Nevertheless, such explanations 
should be treated cautiously and replication is required by future studies.  
 The Effect of Attention Focus and Its interaction with 5.4.2
Empathic Concern on Altruistic Choice  
As predicted in H2a, third parties were more likely to punish the offender when 
taking the unfairness of the offender into account (OB), which was consistent with 
previous findings in food choice (Hare, et al., 2011) and the social decision 
(Gromet & Darley, 2009; Hutcherson & Rangel, 2014; Makwana, et al., 2014) 
paradigms. Notably, participants only showed a trend-to-significant increase in 
helping behavior when focusing on the feeling of the victim (VB). Such findings 
seem to indicate that the help choice is by nature driven by empathy for the vic-
tim, which is set as default (i.e., BB) and already in consistency with the manipu-
lation used in the VB. 
Moreover, compared with lower empathic participants, people with higher 
empathic concern increased the possibility of punishing while reduced the likeli-
hood of helping in the OB (vs. the BB).Against H3a, our findings further clarified 
a main effect of attention focus on the altruistic choice mentioned above. A recent 
behavioral study provides a clue for understanding the current results. Gummerum 
and colleagues (2016) showed that third parties helped the victim more often in a 
third-party compensation game (i.e., whereby only help was possible) when em-
pathic anger (towards the offender who harmed the victim) rather than self-
focused anger (towards the offender who harmed the participants themselves) was 
elicited (Gummerum, et al., 2016). Given the nature of empathic concern, the 
highly empathic people felt more empathic anger in the OB. Intriguingly, they 
switched their approach from compensating the victim to punishing the offender, 
and justified the punishment as a better way to achieve justice when both altruistic 
options were available. Besides, the result that they were also less likely to help 
the victim in the VB might be driven by the fact that they unexpectedly behaved 
more selfishly, since they might be averse to being ―forced‖ to help. Taken togeth-
er, the above-mentioned results suggest that the attention-induced effect on deci-
sion-making could be extended to a more complex social context, and such an 
effect could be further modulated by empathic concern.  
One additional point that might be worthwhile to discuss is the fact that trans-
fer amount, as another important measure of third parties’ altruistic behaviors, did 
not vary much across the different focus conditions, different levels of empathic 
concern, or their interactions. These results, compared with the findings on choice 
behavior, suggest that the altruistic preference, instead of the altruistic intensity, is 
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more sensitive to either personality trait variance or the experimental conditions, 
which provides a better measure for altruism. 
 The Effect of Attention Focus and Its Interaction with 5.4.3
Empathic Concern on the Eye-movements of Third parties 
during Altruistic Decision-making 
Concerning the information searching behavior (H2b), third parties took more 
time to decide to costly intervene, accompanied by more fixations in search of 
information, when they considered the offender’s behavior in the context high-
lighting social norms (OB). This finding indicated the need for more in-depth 
cognitive processing in the OB, as participants must additionally consider and 
reevaluate the situation from the offender’s viewpoint, which differs from how 
third parties naturally think and respond to norm violations. However, no such 
change in information searching was observed in the VB, which further showed 
the weak effect of the VB in influencing choice behaviors. Apart from that, the 
unexpected interaction (H3b) between attention focus (i.e., the VB) and empathic 
concern in cognitive processing during punishment choices suggested that the 
third party might struggle more when the final choice they made (i.e., to punish 
the offender) contradicted both intrinsic (i.e., higher level of empathic concern) 
and external consideration (i.e., perceiving the feelings of the victim).  
Unlike general processing depth, we did not observe the expected difference in 
attentional distribution varied across different focus conditions, as measured by 
the fixation proportion, towards victim-relevant information (H2c).  Interestingly, 
we detected a surprising interaction effect (H3c) whereby third parties with a 
higher level of empathic concern attended less to victim-relevant information in 
the OB. Such a finding indicates that the instruction of considering the unfairness 
of offender drove highly empathic bystanders to attend more to the offender, ra-
ther than the victim, since the search space only included the offender and the 
victim-relevant information in this case. In addition, there seemed to be a perfect 
match between the behavior finding (see above section) and fixation proportion in 
terms of the interaction effect. In either the OB or the VB, highly empathic partic-
ipants paid less attention to victim-relevant information, which might be another 
explanation for the decreased possibility of helping seen in both conditions.    
In addition to the above, we also found that third parties in the OB were less 
(more) likely to attend to victim-relevant (offender-relevant) information during 
either the first or last fixation, which was in consistency with the results on fixa-
tion number. Thus, this suggests that we could induce bias in third party attention 
even at the specific point when they either started, or finished making decisions 
by manipulating the focus. 
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 Limitations   5.4.4
One limitation of the current study was that the analysis on punishment choice 
might be underpowered, because participants systematically chose to punish less 
frequently (only ~13% of all trials), similar to what was found in Studies 1-3 (see 
General Discussion for more details). Given the mild degree of norm violation 
seen in the current setting (i.e., merely unfair money allocation), future studies 
could increase the frequency of punishment by increasing the severity of the norm 
violation, such as introducing the intention of the offender (Buckholtz et al., 
2015). Furthermore, a context in which only punishment (and keeping the money) 
is allowed (e.g., third-party punishment game) might also help to increase pun-
ishment behaviors and gaze behaviors during punishment-related decision-
making.   
Another possible limitation was the unbalanced order between the BB and the 
other two focus manipulation blocks (the OB and VB) among participants. As 
mentioned before, we designed the experiment in this way by assigning the BB as 
the first experimental condition, to guarantee that the participants’ behaviors and 
information search patterns were not biased by the attention focus. However, such 
a design could also be disadvantageous in that the results of the OB and VB are 
always systematically confounded by fatigue, as well as familiarity, due to the 
fixed order, although we mitigated such confounding by counterbalancing the 
order of the OB and VB across participants, and by controlling for the time effect 
(i.e., trial) in the regression analyses. Besides, it is also possible that participants 
had already established decision strategies that could not be easily influenced by 
the introduction of further instructions. For these reasons, the extent of infor-
mation searching required could be reduced in either the OB or the VB, which 
might result in insensitivity of fixation proportion to the manipulation of attention 
focus. In order to address this problem, future studies should modify the design. 
For instance, it is plausible to employ a full between-subjects design. Alternative-
ly, it might also be possible to increase the number of blocks, with fewer trials, 
and to fully randomize the different attention focus blocks within participants (as 
we did in Study 3). 
 Summary 5.4.5
With a modified third-party paradigm, the current study captures for the first time 
how empathic concern affects the underlying cognitive processes during altruistic 
decision-making by recording the gaze behavior. Moreover, we shed some light 
on the influence of the attention focus on different contextual cues highlighting 
particular aspects of an unfair situation (i.e., focusing on either the suffering of the 
victim or the conduct of the offender) and its interaction with empathic concern on 
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altruistic choice and the accompanying eye-movement pattern. Taken together, 
these findings provide direct empirical evidence for the proposal which explains 
the empathy-dependent altruistic preference shift via attention, implied by the 
previous study (Leliveld, et al., 2012). More broadly, these findings could encour-
age future studies on investigating the cognitive mechanism underlying moral 
judgments and decision-making by employing implicit attention measures such as 
eye-tracking techniques (Fiedler & Glöckner, 2015). 
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6 General Discussion 
Although it is not a secret that human beings will voluntarily help a victim and 
punish an offender in response to a social norm violation, at cost to their own 
time, money, and energy even if their own well-beings are not affected directly, it 
is still unknown as to how our brain makes these altruistic decisions, and whether 
other factors could also influence such decisions and their underlying neural cor-
relates as well as the cognitive processes. In the series of experiments introduced 
in the current PhD dissertation, we adopted the modified third-party paradigm 
commonly used in behavioral economics, in combination with popular cognitive 
neuroscience methods (esp. fMRI and eye-tracking), to address the above research 
questions.  
Specifically, Study 1 mainly investigated the neural correlates of third-party 
altruistic decision-making and revealed that help and punishment choices shared 
common neural substrates in the bilateral striatum (esp. ventral part), indicating 
that a reward component accompanies third-party altruism. Moreover, Study 1 
showed the link between empathic concern and third-party altruism at the behav-
ioral and neural level. Study 2 mainly tested the effect of intranasal oxytocin on 
third-party altruistic choice behavior (Studies 2A and 2B) as well as its neural 
correlates (Study 2A). Albeit that oxytocin did not influence the third-party altru-
istic choice behavior, Study 2A showed that oxytocin (vs. placebo) enhanced the 
activation in the left TPJ while participants observed the victim being helped by 
the computer, suggesting its role in improving mentalizing ability during social 
interactions. Study 3 explored the role of other-regarding attention focus in modu-
lating third-party altruistic decisions, as well as their neural correlates. The in-
duced attention focus not only changed the behavior of third parties, but also af-
fected the accompanying decision-relevant activation in the TPJ and control 
network, providing new empirical evidence for attention-decision coupling. To 
further clarify the cognitive process underlying third-party altruistic decision-
making, Study 4 adopted eye-tracking methods and showed that the attention dis-
tribution of third parties towards the victim’s payoffs, measured by the fixation 
proportion, was affected by individual empathic concern levels as well as its inter-
action with instructed attention focus.  
Given that the results, as well as the limitations, of each study have been dis-
cussed in detail directly in each corresponding empirical chapter, in the remaining 
part of this section I will discuss issues of more general interest (i.e., some com-
mon features of our findings across studies, debatable results, and implications), 
describe future directions of research on this topic, and provide a short conclusion 
to end the main part of the dissertation. 
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6.1 Third-Party Deciders Prefer Helping the Victim to 
Punishing the Offender 
Among all four studies, we noticed a common and interesting phenomenon, 
namely that participants on average were at least two-fold more likely to help the 
victim rather than punish the offender10. Intriguingly, this finding, despite not be-
ing the focus of the current dissertation, is consistent with previous studies show-
ing that third parties transferred more money to help than to punish (Chavez & 
Bicchieri, 2013; Lotz, Okimoto, et al., 2011)11. Recent studies have attempted to 
explain such behavioral bias of third-party deciders from the evolutionary per-
spective of social signaling (Jordan, et al., 2016; Raihani & Bshary, 2015b). For 
instance, Raihani and Bshary (2015) found that, compared with the third-party 
punishers who costly punished the selfish offender, third-party helpers who costly 
compensated the recipient were more rewarded by a fourth party (i.e., in a modi-
fied dictator game where the fourth party could increase the bonus of the third 
party with a cost ratio of 1:5) when the third party could either help, punish or 
keep their endowment. Additionally, the fourth party was more likely to reward 
third-party helpers when the third party could only help or keep, rather than only 
punish or keep. These results suggested that another motivation which might 
cause negative impact on the reputation of punishers may refrain participants from 
choosing punishment, especially when they have other options to be altruistic 
(Raihani & Bshary, 2015a). Consistent with these ideas, another recent study 
showed that third-party punishers were less trusted, if they also had the chance to 
help, by the fourth party (i.e., in a trust game where the fourth party played as the 
investor, while the third-party punisher or helper played as the trustee); this sup-
ported their game-theoretical model, which proposes that third-party punishment, 
although considered as an important signal for trustworthiness, is less salient and 
informative than costly helping (Jordan, et al., 2016)12. Taken together, these find-
ings suggest a way to increase your reputation and impression for others, namely 
by punishing the offender when you are not directly affected, this signals that you 
are trustworthy; but you will be considered even more trustworthy and kind by 
others if you try your best to help the victim. 
                                                 
10 It seems that this does not hold true for Study 1 at the first glance. However we should not forget 
that we excluded 10 participants and seven of them chose to always help the victim (i.e., for the 
remaining three participants, 2 of them always punished the offender and 1 was always selfish). 
11 Notably, participants in these studies could perform both help and punishment at the same time, 
unlike the context where participants could either help or punish once in all studies included in the 
present dissertation.  
12 Unlike previous studies, participants in this study helped the victim only as second parties (in a 
context similar to that of the traditional dictator game), and not as third parties. 
Chapter 6.  General Discussion 
140 
6.2 Other Potential Motivations That Drive Third-Party Help 
and Punishment 
Third-party help and punishment, in the studies described herein, are framed as 
altruistic behaviors/decisions based on a consequence-oriented definition, namely, 
benefiting others (i.e., recipients) at cost to the actors (see Introduction). However, 
altruism can also be defined in a more strict sense, in terms of the motivation un-
derlying the behaviors, whereby only behaviors with the goal of benefiting others 
without benefiting the actor (either immediately or in the long run) are purely al-
truism. In our studies, both the offenders and victims are anonymous (i.e., only 
with name initials) and are strangers to the third party participants; all contexts are 
framed as the one-shot game. Therefore, the participants never know who they 
helped and only meet the other parties once13, which ensures that they cannot re-
ceive any payback from other parties in the future.  
Despite such altruistic motivation, it is still possible that these behaviors could 
be driven by other motivations. For instance, each third party in Studies 1 and 2A 
was endowed with 50 MU, which was always lower than the initial payoff of the 
offender (i.e., from 60 to 100 MU). Thus third-party participants might punish the 
offender simply due to envy or aversion to disadvantageous inequality, such that 
they reduced the payoff inequality between themselves and the offender via pun-
ishment (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Pedersen, et al., 2013). In trying to address this 
potential confound, participants were always endowed with more than the offend-
er (and, of course, the victim) in the other three studies (i.e., Study 2B: offender 
maximal payoff: 90 MU, third party initial endowment: 100 MU; Studies 3 and 4: 
offender maximal payoff: ~ € 9, third party initial endowment: € 10). As a result, 
we still observed that third parties costly punished unfair offenders rather than 
selfishly keeping all of their endowment. These results were also in consistent 
with a previous study showing that third-party punishment intensity did not vary 
between envy (i.e., the maximal payoff of the offender was 100 MU, whereas the 
third party was endowed with 50 MU) and neutral (i.e., both the maximal payoff 
of the offender and initial endowment of the third party were 50 MU or 100 MU) 
conditions in a similar paradigm (Jordan, McAuliffe, & Rand, 2014).  
Besides the motivation of envy, another potential motivation that might drive 
helping behavior is efficiency (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004), which refers to con-
                                                 
13 In practice, we might use the different choices of the same offender, matched with different 
victims, given the limitations in time and budget (e.g., Study 1 included 160 trials per participant; 
to ensure different offenders and victims in each trial we have to recruit 320 participants, which is 
much more difficult and less efficient). Since third-party participants completed many trials (i.e., 
~100), especially during the fMRI measurement, and were not asked to memorize any initials, we 
assumed that they did realize that it was sometimes the same offender and thus treated the people 
in each trial as different individuals. 
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cern for maximizing the sum for all individuals in the group, since we applied the 
same cost ratio (i.e., 1:3) on the helping behaviors such that third-party partici-
pants could always increase the total payoff to all three parties (i.e., by producing 
money) via helping the victim in our cases. To fully rule out the motivation of 
efficiency, future studies should use a cost ratio of 1:1 (as in the normal dictator 
game) in the third-party decision task (see also Future Directions). 
6.3 Empathic Concern Can Predict the Choice Preference, 
But Not Always 
Previous evidence showed that participants as third-party deciders were biased 
towards an altruistic choice preference depending on the stable personality trait of 
empathic concern (Leliveld, et al., 2012). In Study 1, we also showed that empath-
ic concern positively (negatively) correlated with the proportion of helping (pun-
ishment) behaviors, and also influenced the decision-making process (i.e., deci-
sion time of making altruistic choices) in a multi-shot game. The predictive effect 
of empathic concern on altruistic choice preference was replicated in Study 3, 
where participants first took part in the third-party task and then made similar de-
cisions by considering either the offender’s social norm violation or the victim’s 
feelings. However, we did not observe the same significant results in the other two 
studies.   
One possible areason for such an inconsistency could be contextual influences 
during the task. A common feature of Studies 1 and 3 (esp. in the baseline condi-
tion) is that participants in both studies were only informed about the third-party 
task and nothing else besides. Therefore, any decisions participants made in these 
two tasks can be regarded as the ―natural‖ decisions, so that the only factor that 
might have influenced their choice preference was empathic concern. On the con-
trary, participants in two other studies, while receiving third-party task infor-
mation, were also informed about the other experimental conditions at the same 
time, which accompanied the decision-making process along the whole task and 
might reduce the effect of empathic concern on altruistic choices. In particular, 
participants self-administered the OXT spray intra-nasally in Study 2. In Study 4, 
participants were given an additional instruction regarding the attention focus be-
fore they started the task in the scanner. From the results, we know that these oth-
er experimental conditions exerted an influence either on the choice behavior or 
its neural correlates, which in the end affects the modulatory effect of empathic 
concern on choice preference in the same context.  
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6.4 Distributed Neural Representation of Third-Party 
Altruistic Decision-making 
 Reward Network 6.4.1
In Study 1, we showed that both help and punishment choices from a third-party 
decider caused more activation in the striatum compared with the control condi-
tion. Since we mentioned many times in the previous section that the striatum 
(esp. the ventral part) is closely associated with either basic reward processing 
(e.g., food, water; see Haber & Knutson, 2009; Wang, Smith & Delgado, 2016) or 
social rewarad processing (e.g., money, positive feedback; see Bhanji & Delgado, 
2014), our results suggest a hedonic component to the third-party altruistic deci-
sion-making, which is similar to the imaging findings for other forms of human 
altruism, such as second-party punishment (De Quervain, et al., 2004) and chari-
table donation (Genevsky, et al., 2013; Harbaugh, Mayr, & Burghart, 2007). In 
fact, such explanation is also consistent with the behavioral finding that spending 
the money on someone else makes people happier than keeping it for oneself 
(Dunn, et al., 2008), which held true even across different cultures (Aknin, et al., 
2013). From a theoretical perspective, this finding might provide a potential prox-
imate explanation for the origin of reputation-based indirect reciprocity, which 
complements the ultimate explanation (i.e., third-party punishment is an important 
mechanism that helps to enforce the development and maintenance of the social 
norm) mentioned in previous studies (Bendor & Swistak, 2001; Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2004b). 
 Control Network 6.4.2
We also observed the involvement of the control network, especially the latera 
prefrontal cortex (LPFC; including the dorsal and ventral part) and the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), during third-party altruistic decisions in our studies. To 
be specific, participants showed enhanced functional coupling between the LPFC 
and striatum during either help or punishment choices, compared with the control 
condition, respectively, in Study 1. Also in this study, we found that more empath-
ic participants showed a stronger neural response during help (vs. punishment) 
choices. In Study 4, we showed that the ACC, as well as LPFC, was strongly acti-
vated for choices in conflict with the attention focus (i.e., helping the victim under 
the condition whereby participants were asked to focus on the offender’s behavior, 
which violated a social norm, in comparison with the same choice in the baseline 
condition).  As mentioned in the previous section, the LPFC, as well as ACC, is a 
crucial part of the attention network (Dosenbach, et al., 2008; Vossel, et al., 2014). 
More importantly, additional evidence has shown that the LPFC strongly was 
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strongly related to norm-related behavior in a social context. For instance, manip-
ulating the excitement of the LPFC (esp. the right part) via non-invasive brain 
stimulation techniques can affect either sanction-induced sharing behavior (Ruff, 
et al., 2013; Strang, et al., 2014) or the acceptance of an unfair offer (Knoch et al., 
2006), which involves the competition between the selfish motive and other-
regarding concern. Our results further extend the role of the control network (esp. 
the LPFC) to altruistic decisions made in a more complex social context. 
 Mentalizing Network 6.4.3
Apart from the regions mentioned above, we also found that the mentalizing net-
work (esp. TPJ) is involved in the third-party altruistic decision-making and the 
accompanying perceptual process. In Study 2, male participants who had the in-
tranasal OXT treatment showed selectively higher activation in the left TPJ when 
they observed the victim being helped (vs. the placebo condition). The effect on 
the TPJ was stronger when participants considered either the offender’s violation 
or the victim’s feelings during decision-making, compared with when they arrived 
at a decision naturally in the baseline condition of Study 4. Despite there being no 
direct evidence from previous studies of the link between the mentalizing network 
and altruistic decisions made per se in social context (Buckholtz, et al., 2008; De 
Quervain, et al., 2004; Spitzer, Fischbacher, Herrnberger, Grön, & Fehr, 2007), 
our results showed that, actually mentalization might always involves in the social 
decision process and appears sensitive to other factors influencing such process. 
These findings also provide support for a theoretical framework in which mental-
izing ability is regarded as a fundamental ability for the evolution of human altru-
ism (De Waal, 2008).  
 Relationship with the Third-Party Punishment Neural 6.4.4
Network 
Buckholtz and Marois (2012) proposed a neural network in support of third-party 
(punishment) decision-making in the context of a legal judgment. In particular, the 
mentalizing-relevant region (esp. the TPJ) and the affect-relevant region (esp. the 
amygdala) of the brain encode the intention of the offender and the harmful con-
sequence of the crime, respectively, during the scene evaluation phase. Signals 
from both types of information are then integrated in the MPFC, another key re-
gion closely associated with social cognition, which then sends the information on 
to the DLPFC for selection and implementation of the final decisions (Buckholtz 
& Marois, 2012). On the basis of this framework, Krueger & Hoffman (2006) 
refined the model by highlighting the role of the dorsal—along with the ventral—
part of MPFC during information integration, and in supplementing the role of the 
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anterior insula in processing affective consequences (Krueger & Hoffman, 2016). 
Consistent with the neural circuitry mentioned above, our studies also revealed 
involvement of the LPFC in altruistic decision-making biased by empathic con-
cern (the dorsal part; Study 1), and showed how the LPFC involvement reflected 
in cases of conflict between choice and the attention focus (the ventral part; Study 
3). We also confirmed an important role of TPJ within this context, which could 
be further modulated by other factors (i.e., intranasal oxytocin, Study 2A; atten-
tion focus, Study 3). Furthermore, we pinpointed for the first time the hedonic 
component (i.e., striatum, Study 1) of third-party altruistic decision-making, 
which was not taken into considerations in previous work. Given the key differ-
ence between tasks (i.e., our studies adopted an unfairness-based economic deci-
sion paradigm in which both the punishment and helping options were available; 
the studies mentioned above adopted the criminal justice judgment paradigm in 
which participants could only punish), our studies basically replicated the previ-
ous findings and further extended the neural network underlying altruistic deci-
sion in the third-party context.    
6.5 Implications for Applied Research  
In companies or organizbations, a very common phenomenon is employee mis-
treatment (e.g., the employee is paid much less than what he/she deserves, or is 
demoted or even replaced by another colleague who is less competent). Several 
applied studies focused on developing a theoretical model to explain and predict 
how the third parties would respond in real life (Skarlicki & Kulik, 2004; 
Skarlicki, et al., 2015; Zhu, Martens, & Aquino, 2012). Usually, these kinds of 
models tried to characterize all of the cognitive stages, from perception of the vio-
lation, evaluation and attribution, blame to final decisions to act, together with 
several factors that modulated the cognitive processing in each stage. From a very 
general perspective, our studies could inform such cognitive models by providing 
more details from measures at different levels of analysis (i.e., behavior, cogni-
tion, brain activation), and even suggested other possible cognitive or affective 
processes during this procedure. Moreover, our studies also highlight additional 
factors modulating a third party’s reaction that were not included in the models.  
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6.6 Future Directions 
 Content-Based Concerns 6.6.1
Although the present series of studies already investigated factors (i.e., empathic 
concern, oxytocin, and other-regarding attention) that are considered most likely 
to influence the third-party altruistic decision-making, there remain several varia-
bles that might affect people’s choice in this context.  
First, the cost ratio of the altruistic choice might influence a participant’s (as a 
third party) altruistic decision-making and its neural correlates. In the current se-
ries of studies, we inherited a cost ratio of 1:3 from the original study on third-
party punishment by Fehr & Fischbacher (2004), in which participants could ei-
ther take 3 MU off of the payoff of the offender, or increase by 3 MU the payoff 
to the victim by transferring 1 MU. The purpose of setting this cost ratio is to mo-
tivate more punishment behavior. However, this gives rise to another potential 
explanation for helping behavior, namely efficiency. Particularly, the motivation 
behind helping behaviors, with this cost ratio, might merely be to create more 
money for the victim or even for both sides (i.e., the victim as well as the third-
party decider him-/herself). There is already evidence showing that participants 
are less likely to punish (and even stopped punishing) the free-rider in a public 
game if the price of punishment is sufficiently expensive (i.e., from the condition 
of paying out 1 MU to decrease by 4 MU, to the condition of paying out 4 MU to 
decrease by 1 MU) (Carpenter, 2007). Thus, future studies might need to compare 
different cost ratios (e.g., cheap/equal/expensive cost ratio: 1:3/1:1/3:1) to further 
assess whether this influences both the choice behaviors and its neural correlates 
within the same paradigm. 
Second, the social link between the third-party deciders and the other two par-
ties might influence the decision and its neural correlates. In the current series of 
studies, all three parties are anonymous. We deliberately used such design to rule 
out other confounding factors in the original study. Recent studies have already 
shown that social relationship do affect third-party punishment behavior. For in-
stance, participants punished the out-group offender more harshly compared with 
the in-group offender (Schiller, et al., 2014). Such in-group bias in third-party 
punishment can even emerge at the age of 6 (Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 
2014). These evidences suggest that third-party helping choices might also be 
influenced by in-group bias or other related factors (e.g., ethnic group and degree 
of social distance, such as family members, friends, and strangers). 
Third, the intention behind the offender’s behavior might influence a third-
party decider’s choice and its neural correlates. In practice, a judge always passes 
the sentences involving different degrees of punishment to criminals, depending 
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on whether they committed the offense (e.g., causing a death) on purpose or by 
accident. Laboratory experiments also confirmed this commonsense finding, 
namely that participants rated offenders fully responsible for a crime as being both 
more blameworthy and deserving of greater punishment compared to those with 
diminished responsibility (Buckholtz, et al., 2015). With the third-party punish-
ment paradigm, another study replicated this finding by showing that participants 
as third-party deciders meted out stronger punishments to unfair dictators if their 
decisions were made by themselves in comparison with the non-intention condi-
tion, in which those decisions were randomly determined by the computer 
(Zhong, Chark, Hsu, & Chew, 2016). Thus it also might be interesting for future 
studies using the third-party task to take intention into account. 
Fourth, a post-hoc literature search showed that other personality traits besides 
empathic concern could also influence the altruistic decisions of bystanders. For 
example, justice sensitivity, a trait capturing the subjective readiness and strength 
in response to an injustice viewed from different perspectives (e.g., offender, vic-
tim, bystander, beneficiary) (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005), has also 
been shown to consistently predict third-party altruistic choices in similar unequal 
situations (Baumert, Schlösser, & Schmitt, 2014; Baumert & Schmitt, 2016; Lotz, 
Baumert, Schlösser, Gresser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011). Thus, future studies on this 
topic should also consider other personality traits as predictive measures.  
Last but not least, it would be valuable for future studies to investigate the dy-
namic learning procedure underlying a third-party decider’s choice, within a re-
peated game paradigm in which participants can alter their behavior and strategy 
based on the offender’s behavior. In the ultimatum game, a previous study adopted 
a norm-training paradigm showed how participant’s behavior changed in response 
to an unpredictable shift in norm (e.g., from advantageous inequality to equality), 
and also how the brain encodes such a learning process (Xiang, Lohrenz, & 
Montague, 2013). Although there might be difficulties in directly applying a simi-
lar procedure to the third-party paradigm, this should still be investigated in the 
future.  
 Methods-Based Concerns 6.6.2
6.6.2.1 The Approach of Computational Modelling 
As we mentioned in our previous studies, we always had to exclude 30% of, or 
even more, participants as they did not make enough altruistic choices (i.e., either 
help, punishment or both) to be used in the later fMRI analyses. To address this 
limitation, the easiest and the most straightforward solution is to recruit more par-
ticipants to maintain a big sample. However, such a solution is not always feasible 
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in practice, as it would entail investing more money in, and to prolonging, the 
project. 
Alternatively, this limitation could be partially solved or mitigated by taking a 
new approach to analyze the data, namely computational modelling. Simply 
speaking, computation modelling characterizes human cognition and information 
processing with the help of formal mathematical equations. The most important 
feature of this approach is that it can be used to generate more precise predictions, 
which can be further used to compare different hypotheses (Busemeyer & 
Diederich, 2010; Glimcher & Fehr, 2013).  In general, this approach consists of 
the following steps: designing a task, coming up with assumptions, building the 
computational model based on those hypotheses, and estimating model parame-
ters; if the goal of the study is to compare several competing models, then investi-
gators also need to quantitatively compare these models (Ahn, Haines, & Zhang, 
2016; Busemeyer & Diederich, 2010). Notably, all the response (or choice) data of 
a participant will be used to estimate the individual model parameters. This is 
quite different from the traditional approach, which is to categorize the data into 
different conditions based on the participant’s choice. In this regard, we suggest 
that computational modelling can take fuller advantage of the data than the tradi-
tional approach.   
Nowadays, the computational modelling approach is becoming more and more 
popular in combination with neuroscience techniques (esp. fMRI and EEG) to fill 
the knowledge gap regarding how, instead of what, our brain processes the infor-
mation and make decisions (Forstmann & Wagenmakers, 2015; O'Doherty, 
Hampton, & Kim, 2007). Applying this combination approach to patients with 
psychiatric disorders even resulted in the emerging field of computational psychi-
atry (Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan, 2012; Stephan & Mathys, 2014; X.-J. 
Wang & Krystal, 2014).   
Concerning third-party altruistic behavior, a recent fMRI study adopted this 
approach to investigate the neural and computational mechanism underlying third-
party punishment (Zhong, et al., 2016). Similar to the standard procedure, partici-
pants as third-party deciders were presented with an allocation choice between an 
offender and a victim (i.e., payoff of the offender/victim in MU: 50/50, 80/20, 
90/10, 100/0) and then decided how much they would like to spend, from their 
own endowment (i.e., 160 MU per round), to punish the offender at a high cost 
ratio (i.e., 1:5; investing 1 MU could decrease the offender’s endowment by 5 
MU). To further investigate how the brain computes the subjective utility of the 
punishment behavior, researchers adopted a modified inequality aversion model 
that incorporated the parameter to capture the aversion of the third-party decider 
for the inequality between the offender and the victim, which thus extended the 
traditional egoistic model of inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Using 
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the individual estimated parameter, they computed the subjective utility given the 
participant’s punishment amount in each round, and further found that it correlat-
ed with ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and right TPJ activation during 
decision-making in such a context, which provides insights into the origin of 
third-party punishment.  
Besides static utility maximization models, more recent studies have started to 
apply the dynamic sequential sampling model (SSM) or attention diffusion drift 
model (DDM), which not only consider the choice but also take the reaction time, 
as well as other process measures (e.g., eye-movements), into account (Bogacz, 
Wagenmakers, Forstmann, & Nieuwenhuis, 2010; Krajbich, et al., 2010; Ratcliff, 
Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016), with respect to the field of social decision-
making. For example, Krajbich and colleagues (2015) in a recent study, showed 
that the attentional DDM with model parameters based on a previous food choice 
task can accurately predict the choice and decision time in a series of social deci-
sion tasks (e.g., dictator game) for a totally different sample (Krajbich, Hare, 
Bartling, Morishima, & Fehr, 2015), suggesting a common cognitive mechanism 
between social and non-social decision-making. Another fMRI study also con-
firmed that the DDM can nicely fits with altruistic choice and the related decision-
making process in a binary dictator game. Moreover, this study first linked the 
model-predicted choice with the neural correlates (i.e., vmPFC and TPJ), which 
generated new insights into the nature of human altruism (Hutcherson, et al., 
2015). In sum, these findings showed the great potential to extend either static or 
dynamic models to the third-party context in the future. 
6.6.2.2 From GLM Analyses to Representational Analyses 
Traditional GLM analysis provides information describing how neural signals 
correlate with different cognitive states or experimental conditions. However, it is 
not very successful in directly revealing how psychological functions are repre-
sented in the brain. This limitation can be addressed by more recent representa-
tional analyses, which usually includes the following two types: multi-voxel pat-
tern analysis (MVPA) and representational similarity analysis (RSA) (Poldrack & 
Farah, 2015). To put it simply, MVPA, based on the principle of machine learning, 
is used to decode and categorize different psychological states from the activation 
patterns of different voxels (Haxby, 2012; Norman, et al., 2006). RSA aims to 
compare how the brain activation patterns differs from different stimuli or psycho-
logical states (Kriegeskorte, et al., 2008). These methods have been applied to 
several domains of cognitive neuroscience, such as visual perception (Bracci, 
Caramazza, & Peelen, 2015; Haxby et al., 2001) and memory (Lewis-Peacock & 
Norman, 2014; Xue et al., 2010). 
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Notably, a recent fMRI study, adopting a modified third-party legal justice 
paradigm and combining traditional general linear model (GLM) analysis and 
MVPA, showed that the right dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) could accu-
rately predict the punishment level of third parties, rather than the evaluation on 
degrees of either harmful consequence or intention of offender committing the 
crime, at the time of arriving at a punishment decision (Ginther, et al., 2016). The-
se MVPA-based findings clarified the unique role of the right DLPFC in third-
party punishment decisions, which avoids the problematic issue of interpretation, 
such as reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006), associated with GLM analyses. This 
study also paves the way for more future studies to apply the representational 
methods to the topic of third-party altruistic decision-making. 
6.6.2.3 Other Notes 
Other possible analysis approaches by using (functional) MRI data might benefit 
future studies on third-party altruistic decision-making. For example, effective 
connectivity methods, such as dynamic causal modeling (Karl Friston, et al., 
2003), can be used to investigate how information is processed by different re-
gions sensitive to different types of decision (e.g., help or punishment) or experi-
mental conditions, from a network perspective. Moreover, structural imaging 
methods, such as voxel-based morphometry (VBM) (Ashburner & Friston, 2000) 
and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) (Le Bihan et al., 2001), could be adopted, to-
gether with computational modelling, to reveal the link between the anatomical 
basis of individual difference in choice preferences in the third-party context.    
Beyond (functional) MRI, it is also possible to use other techniques to investi-
gate the same research question from different perspectives. An interesting ques-
tion would be as follows: when does the brain show the first sign of making an 
altruistic decision in the third-party context? This could be answered via the time-
sensitive EEG technique. Last but by no means the least, future studies could also 
try to find the genetic basis of third-party altruistic decision-making and further 
reveal its link to the neural correlates measured via the above techniques. 
6.7 Conclusion 
Let us return to our original research question: Why do (some) third parties inter-
vene at self-cost when they face a situation in which the social norm is violated 
and their own interests are not even affected? What factors might influence their 
choices in such situations? By adopting a behavioral economics paradigm in com-
bination with neuroscience techniques (esp. fMRI and eye-tracking), the studies 
included in the current dissertation try to provide potential answers (or at least 
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some helpful insights) to these questions by integrating multiple levels of analysis 
(i.e., behavior, cognitive and neural levels). Together with the existing literature, 
we hope that the findings of the above-mentioned studies could shed some light 
on the underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms of third-party altruistic deci-
sion-making. However, it is always necessary to bear in mind the limitations of 
these studies, with respect to the design and analysis. Although there is still a long 
way to go to unveil the mysteries of third-party altruistic decision-making and 
human altruism, future studies will be promising with better designs and advanced 
methodologies. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1. All items in the IRI 
No. Subscale Content Answer Scale 
1 FS I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things 
that might happen to me. 
0---1---2---3---4 
2 EC I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortu-
nate than me. 
0---1---2---3---4 
3 PT I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other 
guy's" point of view.* 
0---1---2---3---4 
4 EC Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they 
are having problems.* 
0---1---2---3---4 
5 FS I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a 
novel. 
0---1---2---3---4 
6 PD In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. 0---1---2---3---4 
7 FS I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I 
don't often get completely caught up in it.* 
0---1---2---3---4 
8 PT I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I 
make a decision. 
0---1---2---3---4 
9 EC When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of 
protective towards them. 
0---1---2---3---4 
10 PD I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very 
emotional situation. 
0---1---2---3---4 
11 PT I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining 
how things look from their perspective. 
0---1---2---3---4 
12 FS Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is 
somewhat rare for me.* 
0---1---2---3---4 
13 PD When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm.* 0---1---2---3---4 
14 EC Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great 
deal.* 
0---1---2---3---4 
15 PT If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time 
listening to other people's arguments.* 
0---1---2---3---4 
16 FS After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one 
of the characters. 
0---1---2---3---4 
17 PD Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 0---1---2---3---4 
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Note: 0 refers to ―does not describe me well‖, 4 refers to ―describes me very well‖. * refers to 
reverse-scored items. IRI includes 28 items in total and is consisted of four subscales with 7 items 
respectively. IRI refers to interpersonal reactivity index; PT refers to perspective-taking; FS refers 
to fantasy; EC refers to empathic concern; PD refers to personal distress. 
  
    
18 EC When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't 
feel very much pity for them.* 
0---1---2---3---4 
19 PD I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies.* 0---1---2---3---4 
20 EC I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 0---1---2---3---4 
21 PT I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to 
look at them both. 
0---1---2---3---4 
22 EC I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 0---1---2---3---4 
23 FS When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in 
the place of a leading character. 
0---1---2---3---4 
24 PD I tend to lose control during emergencies. 0---1---2---3---4 
25 PT When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his 
shoes" for a while. 
0---1---2---3---4 
26 FS When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine 
how I would feel if the events in the story were happening to 
me. 
0---1---2---3---4 
27 PD When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, 
I go to pieces. 
0---1---2---3---4 
28 PT Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would 
feel if I were in their place. 
0---1---2---3---4 
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Appendix Table 2. Stimuli used in the fMRI task (Study 3) 
Block No. Offer Type Payoff 
  Offender Victim 
1 fair 4.53 4.47 
1 unfair 6.83 3.17 
1 unfair 6.98 2.02 
1 unfair 7.94 1.06 
1 unfair 8.00 2.00 
1 unfair 8.04 2.96 
1 unfair 8.92 2.08 
1 unfair 9.19 0.81 
2 fair 5.00 5.00 
2 unfair 6.98 3.03 
2 unfair 7.17 1.83 
2 unfair 7.98 1.02 
2 unfair 8.02 1.98 
2 unfair 8.11 2.89 
2 unfair 8.97 2.03 
2 unfair 9.02 0.98 
3 fair 5.55 5.45 
3 unfair 6.81 2.19 
3 unfair 6.84 3.16 
3 unfair 7.96 3.04 
3 unfair 8.07 0.93 
3 unfair 8.16 1.84 
3 unfair 9.01 1.99 
3 unfair 9.03 0.97 
4 fair 5.53 5.47 
4 unfair 6.89 3.11 
4 unfair 7.04 1.96 
4 unfair 7.86 2.14 
4 unfair 8.03 0.97 
4 unfair 8.09 2.91 
4 unfair 8.83 2.17 
4 unfair 8.89 1.11 
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5 fair 4.54 4.46 
5 unfair 6.97 3.04 
5 unfair 7.10 1.90 
5 unfair 7.91 2.09 
5 unfair 7.92 1.08 
5 unfair 8.20 2.80 
5 unfair 8.99 1.01 
5 unfair 9.13 1.87 
6 fair 5.01 4.99 
6 unfair 7.01 2.99 
6 unfair 7.14 1.86 
6 unfair 7.82 1.18 
6 unfair 8.13 1.87 
6 unfair 8.18 2.82 
6 unfair 8.82 1.18 
6 unfair 9.19 1.81 
7 fair 5.50 5.50 
7 unfair 6.85 3.15 
7 unfair 6.97 2.03 
7 unfair 7.88 3.12 
7 unfair 7.94 2.06 
7 unfair 8.17 0.83 
7 unfair 8.99 2.01 
7 unfair 9.13 0.87 
8 fair 5.03 4.97 
8 unfair 7.11 2.89 
8 unfair 7.11 1.89 
8 unfair 7.89 2.11 
8 unfair 8.06 0.94 
8 unfair 8.17 2.83 
8 unfair 8.87 2.13 
8 unfair 8.97 1.03 
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9 fair 5.04 4.96 
9 unfair 6.89 2.11 
9 unfair 7.16 2.84 
9 unfair 7.90 3.10 
9 unfair 7.98 2.02 
9 unfair 8.14 0.86 
9 unfair 8.82 2.18 
9 unfair 9.01 0.99 
10 fair 5.51 5.49 
10 unfair 6.90 2.10 
10 unfair 7.09 2.91 
10 unfair 7.83 1.17 
10 unfair 7.93 2.07 
10 unfair 8.16 2.84 
10 unfair 8.84 2.16 
10 unfair 9.14 0.86 
11 fair 4.55 4.45 
11 unfair 7.05 1.95 
11 unfair 7.05 2.95 
11 unfair 7.95 2.05 
11 unfair 8.10 2.90 
11 unfair 8.12 0.88 
11 unfair 8.84 1.16 
11 unfair 9.04 1.96 
12 fair 5.05 4.95 
12 unfair 6.93 2.07 
12 unfair 7.12 2.88 
12 unfair 7.90 1.10 
12 unfair 8.03 2.97 
12 unfair 8.12 1.88 
12 unfair 9.10 1.90 
12 unfair 9.17 0.83 
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13 fair 4.50 4.50 
13 unfair 6.86 2.14 
13 unfair 6.94 3.07 
13 unfair 7.81 1.19 
13 unfair 7.89 3.11 
13 unfair 8.05 1.95 
13 unfair 9.09 0.91 
13 unfair 9.09 1.91 
14 fair 5.02 4.98 
14 unfair 7.00 2.00 
14 unfair 7.13 2.87 
14 unfair 7.96 1.04 
14 unfair 8.05 2.95 
14 unfair 8.17 1.83 
14 unfair 8.90 1.10 
14 unfair 9.12 1.88 
15 fair 4.52 4.48 
15 unfair 7.13 1.87 
15 unfair 7.18 2.82 
15 unfair 7.86 1.14 
15 unfair 7.99 3.01 
15 unfair 8.18 1.82 
15 unfair 8.87 1.13 
15 unfair 8.88 2.12 
16 fair 4.51 4.49 
16 unfair 6.96 2.04 
16 unfair 7.19 2.81 
16 unfair 7.82 2.18 
16 unfair 8.00 3.00 
16 unfair 8.02 0.98 
16 unfair 9.16 0.84 
16 unfair 9.20 1.80 
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17 fair 5.54 5.46 
17 unfair 7.15 2.85 
17 unfair 7.19 1.81 
17 unfair 7.84 3.16 
17 unfair 7.97 1.03 
17 unfair 8.20 1.80 
17 unfair 9.05 1.95 
17 unfair 9.08 0.92 
18 fair 5.52 5.48 
18 unfair 6.96 3.04 
18 unfair 7.09 1.91 
18 unfair 7.82 3.18 
18 unfair 7.88 2.12 
18 unfair 7.95 1.05 
18 unfair 8.88 1.12 
18 unfair 9.18 1.82 
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Appendix Table 3. Offer combinations shown for the on-line part of the experiment (Study 4) 
Block No.  Options used in  
the eye-tracking study  
 Alternative option 
  Offender Victim  Offender Victim 
1  4.14 1.99  1.03 1.03 
1  3.88 2.87  0.88 0.88 
1  4.98 2.89  1.11 1.11 
1  4.94 3.94  0.97 0.97 
1  6.13 2.84  1.20 1.20 
1  6.10 3.97  1.03 1.03 
1  6.18 5.10  0.90 0.90 
1  6.82 4.15  1.02 1.02 
1  7.18 4.93  0.96 0.96 
1  8.18 4.16  1.12 1.12 
1  6.87 6.14  0.97 0.97 
1  8.02 4.82  1.10 1.10 
1  8.04 6.00  1.16 1.16 
1  8.91 4.92  0.85 0.85 
1  4.92 0.83  0.88 0.88 
1  4.88 2.11  1.09 1.09 
1  6.13 1.00  1.08 1.08 
1  6.02 1.93  1.08 1.08 
1  6.88 1.08  1.14 1.14 
1  7.05 1.95  1.08 1.08 
1  7.95 1.05  1.09 1.09 
1  6.97 2.93  0.85 0.85 
1  8.11 2.03  0.91 0.91 
1  8.83 0.86  0.98 0.98 
1  8.16 3.18  0.92 0.92 
1  9.12 1.87  1.18 1.18 
1  8.90 2.86  0.85 0.85 
1  9.11 3.88  1.01 1.01 
1  3.18 3.18  0.84 0.84 
1  4.17 4.17  1.09 1.09 
1  5.00 5.00  0.90 0.90 
1  6.07 6.07  1.05 1.05 
1  6.87 6.87  1.04 1.04 
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2  4.05 2.10  1.14 1.14 
2  4.03 2.98  0.93 0.93 
2  5.02 3.17  1.16 1.16 
2  5.06 3.86  1.18 1.18 
2  5.90 2.87  1.07 1.07 
2  5.97 4.11  0.82 0.82 
2  6.05 4.85  0.87 0.87 
2  6.97 4.08  0.81 0.81 
2  7.17 4.87  1.13 1.13 
2  8.14 3.91  1.09 1.09 
2  7.12 5.94  0.99 0.99 
2  7.88 5.10  1.03 1.03 
2  7.92 6.18  0.96 0.96 
2  8.92 5.10  0.82 0.82 
2  5.03 0.94  1.09 1.09 
2  5.06 2.08  0.94 0.94 
2  6.08 0.82  1.06 1.06 
2  5.83 1.94  1.03 1.03 
2  7.11 0.80  0.99 0.99 
2  7.14 2.18  1.16 1.16 
2  8.14 1.00  0.94 0.94 
2  6.90 2.96  0.87 0.87 
2  7.87 2.05  1.15 1.15 
2  9.08 1.16  1.15 1.15 
2  8.10 2.99  0.82 0.82 
2  9.12 1.83  1.19 1.19 
2  8.84 2.88  0.88 0.88 
2  8.89 4.07  1.04 1.04 
2  3.09 3.09  1.00 1.00 
2  3.84 3.84  0.85 0.85 
2  4.86 4.86  1.18 1.18 
2  6.02 6.02  1.14 1.14 
2  6.84 6.84  1.01 1.01 
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3  3.81 1.94  1.09 1.09 
3  4.14 2.92  0.97 0.97 
3  5.13 3.14  0.95 0.95 
3  5.03 3.90  0.87 0.87 
3  5.80 2.82  0.82 0.82 
3  5.92 3.98  1.01 1.01 
3  5.83 5.10  1.16 1.16 
3  6.81 3.89  1.02 1.02 
3  7.20 4.99  0.87 0.87 
3  7.86 4.02  0.94 0.94 
3  7.06 6.17  0.85 0.85 
3  7.86 5.02  1.11 1.11 
3  7.95 5.90  0.94 0.94 
3  8.86 4.85  1.19 1.19 
3  4.93 0.88  1.14 1.14 
3  4.90 2.12  0.88 0.88 
3  5.98 1.13  0.87 0.87 
3  6.19 2.09  1.10 1.10 
3  7.01 0.92  0.98 0.98 
3  7.20 1.89  1.12 1.12 
3  7.95 1.09  1.09 1.09 
3  7.12 2.94  1.08 1.08 
3  8.02 2.09  0.98 0.98 
3  8.97 1.02  1.11 1.11 
3  7.85 3.05  1.04 1.04 
3  8.89 1.86  1.06 1.06 
3  8.93 3.02  1.08 1.08 
3  8.91 3.92  1.20 1.20 
3  2.85 2.85  0.91 0.91 
3  4.09 4.09  1.01 1.01 
3  5.05 5.05  0.85 0.85 
3  5.85 5.85  0.82 0.82 
3  7.04 7.04  1.04 1.04 
Note: Stimuli blocks are randomly assigned to the three attention conditions across participants. 
Namely, for stimuli sets of block 1, it can either be used as stimuli of BB, OB or VB for different 
participants. Same logic fits for the other two blocks. 
